( > c \ h ■ 7 A 

i:  .V  •»>  H i.-v.  i;  a 


: 


■ ' ’ SI 


FI  23  4 

*F7 1 


Section 


% 


t 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/carranzamexico00forn_0 


CARRANZA  AND  MEXICO 


\ 


DON  VENUSTIANO  CARRANZA 
AND  GENERAL  I.  L.  PESQUEIRA 

First  Chief  and  Minister  of  War 


CARRANZA  AND  . 


MEXICO 


/O” 


* >*/ 


BY 

CARLO  DE  FORNARO 


APR  30  191 

V/V  A 

,,,,,, 

cfCAl 


[WITH  CHAPTERS  BY  COLONEL  I.  C. 
ENRIQUEZ,  CHARLES  FERGUSON  AND 
M.  C.  ROLLAND] 


NEW  YORK  ' MITCHELL  KENNERLEY  ' 1915 


CD 


COPYRIGHT,  I915,  BY 
MITCHELL  KENNERLEY 


PRINTED  IN  AMERICA 


TO 

PRESIDENT  WOODROW  WILSON 
who  discovered 
real  Mexico  to  the  Americans 


\ 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I The  Life  of  Don  Venustiano  Carranza  9 

II  Conditions  in  Mexico  During  Diaz’  Regime  34 

III  The  Madero  Revolution,  Its  Aims  and  Fail- 

ures 50 

IV  Plotting  Which  Overthrew  Madero  60 

V  Huerta  in  Power.  The  Landing  of  American 

Marines  in  Vera  Cruz  77 

VI  Financial  Organization  of  the  Revolution  86 

VII  Civil  Organization  of  the  Revolution  96 

VIII  Diplomatic  Work  in  Washington  99 

IX  The  Constitutionalists  in  Paris  102 

X  Investigation  Work  in  the  United  States.  By 

M.  C.  Rolland  106 

XI  General  Outline  of  Campaign  Against  Huerta  114 

XII  Campaign  of  General  Obregon  in  the  West. 

By  Col.  I.  C.  Enriquez  118 

XIII  Villa  and  His  Campaign  in  the  North  132 

XIV  Campaign  of  Gen.  Gonzalez  in  the  East  142 

XV  Zapata  and  His  Campaign  in  the  South  146 

XVI  One  Hundred  Years’  Struggle  for  Land  and 

Democracy  against  Clericalism  157 

XVII  Attempts  at  the  Solution  of  the  Land  Question  166 

XVIII  Behind  the  Scenes  of  the  Carranza-Villa  Im- 
broglio 176 

XIX  The  Need  of  a Democratic  Finance  in  Mexico. 

By  C.  Ferguson  184 

XX  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Carranza  192 

XXI  President  Wilson’s  Mexican  Policy  205 

Reflections  214 

Appendix  219 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


Don  Venustiano  Carranza  and  General  I.  L. 


Pesqueira 

Frontispiece 

FACING  PAGE 

Don  Rafael  Zubaran  Capmany 

99 

Modesto  C.  Rolland 

106 

War  Map  of  Mexico 

114 

General  Alvaro  Obregon 

1 18 

General  S.  Alvarado 

132 

General  Pablo  Gonzalez 

142 

General  Benjamin  Hill 

176 

CHAPTER  I 


LIFE  OF  CARRANZA 


T)ON  VENUSTIANO  CARRANZA! 

Who  is  this  man,  practically  unknown  to 
the  American  public  a year  and  a half  ago,  who  with 
the  help  of  the  Mexican  Constitutionalists,  over- 
threw the  most  cynical,  murderous,  grafting  and 
powerful  military  dictatorship  that  ever  existed  in 
Mexico  ? 

Concentration  of  power  in  Mexico  City,  the  sup- 
port of  the  foreigners,  of  the  church,  the  bankers, 
the  landowners,  the  militarists,  of  foreign  bankers 
and  most  foreign  nations,  with  the  exception  of  the 
United  States  Government,  were  at  the  disposal  of 
General  Huerta  and  his  regime,  but  Carranza  and 
the  Constitutionalists  eliminated'  this  nefarious  rule 
after  eighteen  months  of  unbroken  victories,  sweep- 
ing finally  into  Mexico  City  in  a peaceful,  orderly 
manner. 

The  American  public  is  beginning  to  realize  that 
such  a thorough  victory  could  never  have  been 
achieved  without  a popular  movement,  directed  by 
a fearless,  statesmanlike  chief. 

Venustiano  Carranza,  with  the  exception  of  Don 
Fernando  Iglesias  Calderon,  is  the  oldest  of  all  the 
Constitutionalists,  who  have  fought  for  the  last  year 


io  Carranza  and  Mexico 

and  a half,  with  every  means  in  their  power,  against 
the  rule  of  General  Huerta  and  his  governmental 
camorra. 

Don  Venustiano  Carranza  was  born  in  the  State 
of  Coahuila  in  1859,  and  is  therefore,  fifty-five  years 
old.  In  spite  of  the  assertion  of  one  of  the  corre- 
spondents who  interviewed  him  six  months  ago  for 
the  Metropolitan  magazine,  Mr.  John  Reed,  we 
claim  that  Carranza  is  anything  but  a “ senile  old 
man,”  for  he  rode  over  1,500  miles  on  horseback, 
through  the  States  of  Nuevo  Leon,  Coahuila,  Du- 
rango, Chihuahua  and  Sonora,  visiting  the  military 
camps,  organizing  all  the  state  and  federal  govern- 
ments, and  finally  settling  down  in  Hermosillo,  State 
of  Sonora,  as  his  capital.  Later,  after  Torreon 
had  been  captured  from  the  Federals,  Carranza  with 
his  staff  and  soldiers  again  crossed  the  State  of 
Sonora  into  Chihuahua  on  horseback,  a distance  of 
nearly  300  miles. 

We  must  admit  that  unless  Carranza  had  lived  a 
greater  part  of  his  life  on  his  farm,  he  would  not 
have  been  able  to  stand  the  hardships  and  rigors 
of  that  famous  ride. 

His  mental  training  was  that  of  a lawyer,  for  he 
studied  in  the  schools  of  Coahuila  and  finished  his 
law  course  in  Mexico  City. 

A certain  weakness  of  the  eyesight  prevented  him 
from  practising  law,  so  he  retired  on  his  farm,  dedi- 
cating his  time  to  improving  his  “ hacienda  ” and 
studying  history  and  political  economy. 


II 


Life  of  Carranza 

Like  the  President  of  the  United  States,  Carranza 
is  one  of  the  greatest  authorities  on  the  history  of 
his  own  country. 

Just  as  all  student-statesmen,  Carranza  is  the 
type  of  man  which  makes  no  direct  appeal  to  the 
imagination  of  the  public  by  a strenuous,  romantic 
life  — it  is  the  quiet,  clear,  thinking,  organizing 
brain  which  creates,  commands  and  achieves,  without 
the  blaze  of  trumpets,  or  the  help  of  well-salaried 
press-agents. 

One  incident  in  his  life  stands  out  glaringly  like 
a solitary  facet  of  a diamond  struck  by  sunlight. 
Very  few  Mexicans,  and  it  can  be  safely  said  even 
a lesser  number  of  Americans,  know  that  Carranza 
was  the  only  man  who  started  a local  revolution 
against  General  Diaz,  during  the  rule  from  1876 
to  1910,  and  succeeded;  — that  is  to  say,  continued 
to  live  in  Mexico,  without  sacrificing  his  life  to  his 
bold  attempt. 

This  strange  and  seemingly  incomprehensible  in- 
cident happened  in  the  year  1893,  when  Don  Venus- 
tiano  was  only  thirty-four  years  old. 

At  that  time  there  ruled  over  the  State  of  Coa- 
huila  a governor  named  Garza  Galan.  With  the 
exception  of  Mucio  Martinez  and  General  Cravi- 
oto,  he  was  the  worst  governor  in  Mexico.  Garza 
Galan  used  his  great  power  to  rob,  expropriate 
lands  by  all  manner  of  tricks  and  stratagems,  im- 
prison, kill  those  who  stood  in  his  way,  and  went 
so  far  as  to  kidnap  respectable  girls. 


12 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


Everybody  expected  that  Garza  Galan  would  be 
eliminated  after  his  two  years  of  governorship,  but 
when  it  was  discovered  that  Romero  Rubio  stood 
sponsor  for  another  two  years  of  Garza  Galan  as 
Governor  of  Coahuila,  the  inhabitants  of  that  State 
were  in  utter  dismay  and  protested  to  the  President. 

At  that  time  Romero  Rubio,  the  father-in-law  of 
President  Diaz,  was  one  of  his  closest  advisers. 
He  is  the  originator  of  the  party  which  later  was 
called  the  “ Cientifico  ” party,  and  of  which  Liman- 
tour  became  the  successor. 

As  Romero  Rubio  insisted  on  the  candidacy  of 
Garza  Galan  for  a second  term,  and  as  protests 
were  of  no  avail  with  General  Diaz,  Don  Venusti- 
ano  Carranza  arose  in  arms  with  the  assistance  of 
his  brother,  Don  Emilio,  and  started  on  the  war- 
path against  Garza  Galan.  General  Diaz  sent 
some  federal  troops  to  quell  the  revolt,  but  Don 
Venustiano  and  his  brother  took  particular  care  to 
avoid  coming  into  armed  conflict  with  the  federal 
troops,  while  they  attacked  Garza  Galan’s  state 
troops  and  defeated  them  repeatedly.  This  strange, 
three-cornered  fight  lasted  longer  than  was  ex- 
pected; very  soon,  other  wiser  counsellors  of  Gen- 
eral Diaz  pointed  out  to  him  that  a continuation  of 
this  armed  revolt  might  communicate  itself  to  the 
other  border  States  with  disastrous  effects  to  the 
Federal  Government.  General  Diaz  then  recalled 
the  candidacy  of  Garza  Galan,  and  it  was  trans- 
formed into  the  one  of  Senor  Musquiz. 


i3 


Life  of  Carranza 

Peace  followed,  but  strangest  of  all,  was  the  im- 
munity of  Venustiano  Carranza  and  his  brother  to 
persecutions  and  attempts  on  their  lives. 

Carranza  was  not  a novice  in  the  politics  of  his 
country;  he  served  as  a member  of  the  legislature 
of  his  native  State,  as  Senator  of  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment in  Mexico  City  and  even  as  a governor  of 
his  State. 

Maybe  the  wily  old  dictator,  Don  Porfirio  Diaz, 
made  a mistake  in  the  case  of  Carranza.  For  six- 
teen years  after  the  revolt  against  Garza  Galan, 
Carranza  gave  further  proof  of  his  strength  of 
character,  by  accepting  the  gubernatorial  candidacy 
offered  to  him  by  the  people  of  Coahuila  and  re- 
fusing to  renounce  it  in  the  face  of  the  opposition 
of  the  “ cientifico  ” group  in  Mexico  City,  because 
Carranza  stood  for  the  candidacy  of  General  Reyes 
as  Vice-President,  as  against  Ramon  Corral  who 
was  the  Mephisto  of  the  “ cientifico  ” party. 

The  answer  of  Carranza  to  the  emissary  of  Diaz, 
who  suggested  the  advisability  of  his  refusal  to  run 
for  Governor,  was  as  follows:  “ Tell  General  Diaz, 
that  as  long  as  there  is  a single  person,  who  will 
propose  and  work  in  favor  of  my  candidacy,  I shall 
not  renounce  it,  and  I shall  accept  all  the  conse- 
quences of  my  conduct.” 

After  such  an  unequivocal  answer,  everybody  ex- 
pected that  either  the  door  of  the  penitentiary  would 
close  upon  the  bold  candidate,  or  that  he  would  mys- 


14 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


teriously  disappear,  in  accordance  with  the  policy  of 
General  Diaz. 

What  saved  Carranza  from  either  of  these  fates, 
was  the  publicity  given  to  this  incident  in  the  Amer- 
ican press,  especially  a letter  of  protest  against  the 
meeting  which  was  to  take  place  in  El  Paso,  be- 
tween General  Diaz  and  President  Taft.  The  pas- 
sage referring  to  this  incident  says: 

“ Even  as  I write  these  lines,  the  report  is  wired 
from  Mexico  that  General  Diaz  has  ordered  the  de- 
mission  of  the  Governor  of  Coahuila,  as  the  latter 
showed  a marked  tendency  in  favor  of  General 
Reyes’  candidacy.  Imagine  the  Republican  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  asking  for  the  resignation 
of  Governor  Johnson  of  Minnesota,  because  of  his 
democratic  leanings.”  1 

It  is  quite  logical  that  a man  of  the  stamp  of 
Carranza  should  view  with  great  interest  the  move- 
ment which  culminated  in  the  overthrow  of  General 
Diaz  in  191 1. 

Francisco  I.  Madero  wrote  his  famous  book 
“The  Presidential  Succession  of  1910,”  and  pub- 
lished it  in  San  Pedro,  Coahuila,  in  December,  1908. 

F.  I.  Madero,  because  of  his  innocence  or  his 
fearlessness,  tried  to  create  a working  candidacy, 
with  himself  as  presidential  candidate  and  Dr.  Vas- 
quez  Gomez  as  Vice-President,  in  opposition  to 
General  Diaz  and  Ramon  Corral.  There  was  how- 
ever no  intention  of  rising  to  arms  against  the  gov- 

1 Full  text  of  letter  will  be  found  in  Index. 


i5 


Life  of  Carranza 

ernment  of  Diaz,  but  the  policy  of  the  President 
made  the  opposing  candidate  realize  the  futility  of 
his  efforts. 

F.  I.  Madero  was  placed  in  jail  twice  for  his  dar- 
ing, and  after  the  second  time,  he  was  informed  that 
a third  imprisonment  would  mean  his  complete  elim- 
ination. Madero  took  the  tip,  and  fled  to  San 
Antonio,  Texas.  The  slogan  of  the  Madero  revo- 
lution was  “ Effective  suffrage  and  no  re-election  ” 
and  not,  as  many  Americans  believe,  “ the  land  ques- 
tion.” 

If  any  one  will  take  the  trouble  to  peruse  the  long 
document  of  San  Luis  Potosi,  of  October  5th,  1910, 
signed  F.  I.  Madero,  which  contains  2,500  words, 
it  will  be  noticed  that  the  land  question  takes  up 
very  little  space,  in  comparison  to  the  rest  of  the 
Plan.2 

General  Carranza  never  hesitated  for  one  mo- 
ment, and  was  soon  over  the  border  to  join  Madero, 
and  formed  part  of  his  revolutionary  junta.  He 
was  appointed  chief  of  the  Military  Division  of  the 
States  of  Coahuila,  Nuevo  Leon  and  Tamaulipas, 
and  later  Secretary  of  War  in  the  provisional  cab- 
inet of  F.  I.  Madero. 

The  premature  cessation  of  hostilities  and  the  in- 
stallation of  the  clerical  candidate,  L.  de  la  Barra, 
was  strenuously  opposed  by  Carranza,  who  said  to 
F.  I.  Madero,  “ You  are  delivering  to  the  reac- 

2 Full  text  of  the  Plan  of  San  Luis  Potosi  will  be  found  in 
Index. 


1 6 Carranza  and  Mexico 

tionaries  a dead  revolution,  which  will  have  to  be 
fought  over  again.”  These  prophetic  words  were 
not  heeded,  so  Don  Venustiano  went  back  to  his 
native  State,  and  calmly  awaited  the  course  of 
events,  while  he  offered  himself  as  a candidate  and 
was  elected  as  Governor  of  Coahuila. 

One  of  the  accusations  which  was  published  in  the 
American  papers  by  the  Huerta  press  agents  was 
that  F.  I.  Madero,  as  President,  had  sent  several 
hundred  thousand  dollars  to  Governor  Carranza, 
for  the  purpose  of  arming  and  increasing  the  state 
militia  against  the  Orozco  rebellion.  About  the 
time  of  the  overthrow  of  F.  I.  Madero,  Don  Venus- 
tiano had  been  supposedly  asked  to  give  an  account- 
ing of  the  expenditure  of  the  money  furnished  from 
Mexico  City.  As  he  could  not  account  for  it,  it 
was  said,  he  had  decided  to  start  a revolution  against 
President  Madero.  When  the  Huerta  treachery 
took  place  and  Madero  was  murdered,  Carranza 
took  the  opportunity  to  rebel  against  the  provi- 
sional presidency  of  General  Huerta. 

This  story  may  sound  plausible  to  the  Huerta 
type  of  man,  but  the  facts  in  the  case  dispose  of  it. 
A few  months  before  the  plot  which  overthrew  Ma- 
dero, Don  Venustiano  Carranza  paid  a visit  to  the 
President.  His  watchful  eyes  and  ears  detected  a 
very  complicated  net  of  plots  and  counterplots  brew- 
ing against  Madero.  The  President  did  not  believe 
that  there  were  any  plots,  and  doubted  any  one’s 


17 


Life  of  Carranza 

ability  to  overthrow  him.  Carranza  went  back  to 
his  State  and  communicated  his  suspicions  to  a few 
intimate  friends.  As  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  re- 
lease of  Felix  Diaz  and  General  Reyes  from  their 
jails,  he  at  once  sent  several  hundred  of  the  Coa- 
huila  volunteers  to  the  assistance  of  Madero.  They 
took  part  in  the  assault  against  the  citadel,  and  the 
reason  why  General  Huerta  lingered  so  long  before 
turning  traitor  is  now  clear. 

Besides  the  Coahuila  riflemen,  there  were  several 
hundred  Madero  volunteers  who  were  loyal  to  the 
President.  General  Huerta  could  not  arrest  Ma- 
dero and  Suarez,  and  make  peace  with  Felix  Diaz 
until  the  loyal  Madero  troops  had  been  eliminated. 

So  he  cautiously  kept  his  own  federal  regiments 
back,  and  sent  the  Madero  volunteers  and  the  Coa- 
huila riflemen  to  charge  the  citadel,  manned  by  ma- 
chine guns,  in  close  formation.  The  Coahuila  vol- 
unteers who  were  mostly  mounted,  and  numbered 
about  1,150,  bravely  attacked  the  guns,  but  none  of 
them  came  back  alive;  the  same  happened  to  the 
Madero  volunteers. 

As  soon  as  Huerta  had  disposed  of  the  volun- 
teers, he  made  his  peace  with  Felix  Diaz.  What 
remained  of  the  Madero  and  Coahuila  volunteers 
fled  to  the  standard  of  Zapata  after  Huerta  came 
into  power. 

On  the  1 8 th  of  February,  1913,  Madero  and 
Suarez  were  arrested  by  order  of  General  Huerta. 


1 8 Carranza  and  Mexico 

On  the  19th  of  February  all  Mexico  had  heard  the 
fateful  news,  and  nobody  doubted  the  outcome  of 
the  imprisonment. 

Don  Venustiano  Carranza  never  hesitated  one 
hour,  one  minute;  he  convened  at  once  the  legisla- 
ture of  the  State  of  Coahuila,  and  the  following 
decree  was  the  result: 

Venustiano  Carranza,  Constitutional  Governor  of  the  free 
and  Sovereign  State  of  Coahuila  of  Zaragoza,  informs  its 
inhabitants:  That  the  Congress  of  the  State  has  decreed 

the  following: 

The  Constitutional  Congress  of  the  free,  independent  and 
sovereign  State  of  Coahuila  of  Zaragoza  decrees: 

No.  1421:  Article  1. 

We  disavow  General  Victoriano  Huerta  in  his  character 
of  chief  of  the  Executive  power  of  the  Republic,  which  he 
claims  was  conferred  to  him  by  the  Senate,  and  we  like- 
wise disown  all  the  acts  and  resolutions  which  he  may  dic- 
tate under  such  authority. 

Article  11.  Extraordinary  powers  are  transmitted  to  the 
Executive  of  this  State  in  all  the  branches  of  Public  Ad- 
ministration, so  that  he  may  suppress  what  he  may  deem 
convenient  and  that  he  shall  proceed  by  the  force  of  arms 
to  sustain  the  Constitutionalist  order  of  the  Republic. 

To  arouse  the  Governments  of  the  other  States  and  the 
Chiefs  of  the  Federal,  Rural  and  Auxiliary  Forces,  so  that 
they  may  assist  the  stand  taken  by  the  Governor  of  this 
State. 

Decreed  in  the  room  of  the  Congress  of  the  State,  in 
Saltillo,  on  the  19th  of  February,  1913.  A.  Barrera,  Presi- 


Life  of  Carranza  19 

dent  of  the  Legislature.  J.  Sanchez  Herrera,  Secretary. 
Gabriel  Calzada,  Secretary. 

Let  this  be  printed,  communicated  and  observed. 

V.  Carranza. 

E.  Garza  Perez, 

Secretary. 

Saltillo,  19  de  Febrero  de  1913. 

After  the  imprisonment  of  President  Madero 
and  Vice-President  Suarez  in  February,  1913,  a year 
and  a half  ago,  there  were  twenty-seven  governors 
in  Mexico,  who  had  the  same  opportunity  to  pro- 
test against  the  usurper  Huerta,  and  refuse  to  recog- 
nize his  “ coup  d’etat,”  his  dictatorship  and  his  cow- 
ardly murders.  None  of  the  governors  dared  pro- 
test. Had  all  the  governors  in  Mexico  arisen  to- 
gether with  their  legislatures  and  refused  to  recog- 
nize the  authority  of  the  czar  in  Mexico,  Huerta 
with  all  his  money,  all  his  soldiers,  all  his  greed  and 
ruthlessness,  could  not  have  lasted  more  than  three 
months. 

Don  Venustiano  Carranza  was  the  only  governor 
in  Mexico  who  had  the  audacity  and  patriotism  to 
challenge  the  great  pirate  in  Mexico  City,  who  had 
raised  the  black  flag  with  the  skull  and  the  cross 
bones  over  the  national  palace. 

The  chiefs  of  the  States  were  too  terrorized, 
cowed  and  frozen  by  the  brutality,  the  cynicism,  the 
power  of  the  man  in  the  provisional  presidency,  and 
were  aghast  at  the  suddenness  of  the  events  which 


20 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


led  to  Madero’s  downfall.  They  had  not  found  out 
what  had  happened  behind  the  scenes,  the  horror 
of  the  events  and  their  natural  consequence  had  not 
dawned  upon  their  paralyzed  minds.  Carranza  as 
a real  leader  and  chief  never  faltered  an  instant. 
Those  are  the  rare  and  precious  moments  which 
create  the  national  hero. 

As  soon  as  Felix  Diaz  and  Victoriano  Huerta 
heard  of  the  stand  taken  by  Don  Venustiano  Car- 
ranza as  Governor  of  the  State  of  Coahuila,  they 
realized  that  a formidable  enemy  had  arisen  to 
spoil  their  crooked  game.  They  put  their  heads 
together  and  penned  the  following  epistle  to  Car- 
ranza, signed  it  together,  and  sent  a trusted  friend 
as  emissary  to  find  him  and  convince  him: 

Mexico,  D.  F.  27  de  Febrero  1913. 
Don  Venustiano  Carranza, 

Gov.  of  the  Free  and  Sovereign  State  of  Coahuila, 

Dear  Sir — 

By  letters  of  recent  date  we  have  informed  you  of  the 
plausible  reasons  which  have  inspired  the  army  against  the 
dissolving  regime  of  Don  F.  Madero,  and  we  have  like- 
wise justified  the  acts  which  placed  General  Huerta  in  the 
office  of  President  of  the  Republic. 

We  have  been  informed  that  it  was  your  intention  to  rebel 
against  the  legal  authority  of  the  Government.  We  beg 
to  insist,  in  the  name  of  the  country  and  for  its  exclusive 
benefit,  that  you  change  your  announced  attitude  not  to  col- 
laborate with  us  in  the  work  of  peace  which  we  intend  to  pur- 
sue to  the  end,  at  any  price.  If  for  some  personal  reason 


Life  of  Carranza 


21 


you  wish  to  leave  the  office  which  you  occupy,  and  if  that  can 
be  done  without  offending  or  hurting  our  patriotic  end,  the 
Government  will  give  you  all  sorts  of  guarantees  and  will 
pay  your  salary  up  to  the  end  of  your  term. 

This  letter,  as  you  understand,  must  be  absolutely  of  a 
particular  and  private  character.  On  this  basis  we  beg  to 
inform  you  that  on  our  part  there  will  be  no  obstacles  that 
could  arise  between  ourselves,  which  cannot  be  solved  in 
the  manner  most  suitable  to  you.  It  would  be  advisable 
for  you  to  retire  into  the  United  States  (for  your  greater 
safety).  We  shall  make  all  sorts  of  sacrifices  (should  you 
demand  them)  so  as  to  satisfy  all  your  wishes  and  demands. 
Our  envoy  (agent)  will  bring  you  instructions  on  the  sub- 
ject. He  is  empowered  to  arrange  matters  on  the  spot. 

We  beg  you  to  accept  our  assurance  of  admiration  and  re- 
spect. 

(Signed)  Victoriano  Huerta. 

Felix  Diaz. 


Carranza’s  answer  follows: 


nth  March,  1913. 

Messrs.  V.  Huerta  y Felix  Diaz: 

My  only  answer  to  the  despicable  proposals  offered  to  me 
in  your  letter  dated  February  27th,  is  that  I want  to  in- 
form you  that  men  like  myself  do  not  betray,  do  not  sell 
themselves;  that  is  your  function,  you  who  have  no  other 
objects  in  life  than  the  shameful  satisfaction  of  ignoble  am- 
bitions. 

Raise  the  black  flag  of  your  tyranny,  and  over  the  country 
the  voice  shouts:  “Treason  and  Death.” 

On  my  part,  with  the  help  of  the  Mexican  people,  I shall 
lift  from  the  mud  into  which  you  have  thrown  it,  the  flag 


22 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


of  the  country.  Should  I fall  defending  it,  I shall  have  ob- 
tained for  my  small  action  in  life,  the  greatest  prize  which 
we  honest  men  can.  aspire  to. 

(Signed)  Venustiano  Carranza. 

In  the  month  of  March,  1913,  not  satisfied  with 
having  defied  the  powers  in  Mexico,  General  Car- 
ranza published  the  “ Plan  of  Guadalupe,”  so  called 
from  the  fact  that  the  revolutionary  plan  was 
signed  by  the  officers  at  the  “ hacienda  ” farm  of 
Guadalupe.  The  plan  is  the  following: 

DECLARATION  TO  THE  NATION 

Considering  that  General  Victoriano  Huerta,  to 
whom  the  Constitutional  President,  Francisco  I. 
Madero,  had  confided  the  defence  of  the  institu- 
tions and  the  legality  of  his  government,  on  uniting 
with  the  rebel  enemies  in  arms  against  that  same 
government,  to  restore  the  latest  dictatorship,  com- 
mitted the  crime  of  treason  to  reach  power,  arrest- 
ing the  President  and  Vice-President,  as  well  as  their 
ministers,  exacting  from  them  by  violent  means  the 
resignation  of  their  posts,  which  is  proven  by  the 
messages  that  the  same  General  Huerta  addressed 
to  the  Governors  of  the  States,  advising  them  that 
he  had  the  Supreme  Magistrates  of  the  nation  and 
their  cabinet  prisoners. 

Considering  that  the  legislative  and  judicial 
powers  have  recognized  and  protected  General  Vic- 
toriano Huerta  and  his  illegal  and  anti-patriotic  pro- 
ceedings, contrary  to  the  constitutional  laws  and  pre- 


23 


Life  of  Carranza 

cepts,  and  considering,  finally,  that  some  governors 
of  the  States  of  the  union  have  recognized  the  il- 
legitimate government,  imposed  by  the  part  of  the 
army  which  consummated  the  treason,  headed  by  the 
same  General  Huerta,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
sovereignty  of  those  same  States  whose  governors 
should  have  been  the  first  in  disowning  it,  had  been 
violated,  those  who  subscribe,  chiefs  and  officials, 
in  command  of  constitutional  forces,  we  have  ac- 
corded, and  shall  sustain  by  arms  the  following: 

PLAN 

1.  General  Victoriano  Huerta,  as  President  of  the 

republic  shall  be  disowned. 

2.  The  legislative  and  judicial  powers  of  the  fed- 

eration shall  also  be  disowned. 

3.  The  governors  of  the  states  who  still  recognize 

the  federal  powers  forming  the  actual  admin- 
istration, 30  days  after  the  publication  of  this 
plan,  shall  be  disowned. 

4.  For  the  organization  of  the  army  in  charge  of 

seeing  that  our  purposes  are  carried  out,  we 
name  as  first  chief  of  the  army,  which  will  be 
called  Constitutionalist,  Venustiano  Carranza, 
Governor  of  the  State  of  Coahuila. 

5.  The  Constitutionalist  army  on  occupying  Mex- 

ico City,  the  executive  power  will  be  provi- 
sionally in  charge  of  Venustiano  Carranza, 
first  chief  of  the  army,  or  in  charge  of  that 
person  who  might  substitute  him  in  command. 


24 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


6.  The  provisional  President  of  the  Republic  will 

convene  general  elections  as  soon  as  peace  may 
have  been  consolidated,  handing  the  power  to 
the  citizen  who  may  have  been  elected. 

7.  The  citizen  who  may  act  as  first  chief  of  the  Con- 

stitutionalist army  in  the  States  whose  govern- 
ment might  have  recognized  that  of  Huerta, 
will  assume  the  charge  of  provisional  governor 
and  will  convoke  local  elections,  after  the  citi- 
zens elected  to  discharge  the  high  powers  of  the 
federation  may  have  taken  possession  of  their 
office,  as  provided  for  in  the  foregoing  basis. 

The  plan  was  signed  at  the  Hacienda  of  Guada- 
lupe, Coahuila,  on  the  26th  of  March,  1913. 
Sixty-four  officers  of  the  state  troops  affixed  their 
signatures  to  the  protest.  Among  the  most  famous 
on  the  list  was  Lieut.  Col.  Lucio  Blanco,  who 
fought  in  Tamaulipas  and  initiated  the  sale  of  lands 
belonging  to  Felix  Diaz,  among  Constitutionalist 
soldiers,  and  Major  J.  B.  Trevino. 

As  Don  Venustiano  Carranza  was  leaving  Saltillo 
to  take  the  field  against  the  federals,  he  said  to  a 
friend:  “We  are  going  to  fight  the  three  years’ 

war  over  again.” 

A coincidence  in  atavism  is  that  Don  Venustiano’s 
father,  Colonel  Carranza,  fought  in  the  north  dur- 
ing the  three  years’  war  under  the  leadership  of 
Benito  Juarez  (1857-60)  and  assisted  him  finan- 
cially as  well  as  politically  in  the  struggle.  Later, 


25 


Life  of  Carranza 

after  the  Constitutionalist  government  had  placed 
Benito  Juarez  in  the  presidency  through  the  elec- 
tions, Colonel  Carranza  was  offered  the  reimburse- 
ment of  the  sixteen  thousand  odd  dollars  which  he 
had  contributed  to  the  liberal  cause.  He  refused 
the  money  saying  that  the  victory  of  the  party  was 
sufficient  payment  to  him. 

A further  coincidence,  amusing  to  students  of  his- 
tory, is  found  in  the  case  of  Gen.  Victoriano  Huerta, 
whose  father,  Gen.  Epitacio  Huerta,  fought  under 
the  same  banner  as  Colonel  Carranza.  The  history 
of  the  three  years’  war  mentions  the  name  of  three 
generals:  The  Constitutionalist  Generals  Rocha, 

Huerta  and  Arteaga.  . . . After  the  clericals  had 
been  defeated  by  the  Constitutionalists  under  Benito 
Juarez  in  i860  they  invited  foreign  intervention, 
which  ended  in  the  courtmartial  and  shooting  of 
Emperor  Maximilian  and  Generals  Miramon  and 
Mejia. 

In  the  present  instance,  Don  Victoriano  Huerta, 
when  he  perceived  an  early  defeat,  heaped  indigni- 
ties and  insults  upon  American  citizens  so  as  to  in- 
vite an  intervention  and  a quick  march  of  the  Amer- 
ican troops  into  Mexico  City.  The  clericals  which 
he  represented  preferred  the  presence  of  Americans 
to  that  of  the  Constitutionalists  in  Mexico  City. 
Luckily  for  Mexico,  the  Chief  Magistrate  in  Wash- 
ington foresaw  the  move  and  wisely  refused  to  pull 
the  chestnut  out  of  the  fire  for  a Mexican  monkey. 

The  first  battle  of  the  revolution  was  fought  be- 


2 6 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


tween  Saltillo  and  Monclova  in  a small  place  called 
“ Anhelo,”  which,  translated  from  the  Spanish, 
means  a vehement  desire. 

The  reason  for  going  into  certain  details  of  the 
march  of  Carranza  across  the  northern  States,  is  for 
the  purpose  of  showing  the  physical  endurance,  the 
mental  activity,  as  well  as  the  profound  and  implicit 
faith  that  Venustiano  Carranza  had  in  the  people 
of  Mexico. 

The  personality  of  Ca'rranza  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  sympathetic  to  foreign  newspapermen 
who  have  visited  him.  His  presence  and  manner 
seem  utterly  cold,  intellectual;  extremely  polite, 
non-committal.  When  talking,  his  speech  is  devoid 
of  all  the  superlatives  and  amenities  which  made 
New  York  reporters  say  of  L.  de  la  Barra,  “ He 
talked  incessantly  for  fifteen  minutes  without  saying 
one  word  for  copy.” 

Carranza’s  talent  as  a good  listener  made  him 
the  despair  of  journalists,  who  preferred  the  gen- 
erals who  fought,  talked,  gave  orders  to  shoot  a 
few  prisoners,  and  between  snatches  of  food,  dic- 
tated incidents  from  their  lives  or  told  what  their 
plans  were  for  the  future  of  Mexico.  Carranza  is 
more  subtle  if  not  sufficiently  romantic.  The  care- 
ful observer  must  read  between  the  lines,  when  the 
personality  grows  on  one,  like  the  taste  for  olives 
or  the  magnitude  of  the  Chief  Magistrate  in  Wash- 
ington. Some  leaders  are  unattractive  because  of 
their  very  uprightness,  their  justice,  their  integrity, 


27 


Life  of  Carranza 

their  polish;  their  flawlessness  offers  no  purchase  to 
a sly  attack.  Aristides  asked  an  Athenian  citizen, 
who  had  voted  to  ostracize  him,  if  Aristides  had 
personally  offended  him,  “No,  but  I am  tired  of 
hearing  him  called  the  Just!  ” 

Enemies  of  Carranza  have  accused  him  of  being 
too  much  of  an  aristocrat  and  a puppet  in  the  hands 
of  his  lawyers’  cabinet,  or  again  a jingo  for  effect 
and  a rebel  for  power.  His  conduct  towards  his 
general  staff,  his  generals,  his  enemies,  his  attitude 
towards  the  United  States  and  the  foreign  powers, 
his  promises  or  silence  on  the  question  of  interior 
policy, — his  words,  speeches,  letters  and  decrees 
are  his  best  witnesses  to  judge  him  by. 

After  the  defeat  at  Anhelo,  Carranza  went  to 
the  border,  passing  through  Cuatro  Cienegas,  which 
is  famous  as  his  birthplace,  to  Eagle  Pass. 

In  the  month  of  July,  1913,  when  the  Arrietas 
and  Contreras  were  attacking  Torreon,  Carranza 
joined  them  in  the  hope  of  success,  but  even  the  sec- 
ond time  when  Villa  attacked  Torreon,  the  victories 
were  empty,  except  for  the  arms,  ammunition  and 
money  captured. 

Disconsolate  but  not  discouraged,  Carranza,  ac- 
companied by  about  two  hundred  men,  slowly 
wended  his  way  across  the  State  of  Durango.  Gen- 
eral Huerta  was  at  that  period  on  the  highest  crest 
of  success  and  power, — orders  had  been  telegraphed 
all  over  the  north,  to  the  federal  and  counter-guer- 
rilla chiefs,  to  capture  Carranza,  dead  or  alive,  and 


28 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


be  rewarded  with  a bonus  of  $150,000.  Abraham 
Gonzalez,  Governor  of  Chihuahua,  had  been  ar- 
rested and  assassinated  by  order  of  Huerta.  Venus- 
tiano  Carranza,  therefore,  travelled  at  night  and 
rested  during  the  day;  his  only  pilots  were  the  stars, 
a small  compass  and  a pocket  edition  of  “ Mexico- 
Atlas.”  The  chief  himself  recounts  how  often  dur- 
ing their  night  ride,  they  espied  coming  towards 
them  in  the  distance,  the  vaguely  outlined  forms  of 
peons,  men  and  women  carrying  their  children  in 
their  arms.  Scouts  were  sent  ahead  to  discover  if 
the  peasants  were  only  disguised  federals  in  a des- 
perate attempt  to  assassinate  the  brain  of  the  revo- 
lution, and  capture  a kingly  reward. 

The  phantom  shadows  were  “ pacificos,”  who  had 
walked  for  miles  to  greet  the  chief  who  was  going 
to  battle  for  their  rights  and  their  lands.  They 
only  wanted  to  touch  his  hands,  the  hem  of  his  coat, 
to  hear  the  voice  of  the  great  “ Jefe,”  and  then  they 
turned  their  weary  way  sending  back  a salutation: 
“ May  God  protect  you!  ” or  “ May  God  be  with 
you ! ” which  rang  in  the  silent  night  like  the  voice 
of  the  people,  the  voice  of  God. 

As  Carranza  kept  his  itinerary  secret,  the  first 
encounter  might  have  been  accidental,  but  it  hap- 
pened so  frequently  that  it  seemed  almost  uncanny 
and  supernatural,  this  triumphant  procession  accom- 
panied by  the  blessings,  the  wishes,  the  yearnings 
of  the  Mexican  peons.  Carranza  himself  confessed 
that  no  incident  in  his  life  made  a more  profound 


Life  of  Carranza 


29 


impression  on  him,  and  gave  him  a deeper  insight 
of  the  tremendous  faith  of  the  Mexican  people  in 
their  champions,  pathfinders,  and  saviors. 

Across  the  mountains  in  Durango  to  Tepehuanes, 
into  Parral  in  Chihuahua,  where  he  came  in  con- 
tact with  General  Chao,  and  from  there  across  the 
Sierra  Madre,  a mountain  range,  dividing  Chihua- 
hua from  Sonora,  into  the  small  city  of  Fuerte, 
where  Carranza  met  for  the  first  time  General  Obre- 
gon  and  his  soldiers. 

He  reached  Guaymas,  in  Sonora,  about  the  mid- 
dle of  September,  1913.  The  little  band  was  tired, 
and  their  clothes  were  in  rags,  their  shoes  in  tat- 
ters, but  the  goal  was  reached  and  they  began  the 
work  of  organizing  the  capital  of  the  Constitutional 
government. 

In  Mexico  the  presence  of  Carranza  was  known 
only  to  the  revolutionists,  and  as  the  federals  could 
not  discover  the  whereabouts  of  the  Chief  at  that 
time,  they  heralded  his  disappearance  and  death. 
Everywhere  that  Carranza  had  passed  with  his  band 
of  followers  in  the  small  cities,  away  from  the  fed- 
erals who  cautiously  kept  within  the  city  limits  and 
near  the  railroads,  he  invariably  organized  small 
local  governments  until  he  was  able  to  communicate 
with  his  chiefs  in  the  middle  and  east.  In  the  State 
of  Coahuila,  his  brother  Don  Jesus,  and  Gen.  Don 
Pablo  Gonzalez,  had  come  to  an  understanding  as 
to  the  great  strategic  outline  of  the  campaign  in 
combination  with  General  Villa  in  the  north  and 


30 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


General  Obregon  on  the  west.  In  Guaymas  a pro- 
visional cabinet  was  organized  with  Don  Rafael 
Zubaran  Capmany,  one  of  the  keenest  intellects  of 
the  revolution,  a lawyer  from  Campeche,  with  Fran- 
cisco Escudero  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  as 
Minister  of  Finances  F.  I.  Villareal,  Engineer  G. 
Bonilla  as  Minister  of  Communications,  and  Gen- 
eral Angeles  as  Minister  of  War. 

Gen.  J.  B.  Trevino  was  the  chief  of  the  general 
staff  of  Carranza;  the  chief  secretary  was  G.  Espi- 
nosa Mireles;  there  was  also  a staff  of  officers  at- 
tached to  his  person.  It  was  in  Hermosillo  that  the 
great  strategic  campaign  was  outlined  with  the  help 
of  General  Angeles  and  the  general  staff.  The  or- 
ders to  the  three  chiefs,  Obregon,  Villa  and  Gon- 
zalez, came  from  Hermosillo. 

After  the  northern  States  were  conquered  slowly, 
all  the  city  and  rural  governments  were  organized, 
and  although  the  work  was  arduous  and  continuous, 
it  was  not  quite  as  strenuous  as  the  classic  ride  across 
the  sierras  and  the  deserts.  The  daily  routine  at 
headquarters  was  very  simple  but  efficient.  The 
chief  usually  got  up  between  five  and  six  in  the  morn- 
ing, and  except  w'hen  he  rode  across  the  mountain 
took  his  bath  and  attended  at  once  to  the  most  im- 
portant work  of  the  day.  At  7 A.  M.  there  was  a 
light  breakfast  with  whatever  could  be  had,  milk, 
crackers  with  peach  preserves,  or  honey  and  butter. 
On  the  march  everybody  had  to  be  satisfied  with  the 
national  tortilla,  made  of  cornmeal  and  beans. 


31 


Life  of  Carranza 

Sometimes  they  could  get  fresh  eggs,  sometimes  not 

In  Hermosillo  they  fared  better;  Carranza  had 
two  Indian  attendants,  one  who  did  the  cooking  and 
the  other  who  attended  to  his  horses  and  those  of 
the  general  staff.  The  Mexican  cooks  have  the 
most  wonderful  capacity  for  being  able  to  light  a 
fire  and  cook  anywhere  under  the  most  distressing 
conditions. 

Thus  they  were  able  to  get  meals  and  a few  lux- 
uries like  boiled  and  fried  meal,  vegetables,  and  the 
famous  chile  with  cheese,  and  a powdered  coffee 
called  “ Washington  coffee,”  with  milk.  Sometimes 
they  drank  a red  wine  which  is  grown  in  the  north 
of  Mexico.  Carranza  invited  at  almost  every  meal, 
some  friends  who  had  travelled  many  miles  to  see 
him,  or  soldiers  or  civilians  belonging  to  his  im- 
mediate surroundings. 

Between  the  hours  of  7 -.30  and  1 p.  M.  the  whole 
staff  was  again  busy  taking  orders  from  the  chief, 
— writing,  telegraphing  and  conferring.  At  one 
o’clock  there  was  a light  luncheon  and  the  work  was 
resumed  until  six,  when  the  chief  took  his  daily  ride, 
accompanied  by  an  aide  or  a friend.  Ten  o’clock 
was  usually  the  time  to  retire,  unless  the  “ Jefe  ” 
had  been  invited  to  a fiesta  or  a dance,  which  hap- 
pened quite  frequently  as  Mexicans  are  very  fond 
of  dancing,  theatricals,  speech-making,  and  are  in 
general  very  sociable.  Unlike  most  Mexicans,  the 
chief  does  not  smoke,  or  favor  the  national  drink 
“ tequila,”  or  the  Mexicanized  cognac,  or  the  ex- 


32 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


cellent  Monterrey  and  Toluca  beer  which  was  ad- 
vertised in  Mexico  as  “ the  beer  that  made  Milwau- 
kee jealous.” 

By  February  the  chief  and  his  staff  packed  their 
belongings,  and  the  state  papers,  and  crossed  the 
State  of  Sonora  into  Sinaloa  in  Culiacan,  the  cap- 
ital, which  had  been  captured  by  General  Obregon. 
After  the  organization  of  Sinaloa,  the  peripatetic 
government  moved  back  to  Hermosillo  and  towards 
the  border,  to  Nogales.  By  that  time,  Torreon  had 
been  captured  and  Carranza,  accompanied  by  300 
cavalry  and  400  infantry,  crossed  the  Sierra  Madre 
range  into  Chihuahua,  to  Juarez,  an  excursion  which 
lasted  twenty-five  days  and  covered  over  400  miles. 
They  had  come  from  the  tropical  heat  of  the  deserts 
of  Sonora  to  the  snow  on  the  Sierra  Madre. 

From  Juarez  on,  the  procession  of  the  Chief 
rolled  downward  to  Chihuahua,  Torreon,  Saltillo, 
Monterrey,  Tampico,  down  to  Tepotzotlan  near 
Mexico  City.  The  details  of  his  slow  organization 
of  the  civil  government  of  all  the  conquered  States, 
of  his  foreign  attitude  and  of  the  other  details  of 
ihis  revolutionary  rule,  will  be  discussed  in  separate 
chapters. 

Carranza  at  first  sight  makes  the  impression  more 
of  a Saxon  personality  than  of  a Mexican  type.  The 
Spanish  blood,  which  flows  in  his  veins  three  or 
four  generations  back  must  have  been  of  Basque 
origin,  which  is  pure  northern  European.  He  is 
about  five  feet,  eight  inches  high,  proportionately 


33 


Life  of  Carranza 

built,  neither  too  thin  nor  too  stout,  and  he  carries 
himself  erect  and  in  a dignified  manner.  His  white 
hair  and  beard  contrast  with  the  very  dark  brown 
complexion  which  is  the- result  of  an  active,  out-of- 
door  life.  The  eye-glasses  give  to  his  appearance 
a slight  professional  mien.  The  professorial  air  is 
rather  disconcerting  at  first,  for  one  expects  to  be- 
hold a type  of  a man  different  from  the  quiet,  un- 
assuming, very  polite,  gentleman  farmer,  and  instead 
of  a deep,  Sonorous  voice,  a rather  high  and  clear 
tone  of  speech.  His  eyes  are  hazel,  very  open, — 
his  nose  straight,  his  forehead  very  high,  and  he  has 
the  high  brow  of  an  intellectual,  rather  than  of  a 
fighter,  his  ears  are  quite  large,  denoting  a strong 
constitution  and  a long  life.  The  whole  impression 
is  of  self-restraint,  gentleness;  nevertheless,  the  keen 
observing  eyes  prove  an  alert  intelligence,  always 
watching,  weighing,  judging  and  carefully  registering, 
all  the  impressions  for  future  use.  As  all  men  deal- 
ing with  people  politically,  Carranza  has  a very  re- 
tentive memory  for  faces  and  names.  Being  a com- 
prehending and  patient  listener  he  always  hears  a 
great  deal  more  than  he  says,  but  when  an  answer 
is  required,  the  words  come  out  slowly,  as  if  chosen 
with  extreme  care  to  express  a thought  with  as  few 
words  as  possible.  While  speaking  in  public,  the 
use  of  simple  language  denotes  a clear  mind  which 
can  express  complicated  problems  in  first  principles, 
and  Carranza  makes  himself  understood  by  cultured 
Mexicans  as  well  as  by  peons. 


CHAPTER  II 

CONDITIONS  IN  MEXICO  DURING  DIAZ*  REGIME 

TT  would  appear  after  all  that  has  been  written 

In  the  United  States  and  Europe  concerning 
Mexico,  that  the  people  ought  to  possess  a clearer 
conception  of  the  conditions  which  brought  about 
the  Madero  and  the  Constitutionalist  revolutions, 
especially  when  the  latter  is  nothing  more  than  a 
continuation  of  the  former.  But  the  words  of  the 
late  Joseph  Pulitzer,  when  he  said  that  to  instil 
facts  into  the  minds  of  the  people  there  must  be 
constant  repetition,  seem  undeniably  true.  It  is  not 
sufficient  to  reiterate  certain  facts;  the  correlation 
of  these  facts  must  be  understood  and  explained. 

People  heard  about  the  peonage  system  in  Mex- 
ico, about  the  great  power  of  Porfirio  Diaz,  about 
the  abuses  of  this  power,  but  it  was  not  realized 
how  vital,  how  deep,  how  intimate  the  solution  of 
the  political  problems  was  to  the  Mexicans  them- 
selves. To  foreigners  the  Mexican  problem  was 
only  interesting  in  so  far  as  it  affected  their  inter- 
ests,— no  more. 

After  all  the  cruelties  perpetrated  by  the  Diaz- 
Huerta  regimes,  I have  heard  intelligent  Amer- 
icans exclaim  that  the  Mexicans  needed  a strong 

34 


Conditions  in  Mexico  During  Diaz’  Regime  35 

man  like;  Huerta,  and  that  Diaz  after  all  had 
brought  railroads,  schools,  higher  wages,  money, 
improvements  and  progress.  It  makes  one  almost 
despair  of  human  intelligence  to  hear  such  super- 
ficial prattle,  but  it  proves  the  axiom  of  Joseph  Pu- 
litzer to  be  very  profound  and  that  Porfirio  Diaz 
had  used  it  to  its  fullest  extent. 

Known  by  few  people,  Porfirio  Diaz  used  for 
years  a secret  fund  amounting  to  millions  solely  for 
the  purpose  of  advertising  to  the  world  that  Diaz 
was  the  creator  of  modern  Mexico,  that  “ peace  ” 
and  “ progress  ” were  his  two  watchwords,  with 
which  he  had  put  Mexico  on  a permanent  basis  of 
greatness.  Many  small  newspapers  near  the  bor- 
der as  far  as  San  Antonio  were  paid  as  much  as 
$5,000  a year  to  speak  in  good  terms  about  Diaz 
and  never  to  mention  any  trouble  or  agitation  which 
might  be  started  along  the  border  by  anarchists  who 
might  call  themselves  Mexican  revolutionists. 

Great  newspaper  proprietors  in  the  United 
States  were  given  concessions,  others  were  offered 
special  inducements  to  publish  special  Mexican  num- 
bers, which  brought  from  $25,000  to  $30,000 
worth  of  advertising;  well-known  individuals,  such 
as  judges,  congressmen  and  senators,  were  invited 
in  an  indirect  way  to  visit  Mexico,  were  received 
like  princes,  feted,  dined  and  were  offered  mining 
or  other  concessions  as  one  gives  cigars  to  a guest 
after  dinner.  When  the  concessions  were  not 
needed  or  available,  Don  Porfirio  took  particular 


36 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


care  to  impress  his  famous  visitor  with  a set  of  well 
chosen  phrases  most  apt  to  impress  him  favorably 
as  to  his  greatness,  his  patriotism  and  his  de- 
mocracy. 

One  incident,  which  was  related  to  me,  illustrates 
the  Machiavellian  talent  of  Diaz.  A nationally  fa- 
mous librarian  paid  his  visit  to  General  Diaz,  who 
received  him  very  graciously.  No  concessions  were 
asked  or  wanted  and  the  President  did  not  mention 
the  great  battles  he  had  fought,  which  were  un- 
known to  the  gentle  librarian,  but  he  spoke  at  great 
length  of  the  extensive  school  system  in  vogue  since 
his  ascension  to  the  presidency,  and  ended  the  con- 
versation by  declaring:  “It  is  my  greatest  ambi- 

tion to  be  known  as  the  great  schoolmaster  of  Mex- 
ico.” The  phrase  impressed  the  scholar  and  many 
people  heard  the  phrase*,  and  many  newspapers  re- 
peated it  until  everybody  believed  it. 

Pearson’s  Magazine  printed  six  years  ago  a ful- 
some life  of  Diaz.  What  General  Diaz  thought 
of  it  is  told  in  an  interview  between  Ireneo  Paz,  a 
Mexican  newspaperman  and  the  President  who  were 
friends  for  more  than  sixty  years.  Don  Ireneo  Paz 
asked  the  President:  “ I have  been  wanting  to  ask 

you  if  that  interview  which  the  papers  published  a 
few  months  ago  was  authentic;  that  one  which  is 
said  to  have  taken  place  between  yourself  and  one 
Creelman,  an  American  journalist?” 

“ What  surprises  me  is  that  sagacious  men  like 
you  should  have  been  capable  of  giving  credit  to 


Conditions  in  Mexico  During  Diaz’  Regime  37 

such  folly  (a  seme  j ante  paparrucha) replied 
Diaz. 

“ Because  I did  not  believe  it,  I asked  you  if  it 
was  authentic.” 

“ It’s  as  true  as  a dead  child.  You  know  me 
too  well  to  believe  that  I could  stroll  for  hours  upon 
the  terrace  of  Chapultepec,  exhibiting  the  white  of 
my  eyes  and  opening  my  nostrils  excessively  in  order 
that  the  Yankee  reporter  may  be  able  to  give  wings 
to  his  fancy.  What  happened  was  this:  A friend 
of  mine,  a member  of  my  cabinet,  came  to  read  me 
the  article  which  was  already  manufactured  (con- 
feccionado)  for  an  American  publication.  It 
didn’t  seem  bad  to  me,  or  rather  it  seemed  very 
good,  because  without  compromising  me  much  it  lent 
a lustre  to  my  antecedents,  and  put  me  on  a good 
footing  for  the  future,  so  that  it  gave  me  all  the 
facilities  which  I desired,  whether  to  continue  sac- 
rificing myself  for  the  Fatherland,  or  to  shake  off 
the  dust  thereof  (zafarme)  in  time  if  things  should 
blow  into  a whirlwind  (a  ponerse  turbias).  I ac- 
knowledge to  you  that  I thought  the  writing  was 
so  well  dressed  up,  so  much  in  conformity  with  what 
are  not  but  should  be  my  profoundest  thoughts,  so 
seemly  for  our  luckless  proletariat,  that  I accepted 
it  unhesitatingly  as  if  it  had  been  inspired  by  myself, 
not  making  more  than  a very  few  modifications  on 
some  entirely  Yankee  points  of  view  which  would 
have  put  me  in  a very  ridiculous  position,  and  I gave 
my  consent  to  two  things : — that  it  should  be  pub- 


38 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


lished  in  English  and  Spanish,  and  that  it  should 
be  amply  paid  for.” 

“ About  how  much  was  the  cost  of  this  work?  ” 

“ Some  fifty  thousand  pesos.”  (Como  unos  cin- 
cuenta  mil  pesos.)  1 

Toward  the  end  of  the  Diaz  regime  and  in  an 
effort  to  refute  the  attacks  made  in  a book  by  the 
present  writer  called,  “ Diaz,  Czar  of  Mexico,”  the 
cientificos  inspired  James  Creelman  to  write  “ Diaz, 
Master  of  Mexico”;  whole  chapters  were  also 
dedicated  in  an  effort  to  discredit  the  expose  by 
J.  K.  Turner  in  his  “ Barbarous  Mexico.”  Several 
books  published  in  the  United  States  and  England 
were  bought  by  Diaz.  One  was  “ Porfirio  Diaz,” 
by  R.  de  Zayas  Enriquez,  and  the  other  “ Yucatan, 
the  American  Egypt,”  by  Tabor  and  Frost.  The 
Mexican  government  inspired  their  consul  in  Cuba, 
J.  F.  Godoy,  to  write  a book,  “ Porfirio  Diaz,” 
which  had  “ seventy  pages  of  endorsements  of  Diaz 
written  by  prominent  Americans.”  Here  we  have 
the  case  of  a man,  Mr.  Godoy,  who  actually  went 
about  — or  sent  about  — among  senators,  congress- 
men, diplomats  and  cabinet  officers,  soliciting  kind 
words  for  President  Diaz.2  Porfirio  Diaz  and  his 
cientifico  supporters  thought  that  they  could  keep 
the  Mexicans,  peons,  and  the  middle  class  working- 
men down  if  public  opinion  in  Europe  and  in  the 

1 From  “Mexico  the  Land  of  Unrest,”  by  Henry  Baerlein. 

2 “Barbarous  Mexico,”  J.  K.  Turner. 


Conditions  in  Mexico  During  Diaz’  Regime  39 

United  States  was  misinformed  about  the  real  con- 
ditions in  Mexico. 

The  great  reputation  of  General  Diaz  in  Amer- 
ica and  Europe  was  essentially  manufactured 
through  laudatory  articles  in  the  press,  magazines, 
weeklies  and  daily  papers,  by  the  publication  of 
books,  interviews  of  prominent  Americans  who  came 
back  from  a visit  to  the  “ Great  Old  Man  ” in 
Chapultepec,  who  could  have  said  as  Macbeth, 
“ And  I have  bought  golden  opinions  from  all  sorts 
of  people.”  Judges,  congressmen,  senators,  gov- 
ernors, members  of  cabinets,  even  presidents,  princes 
and  kings  spoke  in  reverence  and  admiration  of 
Don  Porfirio  Diaz. 

What  chance  had  any  patriotic,  democratic,  and 
free  loving  Mexican  against  the  avalanche  of  lies, 
deliberate  and  unconscious  falsehoods?  Whoever 
heard  in  the  United  States  of  the  Massacre  of 
Papantla  where  20,000  Mexican  peasants,  men, 
women  and  children  were  shot  down  in  cold  blood, 
and  as  a result  half  a dozen  villages  wiped  off  the 
map  of  Mexico? 

What  newspaper  in  America  published  the  story 
of  the  revolution  of  Tomochic,  when  15,000  moun- 
taineer peasants  in  Chihuahua  were  destroyed  and 
only  forty  old  men  and  women  were  left  to  tell  the 
tale?  And  the  murder  of  15,000  men,  the  whole 
male  population  of  Juchitan,  State  of  Oaxaca,  in 
revenge  for  the  death  of  Diaz’s  brother,  and  the  as- 


40 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


sassination  of  750  workingmen  of  the  Orizaba  cot- 
ton mills? 

Workingmen  in  Mexico  were  killed  if  they  at- 
tempted to  unionize  or  to  strike,  the  peasants  were 
slaughtered  to-  take  away  from  them  their  rights 
under  the  law;  the  Yaqui  Indians  were  deported 
and  sold  into  slavery  in  Yucatan  to  permit  the  great 
landowners  in  Sonora  to  sell  their  land  to  American 
syndicates.  Anybody  who  protested  orally  or  in 
writing  was  thrown  into  jail,  where  imprisonment 
was  worse  than  death.  We  reproduce  the  descrip- 
tion by  a Mexican  of  a night  passed  in  the  prison 
of  Belem,  Mexico  City. 

May  16. 

I dare  not  credit  the  testimony  of  my  senses.  I cannot 
yet  believe  all  that  I have  suffered  in  that  horrible  night 
which  has  just  passed;  a night  of  horrible  dreams,  a suc- 
cession of  repugnant  nightmares,  terrific,  phantastic,  de- 
moniacal, impossible,  inconceivable  and  nevertheless  perfectly 
and  completely  real.  I thought  the  night  would  be  end- 
less. I fancied  myself  in  the  infernal  regions,  in  a hell  as 
the  heated  phantasy  of  the  poet  of  maniacal  brain  never  con- 
ceived it. 

The  prison  is  a sort  of  a room  of  50  yards  in  length  by 
6 broad  and  5 in  height,  that  is  to  say  1500  cubic  yards. 
Within  its  walls  sleep  800  individuals  according  to  my  cal- 
culation. The  hygienists  claim  that  12  by  14  cubic  yards  of 
air  are  necessary  in  a dwelling  for  each  person:  in  that  space 
we  did  not  even  have  2 cubic  yards  each. 

All  the  ventilation  consists  in  an  iron  grating  at  the  en- 
trance at  one  extremity  and  a window  at  the  other  end. 


Conditions  in  Mexico  During  Diaz’  Regime  41 

How  could  800  persons  stay  in  that  small  space?  It  is  a 
mystery  to  me;  I have  seen  it  and  still  I cannot  explain  it, 
and  I am  almost  willing  to  admit  the  penetrability  of  the 
bodies. 

The  men  lie  down  in  two  rows,  feet  to  feet  and  the  head 
against  the  wall.  Those  who  arrive  first  or  the  strongest 
lie  on  the  ground,  those  who  follow  do  as  best  they  can  by 
lying  between  two  bodies  cradle-wise.  Everybody  must  per- 
force sleep  sideways.  For  this  reason  quarrels  and  fights 
are  frequent  and  occasionally  they  end  in  wounds  and  some- 
times in  death. 

In  this  prison  there  are  some  revolting  W.  C.’s.  They 
are  cleaned  in  the  morning,  but  as  the  night  advances  they 
are  used  constantly  and  as  there  is  no  running  water,  the 
fecal  matter  and  the  urine  run  over  onto  the  ground  soak- 
ing those  who  sleep  near  them.  Some  wretches  even  sleep 
seated  on  those  barrels,  and  bitter  fights  take  place  when 
somebody  wants  to  use  them  and  for  that  purpose  they  are 
forced  to  disturb  the  sleepers  on  top  of  the  barrels.  Others 
prefer  to  commit  nuisance  where  they  happen  to  be,  against 
the  companions  who  happen  to  be  near  them  and  that  occa- 
sions new  fights. 

The  atmosphere  is  so  fetid  that  it  almost  chokes  and 
asphyxiates  you.  It  is  so  dense  that  you  can  almost  cut  it 
with  a knife. 

This  dungeon  is  lighted  by  some  electric  lamps  whose  rays 
can  barely  penetrate  the  atmosphere.  Eight  hundred  men 
habitually  dirty,  clad  in  pestilential  rags,  the  respiration  of 
all  those  lungs,  the  emanations  of  all  these  bodies,  the  filth  of 
those  barrels.  ...  I am  horrified  at  the  remembrance  of  it 
all  and  I am  wondering  that  I am  still  alive. 

Soon  after  the  prisoners  have  settled  to  sleep,  from  the 
different  walls  there  starts  a downward  immigration  of 


42 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


myriads  of  parasitical  insects.  One  cannot  possibly  conceive 
the  innumerable  number  of  bed-bugs,  some  of  enormous  size, 
lice  of  all  classes,  fleas,  mosquitoes  and  cock-roaches.  They 
assure  me  that  the  prisoners  become  accustomed  to  all  these 
parasites  and  they  do  not  heed  them.  The  truth  is  that  be- 
sides myself  I did  not  notice  anybody  paying  any  attention 
to  them. 

Only  three  persons  were  privileged  to  use  cots;  the  head 
keeper  and  two  head  men.  I could  not  find  a place  to  lie 
down.  The  head  keeper  saw  me  standing  and  understood 
the  reason  of  my  perplexity  and  authorized  me  to  sleep  under 
his  cot.  At  first  I took  this  offer  as  an  insult;  later  I un- 
derstood the  full  value  of  that  concession  which  was  not 
gratis  but  cost  me  25  cents. 

It  had  just  struck  nine  at  the  prison  clock  when  suddenly 
and  accidentally  all  the  electric  lights  went  out.  The  dark- 
ness was  absolute.  Immediately  a formidable  roar  arose 
from  that  mob  and  a fearful  struggle  began.  There  were 
heard  shouts  of  hatred,  fearsome  lamentations,  blasphemies, 
the  voices  of  the  head  men  trying  to  impose  order  and  shout- 
ing to  the  prisoners  to  keep  silent,  but  without  avail.  It 
was  undescribable  uproar. 

Soon  afterwards  footsteps  of  soldiers  were  heard  nearing 
the  door.  An  employe  arrived  with  the  escort  bringing 
a lantern  along.  He  opened  the  grated  door  with  a great 
deal  of  noise  and  gave  order  to  the  soldiers  to  fire  in  case 
of  further  disorder.  Then  everything  was  silent  as  if  by 
incantation.  The  turnkey  asked  for  the  oil  lamps  hanging 
on  the  walls,  lighted  them  and  distributed  them  to  the  head 
men  to  place  them  in  their  corresponding  places.  From 
time  to  time  the  silence  was  interrupted  by  some  stifled 
groans. 

The  turnkey  ordered  the  formation  of  rows  to  make  ready 


Conditions  in  Mexico  During  Diaz’  Regime  43 

for  the  roll  call.  They  brought  the  register  and  the  prison- 
ers going  into  the  corridor  after  their  names  being  called. 
Some  did  not  appear,  others  answered  in  a dying  voice.  All 
the  prisoners  able  to  do  so  went  back  to  rest.  There  were 
three  dead  and  seventeen  wounded.  Who  are  the  authors 
of  these  crimes?  They  have  so  far  not  discovered  them,  and 
those  who  know  the  way  of  the  prison  claim  that  they 
never  will  be  found.  The  prisoners  no  matter  how  strict 
the  vigilance  and  how  often  they  search  them  succeed  in 
hiding  pieces  of  bones  which  form  part  of  the  meat  rations, 
and  these  bones  they  sharpen  against  the  stones  of  the  floor 
until  they  become  as  sharp  and  pointed  as  daggers. 
Those  are  the  weapons  used  in  their  fights.  They  also  em- 
ploy scissors,  and  spoons  and  other  instruments  which 
are  used  in  their  different  trades  and  which  they  manage  to 
steal. 

Every  time  that  there  is  a riot  as  happens  when  the  lights 
go  out  then  some  of  the  most  hardened  prisoners  take  ad- 
vantage of  this  fact  to  revenge  themselves  or  to  wound  those 
nearest  to  them,  without  any  provocation,  and  it  is  very 
difficult  to  discover  the  author  of  the  crime  as  many  are 
spattered  with  blood  owing  to  the  crowded  conditions  of 
the  dormitory. 

Many  of  the  wounds  result  from  the  indiscriminate  use 
of  the  stick  in  the  confusion  and  darkness  by  the  head  men, 
who  do  so  in  self-defence  or  in  fear. 

After  the  dead  and  wounded  had  been  taken  to  the  hospital 
they  locked  us  up  again  calling  the  names  anew  and  leav- 
ing two  guards  at  the  gate  to  fire  at  the  first  sign  of  dis- 
order. I went  back  to  my  place  under  the  cot  of  the  head 
keeper  thinking  to  myself  that  the  solitary  cell  in  spite  of 
the  “ incommunicacion  ” was  preferable  to  this  dangerous  and 
filthy  galley.  I did  not  sleep  a wink  all  night  long.  At  6 


44 


Carranza  and  Mexico  . 


o’clock  in  the  morning  they  opened  the  gate  and  all  this  sick- 
ening lee  contained  was  vomited  forth. 

I was  one  of  the  first  ones  to  go  out  and  I nearly  fainted 
when  I felt  the  fresh  air  of  the  morning.  Mr.  H.  . . . 
was  waiting  for  me  and  he  invited  me  to  breakfast  with  him 
in  the  department  of  distinction.  Later  he  asked  to  see  the 
warden  so  as  to  get  me  a permit  to  go  over  to  his  department. 

Meanwhile  I jotted  down  those  notes  although  I did  not 
know  how  I managed  to  do  so  as  my  head  seems  to  be  a 
vacuum.  I think  I have  a beginning  of  fever. 

Not  only  were  Mexicans  persecuted  in  their  own 
country,  but  when  Mexican  liberals  fled  across  the 
border  into  the  United  States,  thinking  that  they 
could  tell  the  truth  and  publish  it  in  the  American 
press,  they  were  persecuted  and  imprisoned  through 
the  orders  of  the  Mexican  Ambassador  in  Wash- 
ington to  the  Attorney  Generals  under  Theodore 
Roosevelt,  and  William  H.  Taft.  Some  of  the  lib- 
erals were  even  kidnapped  across  the  Mexican  bor- 
der and  sent  to  rot  in  the  fortress  of  San  Juan  de 
Ulloa  in  Vera  Cruz.  Manuel  Sarabia,  F.  Flores 
Magon,  L.  Rivera  and  Antonio  I.  Villareal  were 
the  pioneers  of  Mexican  agitation  against  Diaz. 
“ Mother  ” Jones  by  suggestion  of  the  writer  be- 
fore his  imprisonment  for  libel  against  a Diaz  of- 
ficial, induced  Congressman  W.  B.  Wilson  of  Penn- 
sylvania (Secretary  of  Labor  in  the  Cabinet  of  Wil- 
son), to  investigate  the  persecution  of  Mexican  lib- 
erals in  the  United  States  by  American  officials  in 
1910.  The  result  was  a cessation  of  these  perse- 


Conditions  in  Mexico  During  Diaz’  Regime  45 

cutions  and  a renewal  of  agitation  in  the  southwest 
and  along  the  border. 

The  agitation  against  the  blood  and  iron  rule  of 
Porfirio  Diaz  was  begun  over  six  years  before  the 
Madero  revolution;  it  was  the  preliminary  work  of 
untold  numbers  of  martyrs  who  died  unknown, 
crushed  by  the  ruthless  hand  of  the  half-breed  Czar. 

In  every  State  governors,  jefes  politicos,  and  cien- 
tificos  robbed  the  Indians  of  the  land  in  their  pos- 
session. By  the  year  1892  all  the  great  bodies  of 
agricultural  land  had  passed  from  the  possession  of 
more  than  a million  small  farmers  into  the  hands 
of  less  than  fifty  rich  families  and  corporations  of 
the  Diaz  clique. 

The  State  of  Morelos  (2,734  square  miles)  and 
a population  of  179,614  inhabitants,  became  prac- 
tically the  property  of  half  a dozen  families.  In 
the  State  of  Chihuahua  one  family  alone,  the  Ter- 
razas, owned  as  much  land  as  the  combined  ter- 
ritory of  Switzerland,  Belgium  and  Holland. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  Diaz  regime  nearly  3,000,- 
000  Indians  had  been  despoiled  of  their  native  land 
and  General  Diaz  had  sold  over  83,000,000  acres 
for  the  paltry  sum  of  $3,000,000. 

The  policy  of  General  Diaz  was  to  eliminate  the 
Mexican  Indian  peons  from  valuable  land  and  from 
an  independent  economic  life  into  peonage  in  great 
haciendas,  in  great  mines  and  factories  where  they 
could  be  more  easily  controlled  by  the  rurales  and 
the  soldiers.  At  the  height  of  Diaz’s  rule,  in  1908, 


46 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


when  all  the  world  was  singing  the  paeans  to  the 
glory  of  Porfirio  Diaz,  the  writer  found  out  by  per- 
sonal investigation  that  the  average  salary  for  un- 
skilled labor  in  the  mines  near  the  city  of  Pachuca 
(inh.  40,000)  was  three  cents  gold  a day,  and  in 
the  haciendas  six  cents  gold. 

What  was  the  result  of  this  policy  of  despolia- 
tion and  oppression?  Simply  that  wages  in  the 
great  haciendas,  mines,  and  factories  were  kept  as 
low  as  possible,  while  prices  of  food  stuffs  and  neces- 
sities went  up  by  the  help  of  a rigid  system  of  high 
tariff.  The  great  haciendados,  the  foreign  owners 
of  mines  and  industrial  concerns,  the  same  ones  who 
were  reaping  a golden  harvest  and  singing  the 
praise  of  Diaz’s  rule  were  buying  labor  in  Mexico 
at  a very  low  Mexican  silver  rate  and  were  selling 
the  result  of  this  labor  at  a gold  rate. 

The  press  agents  of  Diaz  spoke  of  the  perfect 
school  system  inaugurated  at  the  beginning  of  his 
rule.  General  Diaz  never  could  have  crushed  Mex- 
ico in  the  iron  grip  of  his  hand  if  education  had 
been  as  general  as  was  claimed.  The  percentage 
of  illiteracy  in  the  thirty-five  years  of  the  czar’s 
rule  was  lowered  from  ninety  to  eighty-six  per  cent, 
but  only  in  the  cities.  The  rural  school  system  was 
almost  completely  neglected,  or  was  turned  over  to 
the  care  of  priests  and  nuns. 

It  was  this  fourteen  per  cent,  of  the  people  who 
could  read  and  write,  which  organized  the  agitation 


Conditions  in  Mexico  During  Diaz’  Regime  47 

in  Mexico  under  tremendous  difficulties  and  by  un- 
heard-of sacrifices. 

The  political  advisers  of  Diaz  never  dreamed 
that  every  Indian  who  was  expatriated,  every  work- 
ingman who  saw  the  murders  of  his  companions, 
every  Mexican  who  suffered  from  an  unjust  impris- 
onment, became  an  incipient  rebel,  only  awaiting  the 
time  that  a leader  would  show  them  their  strength 
and  the  way  to  break  the  chains  of  their  economic 
and  political  slavery. 

It  could  never  be  imagined  by  the  rich  foreign 
investors  in  Mexico  who  had  observed  the  patient 
and  ignorant  peons,  that  no  matter  how  pacific,  how 
miserable  and  subdued  a race,  the  day  would  come 
when  they  must  rebel  and  evolve  into  a daring  and 
independent  race. 

The  same  happened  in  France  through  the  revo- 
lution. Read  the  description  written  by  Mirabeau’s 
father  of  the  savage-looking,  long-haired,  barefoot 
peasants  who  came  down  from  the  mountains,  and 
the  older  Mirabeau’s  prophetic  reflections  on  the 
subject. 

The  worst  offenders  and  the  greatest  enemies  to 
Mexican  political  and  economic  freedom  were  the 
foreigners;  they  always  stood  by  the  oppressors 
with  their  financial  and  moral  influence  in  Mexico, 
in  the  United  States  and  in  Europe.  Without  this 
powerful  help  Diaz  would  never  have  lasted  thirty- 
five  years.  Foreigners  in  Mexico  were  treated  with 


48  Carranza  and  Mexico 

a deference  and  were  allowed  privileges  unknown 
to  the  average  Mexican.  Porfirio  Diaz  always 
raised  the  spectre  of  American  intervention  when 
he  wanted  to  frighten  restless  Mexicans. 

The  only  friends  of  liberal  Mexico  were  the  So- 
cialists and  the  organized  workingmen  in  Europe 
and  especially  in  the  United  States  who  understood 
from  the  beginning  the  danger  of  an  enslaved,  ill- 
paid  proletariat  across  the  border.  The  great  agi- 
tation which  exposed  the  iron  rule  of  Diaz  was 
helped  by  Socialists  and  the  proletariat  in  the 
United  States,  and  made  it  easy  for  Madero  and 
his  friends  to  plot  and  organize  a revolution  across 
the  border. 

The  foreign  bankers,  concessionaires,  “ friends 
of  the  friends  ” of  General  Diaz,  wanted  a con- 
tinuation of  peace  at  any  price,  even  at  the  price  of 
subjugation  of  all  Mexican  liberties,  or  if  that 
failed,  by  American  intervention,  and  as  a result  of 
it  either  American  conquest  or  of  American  police 
rule  as  in  Cuba. 

The  successor  of  Diaz  had  been  chosen  by  the 
invisible  rulers  of  Diaz,  every  thing  about  it  was  cut 
and  dried,  and  even  the  list  of  members  of  the  Cab- 
inet of  the  successor  had  been  drawn  up.  When  a 
foreigner  was  asked  about  the  economic  and  polit- 
ical rights  of  the  Mexicans,  he  shrugged  his  shoul- 
ders and  answered  that  Indians  and  niggers  were 
not  fit  to  rule  themselves.  The  self-same  Ameri- 
cans who  would  have  started  a revolution  in  their 


Conditions  in  Mexico  During  Diaz’  Regime  49 

own  country  if  political  conditions  had  been  as  op- 
pressive as  in  Mexico,  spoke  contemptuously  of  the 
valiant  struggle  of  the  middle  class  Mexicans.  To 
my  utter  amazement  I heard  an  American  clergy- 
man inform  me  after  he  had  listened  to  a lecture 
of  mine  in  favor  of  the  Constitutionalists  and  the 
prophecy  of  a speedy  downfall  of  Huerta,  that  he 
nevertheless  believed  Mexico  needed  strong  men 
like  Huerta  and  Diaz. 

Americans  who  invest  money  in  Mexico  cannot 
be  blamed  for  being  ignorant  of  Mexican  conditions, 
but  how  about  foreigners  who  live  years  in  Mexico 
and  come  in  daily  contact  with  the  people?  Is  it 
a wonder  that  Mexicans  are  suspicious  of  for- 
eigners ? 

Porfirio  Diaz  sold  out  his  country  to  foreigners 
for  a pittance,  he  made  them  rich  and  prosperous, 
and  he  used  Mexican  labor,  freedom,  and  their  suf- 
fering to  raise  himself  on  a pinnacle  of  fame  un- 
heard of  to  any  other  man  of  his  times.  Mexico 
was  only  Mexico,  but  Diaz  was  its  prophet,  its 
savior,  its  creator,  its  superman,  and  demi-god. 
The  Mexicans  were  an  unknown,  negligible  quan- 
tity and  quality,  and  the  fatal  pseudo-greatness  of 
Diaz  was  trumpeted  across  the  world  by  an  army 
corps  of  foreign  concessionaries,  exploiters  and 
grafters.  But  the  great  Diaz  myth  like  a mon- 
strous Frankenstein  destroyed  itself  in  time. 


CHAPTER  III 


THE  MADERO  REVOLUTION,  ITS  AIMS  AND  FAILURES 

TN  the  summer  of  1908,  when  the  writer  was  in 
Mexico  he  had  heard  that  a man  called  F.  I. 
Madero  was  writing  a book,  in  which  he  discussed 
the  advisability  of  contesting  the  seventh  presiden- 
tial election  of  General  Diaz.  The  book  was  sup- 
posed to  have  been  written  in  collaboration  with  a 
journalist  who  later  was  rewarded  with  the  Gover- 
norship of  Chiapas. 

“The  Presidential  Question  of  1910,”  the  title 
of  the  book,  had  about  ninety  thousand  words  of 
written  matter,  and  began  with  the  War  of  Inde- 
pendence down  to  General  Diaz’s  regime  when  he 
tried  to  analyze  the  future  political  conduct  of  Diaz. 

Of  the  interview  of  General  Diaz  in  Pearson’s 
Magazine  of  1908,  he  said:  “We  judge  a study 

of  his  declarations  to  Creelman  useless,  as  we  do 
not  believe  they  are  sincere,  for  they  are  in  mani- 
fest contradiction  with  his  past  acts,  as  General 
Diaz  has  always  made  promises  which  were  never 
kept,  from  the  Plan  of  la  Noria  down  to  the  last 
one.” 

Although  few  intelligent  Mexicans  took  General 
Diaz  at  his  word,  they  nevertheless  caught  him  for 

50 


The  Aladero  Revolution 


Si 


the  first  time  in  a flagrant  political  “ faux  pas  ” 
for  not  having  denied  the  interview.  They  saw  a 
chance  to  take  him  at  his  own  words  and  start  the 
work  of  organizing  an  agitation  of  the  political  con- 
science of  Mexico. 

Madero’s  book  was  a powerful  factor  in  this 
propaganda,  which  was  followed  by  a national  or- 
ganization of  political  clubs  and  speechmaking  by 
a few  daring  young  men  of  the  middle  class.  This 
fearless,  open  propaganda  copied  the  campaigning 
methods  of  the  United  States  and  Madero  was  the 
head  of  the  movement. 

At  first,  Diaz,  his  political  supporters  and  even 
the  foreigners  laughed  at  their  rash,  foolish  crusade 
which  they  thought  would  soon  be  crushed  and  de- 
stroyed. 

The  Diaz  clique,  the  cientificos  and  the  old  sup- 
porters of  the  czar,  men  like  General  Reyes,  Gen- 
eral Naranjo,  General  Trevino,  General  Izabal, 
General  Torres,  General  Terrazas,  Gen.  Mucio 
Martinez,  T.  Dehesa,  R.  Corral,  J.  Y.  Limantour, 
E.  Creel,  Gen.  G.  Cosio,  O.  Molina  would  all 
have  liked  to  be  president,  but  they  were  too  much 
in  awe  of  the  power  of  the  old  man  in  Chapultepec. 
Their  political  work  was  all  done  underground,  they 
were  all  getting  ready  for  the  moment  when  Gen- 
eral Diaz  should  step  down  gripped  by  the  hand 
of  death.  None  of  them  imagined  that  any  Mex- 
ican, no  matter  how  daring,  could  shake  the  founda- 
tion of  the  Diaz  throne  without  the  help  of  the  mid- 


52 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


die  class  of  Mexico.  When  the  old  guard  ob- 
served the  impunity  of  the  Madero  propaganda 
they  guessed  that  it  was  going  to  be  a repetition  of 
the  events  in  the  presidential  elections  of  1903-04 
when  Diaz  allowed  his  foolish  enemies  to  come  out 
in  the  open  and  then  destroyed  them  wholesale  and 
in  detail. 

The  great  strength  of  Madero  consisted  in  his 
peaceful  methods  of  propaganda  and  his  constant 
advice  to  Mexicans  to  be  patient  under  the  perse- 
cutions of  the  government  agents.  He  advised 
them  to  suffer  even  imprisonment  and  death  so  as 
to  awaken  the  interest  of  the  majority  who  would 
soon  follow  their  example. 

Madero  was  assisted  in  his  campaign  by  his 
brother  Gustavo  and  a young  lawyer  Roque  Es- 
trada, and  was  accompanied  everywhere  by  his  wife, 
even  in  jail.  Roque  Estrada  wrote  about  the  evo- 
lution of  the  Madero  revolution  and  divided  it  into 
four  parts: 

1.  The  Awakening  of  the  Mexican  political  soul. 

2.  The  Concentration  of  the  revolutionary  prop- 
aganda. 

3.  The  Destruction  of  the  Diaz  regime. 

4.  The  Reconstruction  of  the  new  government.1 

The  campaign  continued  under  difficulties,  when 

the  supporters  of  Diaz  awakened  to  the  fact  that 
Madero  was  growing  popular.  Then  on  the  6th 
of  June,  1910,  came  the  news  of  his  arrest. 

1 “ The  Revolution  and  F.  I.  Madero,”  Roque  Estrada,  1912. 


The  Madero  Revolution 


53 


It  must  be  added  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  the 
indifference  of  the  authorities  to  the  Madero  prop- 
aganda was  the  firm  conviction  that  F.  I.  Madero 
was  a fool,  an  idiot,  who  was  being  used  by  power- 
ful enemies  to  initiate  a counter  campaign  against 
Diaz.  A second  reason  was  the  fact  that  Madero 
belonged  to  a wealthy  and  politically  influential  fam- 
ily of  which  the  head,  Don  Evaristo,  had  been  Gov- 
ernor of  Coahuila  during  General  Gonzalez’  term 
(1880-84).  Moreover,  the  Maderos  had  finan- 
cial connections  in  New  York,  Paris  and  Lon- 
don. 

Besides  the  head  of  the  family,  every  member  of 
the  Madero  clan  had  disowned  Francisco  I.  Ma- 
dera’s political  activities  with  the  exception  of  his 
wife  and  Don  Gustavo.  It  was  a repetition  of  the 
story  of  Joseph  in  the  Old  Testament:  F.  I.  Ma- 
dero like  Joseph  was  sold  out  by  this  brother’s  fam- 
ily. There  was  a radical  wing  in  the  Madero  move- 
ment headed  by  Gustavo  Madero  which  believed 
that  all  the  peaceful  methods  of  agitation  were  use- 
less and  that  the  only  successful  method  of  over- 
throwing the  dictator  was  to  be  effected  in  the  same 
way  by  which  he  had  come  into  power  — by  revo- 
lution. 

F.  I.  Madero  insisted  on  peaceful  methods,  so 
Gustavo  without  informing  his  brother  went  to 
Paris  ostensibly  to  organize  a Mexican  Railway  of 
the  Centre.  As  soon  as  he  cashed  the  first  instal- 
ment of  the  moneys  for  the  construction  ($375,- 


54  Carranza  and  Mexico 

ooo)  2 he  used  it  to  buy  arms  and  ammunition  for 
the  revolution  which  was  certain  to  burst  out  in  a 
few  months. 

In  San  Luis  Potosi,  October  5th,  1910,  Don  F.  I. 
Madero,  who  by  this  time  had  become  convinced 
of  the  futility  of  peaceful  propaganda,  wrote  the 
famous  Plan.  A few  days  later  he  was  advised 
that  there  was  an  order  for  his  arrest  which  would 
be  followed  by  the  application  of  the  “ Ley  Fuga.” 
Disguised  as  a common  laborer  he  fled  into  the 
United  States  on  October  7th,  and  went  to  San  An- 
tonio. Some  New  York  papers  had  long  accounts 
of  his  flight  and  plans,  sent  by  their  correspondents 
but  the  news  was  not  published. 

The  Plan  of  San  Luis  Potosi  was  a direct  chal- 
lenge to  Porfirio  Diaz,  and  it  used  almost  the  same 
slogan  which  General  Diaz  had  written  on  the  Plan 
de  la  Noria  against  Juarez  and  later  his  Plan  de 
Tuxtepec  and  Palo  Blanco  which  was:  “Effective 

suffrage  and  no  re-election.” 

A great  deal  has  been  published  about  the  great 
promises  of  land  reform  and  distribution  of  great 
estates  by  F.  I.  Madero  and  which  he  could  or  would 
not  fulfil. 

The  exact  wording  of  that  famous  Article  3d  of 
the  Plan  has  either  been  forgotten  or  misinter- 
preted. We  reproduce  the  Article: 

Article  3d:  “ As  a result  of  the  abuses  of  the 

lands,  numerous  small  proprietors,  mostly  Indians, 
2 “ The  Political  Shame  of  Mexico,”  E.  I.  Bell,  1914. 


The  Madero  Revolution 


55 


have  been  despoiled  of  their  lands  by  common  con- 
sent of  the  ministry  of  Fomento  or  by  the  decisions 
of  the  Mexican  courts.  In  justice  to  the  old  pro- 
prietors, they  should  be  given  back  lands  which 
have  been  taken  away  from  them  in  such  an  arbi- 
trary manner.  The  decisions  of  the  Ministry  of 
Fomento  and  of  the  courts  will  be  subject  to  revi- 
sion and  it  will  be  demanded  of  those  who  acted  in 
such  immoral  fashion,  to  return  the  land  to  their 
original  owners,  besides  paying  them  an  indemnity. 
Only  in  case  that  the  lands  should  have  passed  to  a 
third  party  before  the  publication  of  this  plan,  will 
the  original  owners  receive  an  indemnity  from  those 
whose  spoliation  benefitted  them.”  3 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Plan  of  San  Luis 
Potosi  aimed  first  of  all  to  destroy  the  regime  which 
had  made  the  land  robbery  possible. 

After  the  capture  of  Juarez  the  whole  Diaz  Gov- 
ernment was  practically  destroyed  as  a political 
force  and  the  Reconstruction  would  have  been  easy 
with  a new  government.  But  the  reactionary  forces 
were  at  work  to  arrest  the  impetus  of  the  revolu- 
tion. Limantour  came  back  from  Paris  and  pre- 
pared the  way  to  an  entrance  of  the  reactionaries 
by  threatening  to  arrest  Gustavo  Madero  for  the 
misappropriation  of  money  to  the  use  of  the  revo- 
lution. 

Madero’s  father  and  brother  had  to  accept  his 
conditions  and  went  post  haste  to  confer  with  F.  I. 

3 See  Plan  in  Index. 


56 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


Madero  at  the  border.  Limantour’s  conditions 
were  the  cessation  of  hostilities  and  a constitutional 
transfer  of  the  presidential  power  on  the  shoulder 
of  the  clerical  L.  de  la  Barra.  Limantour’s  clever, 
strategic  movement  arrested  the  radical  impulse,  put 
a few  Maderistas  in  the  Cabinet,  and  others  in  the 
Governorship,  but  the  inexperience  of  the  new  men 
and  the  conscious  inertia  of  ministers,  like  Ernesto 
Madero,  Secretary  of  Finance  and  Rafael  Hernan- 
dez, Secretary  of  Fomento,  checked  all  effective  at- 
tempts at  reforms.  The  two  radical  brothers, ( the 
Vasquez  Gomez,  were  eliminated.  Limantour 
went  back  to  Paris  to  watch  from  a distance  and 
to  direct  the  tactics  of  the  policy  of  inertia. 

Meanwhile  plots  were  hatched  against  the  life 
of  Madero.  One  almost  succeeded  at  this  time. 
While  L.  de  la  Barra  was  provisional  President  they 
sent  F.  I.  Madero  to  confer  with  Zapata  who 
agreed  to  meet  him  on  condition  that  no  federal 
troops  should  accompany  Madero  in  Cuautla.  Gen- 
eral Huerta,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  federal  troops 
in  Morelos  broke  the  promise,  and  attacked 
Cuautla  in  hopes  that  Zapata  would  kill  Madero  for 
his  supposed  treachery.  The  common  sense  of 
Zapata  saved  Madero’s  life. 

The  first  conspiracy  against  Madero  happened 
when  he  was  in  Juarez  and  the  cientificos  had  plot- 
ted his  destruction  by  inciting  the  suspicious  anger  of 
men  like  Orozco  and  Villa  against  him.  But  Ma- 
dero’s bravery  saved  him  again.  The  cientifico 


The  Madero  Revolution . 


57 


plotters  were  said  to  be  T.  E.  Obregon,  F.  Carbajal 
and  Oscar  Braniff.  T.  E.  Obregon  later  became  a 
member  of  Huerta’s  cabinet  and  Carbajal  the  pro- 
visional president  following  the  flight  of  General 
Huerta.  As  soon  as  Madero  was  elected  the  cien- 
tificos  captured  Orozco  with  money  and  started  him 
as  the  head  of  a counter  revolution  before  the  Presi- 
dent had  been  seated  a month.  Then  they  pushed 
General  Reyes  and  later  Felix  Diaz  and  Vasquez 
Gomez  to  revolt  against  Madero. 

These  movements  although  they  failed,  were 
kept  up  so  as  to  show  the  world  the  incompetence 
and  lack  of  popularity  of  the  Madero  regime. 
Zapata  started  on  the  war  path  incited  by  the  cruel- 
ties of  the  federal  generals  and  all  over  the  country 
rich  haciendados  (ranchers)  gave  money  to  guerrilla 
leaders  to  keep  up  the  anarchy  and  by  attacks  on 
American  property  and  American  citizens  to  invite 
American  intervention. 

Twice  the  Taft  regime  attempted  or  threatened 
an  invasion  of  Mexico  and  once  they  almost  suc- 
ceeded. The  failure  was  due  to  the  expose  of  the 
little  plot  which  resulted  in  the  resignation  of  Dick- 
inson, then  Secretary  of  War.4 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Attorney  General 
under  Taft  was  a lawyer  who  had  been  a personal 
representative  of  Diaz  in  the  United  States,  and 
among  some  of  the  lawyers  who  had  been  his  part- 

4 The  New  York  Call  published  the  first  article  of  the  expose,  May 
S,  i9ii- 


58 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


ners  was  a brother  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  All  were  interested  in  Mexico  financially 
and  politically. 

The  threats  of  invasion  by  the  Taft  regime  had 
a disastrous  effect  on  the  reorganization  of  the  new 
government.  Madero  was  surrounded  by  enemies 
at  home  and  abroad.  The  army,  the  cientificos  and 
the  clericals  were  plotting  at  home.  The  Mexican 
Ambassador  Calero  had  formed  an  alliance  with  the 
American  Ambassador,  hoping  to  step  into  the 
presidency  as  L.  de  la  Barra  had  done.  Calero 
went  so  far  as  to  telegraph  to  some  French  bankers 
who  were  negotiating  a loan  to  Madero,  to  stop 
until  further  orders;  the  further  orders  were  sup- 
posed to  come  from  the  new  government  which 
Calero  hoped  to  head. 

But  meanwhile  there  should  not  come  any  finan- 
cial assistance  to  Madero.  In  Congress  men  like 
F.  Bulnes,  Q.  Moheno,  J.  M.  Lozano  headed  the 
opposition  which  interfered  with  any  plans  of  re- 
form, by  cutting  off  all  financial  help.  Madero  was 
just  beginning  to  reap  the  fruit  of  his  policy  of  con- 
ciliation. 

With  few  exceptions  all  the  old  Diaz  appoint- 
ments in  the  courts,  in  the  States,  in  the  consular 
and  diplomatic  service  were  kept  in  their  places,  and 
as  a result  the  old  methods  were  kept  in  vogue.  All 
the  army  officers  who  had  ruthlessly  fought  the  revo- 
lutionists were  left  in  their  positions  and  the  rebel 
chiefs  were  dismissed  with  thanks. 


The  Madero  Revolution 


59 


With  the  new  interests  created  by  the  Madero 
ascension  to  power  there  sprang  up  a hungry  crowd 
of  office  seekers  and  a neo-cientifico  regime  headed 
by  Ernesto  Madero  and  Rafael  Hernandez.  It 
would  not  be  supposed  even  as  a fantastic  flight  of 
a poetical  imagination  that  the  neo-cientificos  would 
sincerely  attempt  a reform  of  the  government.  E. 
Madero  is  reported  as  having  said  that  the  financial 
system  left  by  Limantour  worked  like  a Swiss  watch. 
The  only  reform  to  men  of  great  interests  can  be 
achieved  in  their  favor,  not  against  them. 

Zapata  could  only  be  induced  to  stop  his  rebellious 
activity  by  a solution  of  the  agrarian  problem  in 
Morelos.  The  Cabinet  Minister  under  Madero 
only  incited  the  exasperation  by  sending  men  of 
Huerta’s  stamp  in  their  midst. 

It  can  be  safely  asserted  that  all  the  government 
officials  in  Mexico  were  inimical  to  reforms  begin- 
ning with  the  Madero  clan  (excepting  F.  I.  and 
Gustavo  Madero),  down  to  the  lowest  officials. 
The  men  who  had  fought  for  the  revolution  watched 
in  disgust  and  dismay  the  disintegration  of  the  revo- 
lutionary ideals. 


CHAPTER  IV 


PLOTTING  WHICH  OVERTHREW  MADERO 

\T7E  have  seen  in  the  foregoing  chapter  the  mis- 
’ * takes  which  had  been  made  by  Madero. 
Being  surrounded  by  enemies,  he  was  too  lenient 
with  them,  and  it  proved  disastrous. 

Orozco,  one  of  his  chiefs  of  guerrilla,  should 
have  been  court-martialled  and  shot  in  Juarez  ac- 
cording to  military  rule.  The  same  drastic  penalty 
could  have  been  applied  without  injustice  against 
two  other  high  officers  in  the  Mexican  army,  who 
had  rebelled  against  the  authority  — Felix  Diaz  and 
General  Reyes.  But  Madero,  besides  being  too  hu- 
mane for  such  methods,  sincerely  believed  that 
leniency  was  a sign  of  strength.  Assuredly  it  was, 
but  only  in  case  the  cabinet  and  the  government  in 
general  had  been  loyal  to  him.  Some  cabinet  mem- 
bers plotted  quite  openly  against  him  — A.  G. 
Granados,  for  instance.  The  headquarters  of  the 
plotters  were  in  Paris  and  Geneva,  with  a branch 
office  in  the  New  York  Consulate.  In  Mexico  Ro- 
dolfo Reyes  was  the  soul  of  the  movement.  In 
Paris,  Limantour  and  L.  de  la  Barra  worked  to- 
gether with  General  Mondragon  to  unravel  the 

60 


Plotting  which  Overthrew  Madero  6 1 

threads  of  the  conspiracy  in  favor  of  Felix  Diaz, 
who  would  represent  the  old  Porfirista  crowd,  with 
the  assistance  of  the  clericals  and  the  great  land- 
owners,  and  bankers,  Americans  as  well  as  Mexican 
and  French. 

In  New  York  the  plotters  supported  General 
Reyes  as  representing  the  army,  especially  the 
younger  element.  To  all  appearances  the  con- 
spiracy was  essentially  a military  mutiny  backed  by 
the  cientificos,  the  landed  interest  and  the  clericals. 
The  most  prominent  army  plotters  were  General 
Mondragon,  General  Reyes,  General  Blanquet,  Gen. 
Felix  Diaz,  General  Beltran,  General  Navarrete  and 
General  Huerta.  Among  the  civilians  were:  M. 
Calero,  A.  G.  Granados,  T.  E.  Obregon,  Vera  Es- 
tanol,  A.  R.  Gil,  L.  de  la  Barra,  J.  M.  Lozano,  Q. 
Moheno  and  Dr.  Urrutia.  The  political  and  mili- 
tary heads,  exemplified  in  the  above  mentioned 
names,  represented  the  army,  the  cientificos,  the 
clericals,  the  landed  aristocracy, — in  fact,  all  the 
reactionary  powers  and  none  of  the  liberal  or  revo- 
lutionary tendencies  of  the  people. 

In  utter  blindness,  innocence  and  optimism,  call 
it  what  you  please,  Madero  scoffed  at  the  idea  of 
a plot  which  could  overthrow  him.  He  firmly  be- 
lieved that  the  Mexican  people  were  behind  him 
and  would  support  him.  He  forgot  that  all  the 
powers  of  reaction  were  well  organized  and  that  the 
Mexican  people  who  supported  him  were  not  or- 
ganized,— that  they  were  at  the  mercy  of  a few 


6 2 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


political  bandits  without  principles  and  without 
country. 

These  unpatriotic  politicians  knew  from  experi- 
ence that  the  foreign  bankers,  the  foreign  corpora- 
tions, the  American  government  and  especially  the 
American  ambassador,  wrere  inimical  to  Madero, 
and  hostile  to  liberal  ideas,  and  would  help  them  to 
resist  any  attempts  to  reform  the  land  question  or 
change  the  financial  “ status  quo  ” as  left  over  by 
J.  Y.  Limantour. 

When  Gustavo  Madero  discovered  the  plot  on 
February  4th,  and  learned  of  the  conspirators,  he 
took  it  to  his  brother,  who  laughed  at  him.  The  mu- 
tiny started  on  Sunday  morning,  the  9th  of  February. 
During  five  days  Madero  continued  playing  with 
fate,  and  when  the  rebellion,  which  was  dated  for 
the  1 6th  of  March,  burst  out  on  the  9th,  he  was 
taken  by  surprise.  The  plotters  were  scared  into  ac- 
tion six  weeks  before  the  date  set,  because  they  sus- 
pected treachery  in  their  own  ranks.  On  one  side 
there  existed  the  ambition  of  General  Reyes,  who 
was  under  the  political  management  of  his  son  Ro- 
dolfo, on  the  other  side  the  ambition  of  Felix  Diaz, 
whose  mentor  was  General  Mondragon.  General 
Huerta’s  ambitions  were  always  latent,  but  were 
kindled  and  managed  by  his  political  tutor,  Dr.  Ur- 
rutia,  who  represented  the  clerical  interests,  as  far 
back  as  the  Diaz  time. 

In  the  year  1908  a young  painter,  Dr.  Atl,  had 
to  undergo  an  operation  and  went  to  the  sanatorium 


Plotting  which  Overthrezv  Madero  63 

of  Dr.  Urrutia.  There  he  found  General  Huerta, 
who  was  then  unknown  to  anybody  except  his  own 
officers  and  soldiers.  Dr.  Atl  was  a “ compadre  ” 
of  Dr.  Urrutia,  and  although  a radical  of  the  ex- 
tremest  type,  Dr.  Urrutia  and  General  Huerta  only 
laughed  at  him,  humored  him,  but  took  him  into 
their  confidence.  One  afternoon  as  they  were  dis- 
cussing political  events,  Dr.  Urrutia  exclaimed  that 
ambitious  and  able  men  should  prepare  the  way  for 
the  presidency  after  the  death  of  General  Diaz. 
Finally  Dr.  Urrutia  said  to  General  Huerta  : “ Gen- 
eral, you  look  like  presidential  timber,  you  are 
capable  and  fearless  and  you  control  half  of  the 
army.  Why  don’t  you  begin  to  get  ready?  ” Gen- 
eral Huerta  looked  at  Dr.  Urrutia  and  Dt.  Atl 
through  half  closed  eyes,  expressionless  as  a graven 
image,  and  after  a long  pause  he  said:  “ It  is  diffi- 
cult, but  it  is  not  impossible.” 

During  the  Reyes-Diaz  mutiny  in  Mexico  City, 
General  Huerta  was  in  charge  of  the  troops.  He 
was  making  a great  noise  and  killing  off  as  many 
volunteers  of  Madero  and  non-combatants  as  pos- 
sible. His  ambition  was  to  sap  the  strength  of  the 
Maderists  and  to  terrorize  the  population  of  the 
city  into  acquiescence  to  any  future  pact. 

During  these  strenuous  ten  days  Dr.  Urrutia  was 
seen  going  back  and  forth  constantly  between  the 
house  of  the  Bishop  of  Mexico  and  General  Huerta. 
He  was  advising  the  soldiers  and  tying  the  strings 
which  would  lift  the  less  experienced  Huerta  into 


64 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


the  presidential  chair,  backed  by  the  money  and  the 
prestige  of  the  Church.  During  the  ten  days  of 
constant  bombardment,  the  citadel  where  Felix  Diaz 
was  entrenched  was  touched  but  twice  by  the  Huerta 
guns,  and  the  National  Palace  only  twice  also.  An 
American  officer  who  happened  to  be  in  Mexico 
City,  backed  the  claim  of  General  Angeles,  that  the 
citadel  could  have  been  taken  in  a few  hours  if 
Huerta  had  really  been  sincere  in  his  attack.  Gen- 
eral Angeles  proposed  to  carry  the  citadel  if  F.  I. 
Madero  would  only  place  him  at  the  head  of  the 
government  troops.  Madero  refused  for  fear  of 
hurting  Fluerta’s  vanity,  and  hoped  thus  to  prove 
that  he  had  faith  in  his  loyalty. 

We  publish  the  account  of  events  which  followed 
the  arrest  of  Madero  and  Suarez,  by  Mr.  Marquez 
Sterling,  who  tried  his  best  to  save  Madero’s  life. 

DECLARATION  made  by  the  Minister  of  the  Re- 
public of  Cuba  in  Mexico,  Mr.  Manuel  Mar- 
quez Sterling,  to  the  Herald. 

It  was  exactly  twenty-nine  days  after  I presented 
my  credentials  to  President  Madero,  when  the  re- 
volt in  the  City  of  Mexico  started.  I shall  not  re- 
fer to  the  tragic  scenes  which  took  place  during  the 
struggle  in  the  city,  from  the  9th  of  February  to 
the  ruin  of  the  government,  as  the  same  are  now 
well  known  to  all  the  world;  I shall  only  refer  to 
the  fall  of  Mr.  Madero,  after  ten  days  of  terrible 


Plotting  which  Overthrew  Madero  65 

disorder,  during  which,  automobiles  of  diverse  lega- 
tions constantly  crossed  the  streets  of  the  city. 

On  the  morning  of  February  1 8th,  in  a confer- 
ence which  I had  with  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Re- 
lations,. Pedro  Lascurain,  he  assured  me  that  in  the 
afternoon  the  revolt  would  receive  a decisive  blow, 
and  that  the  city  would  return  to  the  hands  of  the 
government.  Precisely  at  two  o’clock  in  the  after- 
noon, I received  notice  that  General  Blanquet  had 
made  the  President  and  his  cabinet  prisoners.  A 
short  time  later  we  were  called  to  the  American 
Embassy  by  Mr.  Henry  Lane  Wilson  and  informed 
of  this  extraordinary  event. 

General  Blanquet  verified  the  arrest  by  order  of 
General  Huerta,  and  as  a consequence,  the  sharp- 
shooting ip  the  streets  ceased.  In  the  evening,  the 
Ministers  of  Chile,  Brazil  and  I visited  the  Amer- 
ican Embassy,  looking  for  further  news.  We  there 
met  General  Huerta  and  Gen.  Felix  Diaz,  who  for 
several  days  had  fought  in  the  streets  of  Mexico. 
They  were  accompanied  by  other  persons,  such  as 
the  actual  Minister  of  Justice,  Lie.  Rodolfo  Reyes. 
Reyes  then  read  in  a loud  voice,  in  our  presence,  a 
document  in  which  both  Generals  agreed  upon  the 
ceasing  of  hostilities.  Huerta  and  Diaz  later 
signed  this  document,  embracing  immediately  after- 
wards, while  their  companions  applauded;  the  diplo- 
mats did  not  applaud,  remaining  as  mute  witnesses 
of  a scene  which  was  unexplainable  to  us. 


66 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


On  the  19th,  in  the  morning,  I left  the  Cuban 
Legation  and  went  through  several  streets,  in  order 
to  get  an  idea  of  the  popular  sentiment.  I heard 
the  death  of  Gustavo  Madero  discussed,  of  whose 
capture  I had  already  heard,  they  saying  that  he 
had  been  assassinated  in  the  arsenal,  and  that  in  the 
afternoon  Huerta  would  execute  the  president  him- 
self. They  also  stated  that  the  Vice-President, 
Pino  Suarez,  had  tried  to  escape.  While  I listened 
to  all  this,  a distinguished  Mexican  gentleman,  whose 
name  I shall  not  state,  detained  rrte  and  said:  “ You 
and  the  members  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps  are  the 
only  ones  who  can  save  Madero.” 

On  returning  to  the  Legation,  this  idea  had  taken 
possession  of  my  mind,  and  for  that  purpose  I im- 
mediately sent  a note  to  the  American  Ambassador, 
communicating  the  matter  to  him  and  proposing  to 
him  that  the  Diplomatic  Corps  should  take  charge 
of  the  same.  In  the  name  of  my  government,  I of- 
fered the  services  of  the  Cruiser  Cuba  (which  some 
days  previous  I had  requested  from  my  government, 
and  which  was  anchored  in  Vera  Cruz)  to  save  them 
from  danger,  taking  them  away  from  the  country, 
in  case  they  should  obtain  their  liberty.  I immedi- 
ately went  to  the  Japanese  Legation  to  see  the  par- 
ents of  the  President,  who  had  heard  of  the  death 
of  their  son,  Gustavo,  and  which  they  did  not  credit. 
They  begged  me  therefore,  to  go  to  Mr.  Wilson  and 
beg  him  to  aid  us  with  General  Huerta,  to  save  the 
lives  of  their  two  sons.  The  Charge  d’ Affaires  of 


Plotting  which  Overthrew  Madero  67 

the  Japanese  Legation  accompanied  me  to  the  Amer- 
ican Embassy  and  we  made  our  proposition  known 
to  the  Ambassador. 

We  there  met  the  Spanish  Minister,  and  he  and 
I agreed  that  the  situation  was  more  serious  than 
we  had  thought,  and  therefore  determined  to  per- 
sonally see  General  Huerta,  asking  him  for  the  lives 
of  the  prisoners.  We  went  in  my  automobile,  flying 
the  Cuban  flag,  but  we  were  not  able  to  see  Huerta. 
Instead,  we  were  received  by  General  Blanquet,  who 
treated  us  with  great  courtesy,  assuring  us  that  they 
would  respect  the  lives  of  the  prisoners,  and  while 
this  was  passing  the  Minister  of  Chile  arrived,  tell- 
ing us  that  Madero  had  consented  to  resign  as 
President  of  the  Republic,  and  that  the  Secretaries 
of  State  and  other  persons  who  had  been  made  pris- 
oners with  Madero  and  Pino  Suarez,  had  been  set 
at  liberty. 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th  nevertheless,  a rep- 
resentative of  Huerta  urged  Madero  to  resign. 
Madero  replied  to  this  messenger  that  he  was 
now  resolved  to  resign,  provided  that  he  who  had 
usurped  his  place  should  govern  according  to  the 
Constitution.  While  they  were  explaining  this, 
Mr.  Lascurain  went  to  see  Madero,  as  a mediator, 
to  whom  Madero  expressed  the  conditions  under 
which  he  would  resign.  Lascurain,  in  Huerta’s 
name,  accepted.  These  conditions  were:  that  the 
resignation  should  be  delivered  to  the  Minister  of 
Chile,  who  would  retain  it  in  his  possession  until 


68 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


Madero  and  Pino  Suarez  should  be  safely  aboard 
the  Cuba  in  Vera  Cruz.  Madero  stipulated  also 
that  in  the  trip  to  Vera  Cruz,  they  should  be  ac- 
companied by  the  Charge  d’Affaires  of  Japan  and 
myself,  Madero  insisting  principally  in  that,  before 
delivering  the  resignation  to  Congress,  Huerta 
should  sign  a letter,  in  which  he  would  promise  to 
comply  with  the  terms  of  same. 

That  same  afternoon  Madero  signed  his  resig- 
nation, and  further,  as  Lascurain  was  present,  he 
granted,  at  his  indication,  that  the  affair  should  be 
ventilated  among  Mexicans,  handing  the  resignation 
to  Lascurain,  instead  of  delivering  it  to  the  Min- 
ister of  Chili.  It  was  then  stipulated  that  at  ten 
o’clock  that  night  Madero  and  Pino  Suarez  would 
leave  for  Vera  Cruz  in  a special  train,  together  with 
their  families,  and  accompanied  by  myself  and  an 
official  of  the  Japanese  legation,  and  escorted  by  a 
powerful  guard. 

Having  communicated  this  arrangement  to  the  of- 
fice of  General  Blanquet,  I ascended  to  General 
Huerta’s  department  to  see  him,  but  I was  informed 
that  he  was  sleeping.  I immediately  returned  to 
the  office  of  General  Blanquet,  where  the  Ministers 
of  Chile  and  Spain  awaited  me.  We  then  asked 
for  permission  to  see  Madero  and  same  was  im- 
mediately conceded  to  us,  going  to  the  four  first 
rooms,  in  which  he  was  confined. 

Madero  warmly  expressed  his  gratitude  to  me, 


Plotting  which  Overthrew  Madero  69 

begging  me  to  accompany  him  to  Vera  Cruz,  which 
request  I was  pleased  to  accede  to. 

“ When  you  are  ready,”  he  told  us,  “ come  to  the 
palace  in  order  to  go  to  the  station.  It  would  be 
well  if  you  could  come  at  eight,  but  at  any  rate  I 
shall  wait  for  you  until  ten  o’clock.” 

I then  left,  and  immediately  went  to  telegraph 
to  the  Commander  of  the  Cuba  that  he  should  ex- 
pect us,  being  ready  to  sail  from  Vera  Cruz,  and 
that  he  should  do  what  was  necessary  in  order  to 
receive  aboard  the  Heads  of  the  Government  and 
their  families. 

At  eight  o’clock  I was  punctually  at  the  Palace, 
making  my  proposition  known  to  General  Blanquet. 
He  ordered  one  of  his  aides  to  accompany  me;  the 
four  rooms  occupied  by  Madero  and  Pino  Suarez 
were  connecting.  The  door  of  one  of  the  rooms 
faced  the  yard,  and  there  were  many  soldiers  and 
officials  in  the  entrance;  there  wrere  also  sentinels  in 
the  interior  of  the  sparsely  furnished  rooms,  sen- 
tinels who,  according  to  what  I knew  were  replaced 
each  moment.  General  Angeles,  one  of  the  offi- 
cial favorites  of  Madero,  was  also  a prisoner  in 
these  rooms.  Ernesto  Madero  was  there  visiting 
his  nephew. 

Receiving  us  affectionately,  Madero  asked  me  if 
I knew  anything  about  his  brother  Gustavo,  and  it 
could  be  seen  that  he  did  not  know  of  his  death.  I 
evaded  the  question  to  the  best  of  my  ability.  Sud- 


70 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


denly,  Madero  asked  about  the  letter  that  he  had  to 
give  to  Huerta.  None  of  us  had  it,  and  then  Er- 
nesto Madero  said  that  he  would  go  and  get  it  from 
Huerta.  Almost  immediately  he  returned  without 
it,  but  with  the  news  that  Lascurain  had  gone  to 
present  Madero’s  resignation  to  Congress. 

On  knowing  this,  Madero  became  very  excited, 
and  from  that  moment  lost  all  hope  of  salvation. 
“ I have  fallen  into  a trap  for  the  second  time,” 
he  said,  indicating  to  his  uncle  that  he  should  go  and 
tell  Lascurain  that  he  wished  him  to  come  immedi- 
ately. Then  Ernesto  Madero  confessed  the  truth 
to  him,  telling  him  that  the  resignation  had  already 
been  presented  and  accepted  by  Congress.  “ This 
is  a felony  of  Lascurain,”  said  Madero.  “ The 
agreement  was  that  the  resignation  should  not  be 
presented  until  I was  aboard  the  Cuba.’* 

In  those  moments,  we  knew  by  the  conduct  of 
an  official  that  Huerta  had  just  been  designated  as 
Provisional  President  by  Congress. 

“ This  has  been  the  second  trap  into  which  I have 
fallen,”  Madero  finally  said  to  me.  “ I am  now 
convinced  that  I shall  not  leave  Mexico  alive.  They 
will  conduct  me  to  prison  this  same  night,  and  on 
the  trip,  they  will  shoot  me,  or  else  they  will  assas- 
sinate me  right  here,  as  soon  as  we  are  alone.” 

Ernesto  Madero  begged  me  to  remain  with  him, 
telling  me  that  if  they  succeeded  in  surviving  that 
night,  that  probably  the  Diplomatic  Corps  would 
be  capable  of  saving  them.  I decided  to  accom- 


Plotting  which  Overthrew  Madero  71 

pany  them,  for  how  could  I have  the  heart  to  take 
my  hat  and  leave  them,  being  persuaded  that  these 
men  would  be  dead  as  soon  as  I was  in  the  street? 
Ernesto  finally  left  us,  Madero,  Pino  Suarez  and 
I remaining  in  these  gloomy  rooms. 

At  one  o’clock  in  the  morning  he  invited  me  to 
rest,  indicating  to  me  that  he  was  very  sleepy,  and 
without  the  least  agitation,  this  man  who  had  just 
been  deposed  from  the  Presidency,  commenced  to 
prepare  two  beds  with  chairs,  one  for  himself  and 
the  other  for  me. 

He  had  finished  his  labor,  when  an  official  sent 
by  General  Huerta  arrived,  he  having  ordered  him 
to  tell  us  that  the  train  arranged  to  conduct  the  pris- 
oners out  of  the  country  was  conveniently  ready,  but 
on  account  of  circumstances  which  he  would  explain 
later,  it  had  been  impossible  to  despatch  it.  The 
same  official  invited  me  to  retire  and  wait.  And 
as,  previously,  something  had  been  said  in  regard 
to  the  train  being  ready  to  leave  at  five  o’clock  in 
the  morning,  I asked  the  official  if  this  was  in  the 
programme,  but  he  replied  that  he  did  not  know 
anything.  As  soon  as  I saw  Madero  sleep,  I went 
to  keep  company  with  Pino  Suarez,  first  giving  a 
glance  at  Madero,  who  slept  like  a child.  At  this 
moment,  the  guards  entered  and  turned  out  the 
lights. 

From  the  upper  crevices  of  the  windows  some 
rays  of  light  penetrated,  but  they  did  not  molest 
us.  We  were  so  closely  guarded,  that  any  phrase 


72 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


which  passed  between  Pino  Suarez  and  myself  had 
to  be  spoken  in  a very  low  voice. 

At  9 -.30  in  the  morning  breakfast  was  served  to 
us.  Pino  Suarez  did  not  wish  to  take  the  coffee, 
fearing  that  it  might  be  poisoned,  but  Madero  and 
I took  it.  Then  Madero  gave  the  boy  who  had 
served  us  a dollar,  and  told  him  to  bring  us  the 
morning  papers.  We  did  not  permit  this,  fearing 
that  he  might  find  out  about  Gustavo’s  death.  Ma- 
dero became  resigned,  lying  down  on  his  bed  of 
chairs,  where  he  slept  for  twenty  minutes. 

When  he  awakened,  he  said  he  was  prepared  for 
everything  that  might  happen,  but  he  indicated  to 
me  that  I should  approach  the  diplomats  in  order 
to  save  him,  which  I promised  to  do  with  pleasure. 
He  also  asked  me  if  his  wife  had  also  made  any 
petition  personally  to  Huerta. 

About  ten  o’clock  in  the  morning,  the  wife  of 
Pino  Suarez  arrived,  accompanied  by  a gentleman, 
and  I then  took  leave  of  them. 

The  balance  of  that  day,  February  20th,  and  the 
two  following  days,  we  worked  to  save  Madero.  I 
asked  Huerta  why  he  had  not  given  his  consent  in 
this  respect,  to  which  he  replied  that  he  did  not 
dare  send  Madero  to  Vera  Cruz,  until  he  could  have 
confidence  in  the  military  authorities  of  that  place. 
I,  in  turn,  indicated  to  him  that  he  might  be  sent  to 
Tampico,  where  I could  have  the  Cuba  sent.  He 
further  showed  himself  irresolute.  Almost  all  the 


Plotting  which  Overthrew  M cider o 73 

foreign  ministers  saw  Huerta  personally  that  day, 
and  interceded  for  the  life  of  Madero. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2 2d,  the  ministers  thought 
the  lives  of  Madero  and  Pino  Suarez  to  be  out  of 
danger,  although  we  had  heard  the  rumor  that  they 
schemed  to  place  Madero  in  an  insane  asylum.  At 
night  all  the  ministers  approached  the  American  Em- 
bassy to  celebrate  the  anniversary  of  the  birth  of 
Washington.  Huerta  and  all  the  Ministers  in  his 
Cabinet  were  present  and  they  all  appeared  very 
calm. 

On  the  morning  of  the  following  day,  Sunday, 
I was  very  urgently  called  to  the  telephone.  It 
was  Mrs.  Madero,  who  was  very  excited  on  account 
of  the  news  she  had  received  that  her  husband  had 
been  wounded.  I answered  that  this  could  not  be 
true,  but  a little  later  I read  in  the  morning  papers 
the  event  of  the  death  of  Madero  and  Pino  Suarez 
at  11:15  the  previous  night,  on  being  taken  to  the 
penitentiary. 

Ambassador  Wilson  finally  tried  to  obtain  per- 
mission for  Mrs.  Madero  to  see  the  body  of  her 
husband.  We  then  believed  that  the  balance  of  the 
family  were  in  danger,  and  I hastily  proposed  to 
take  them  from  the  country.  I personally  sent  in 
a secret  manner  to  Vera  Cruz,  Francisco  Madero, 
father  of  the  assassinated  president,  and  his  brother 
Ernesto,  and  they  embarked  on  the  Cuba. 

I later  conducted  the  mother,  widow  and  sister 


74 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


of  the  President  to  the  Cuba,  leaving  Vera  Cruz 
on  February  25th. 

Mr.  Marquez  Sterling  has  belonged  to  the  Diplo- 
matic Corps  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba  several 
years,  and  has  occupied  the  post  of  Minister  in  Ar- 
gentine, Peru  and  Brazil.  During  the  administra- 
tion of  President  Palma,  he  was  counsellor  of  the 
Department  of  State.  He  presented  his  resigna- 
tion as  Minister  of  Mexico  after  the  murder  of  Ma- 
dero  and  Suarez. 

In  the  account  of  the  events  leading  to  the  mur- 
der of  Madero  and  Suarez,  Mr.  Marquez  Sterling 
mentions  the  excitement  of  the  prisoner-president 
when  he  discovered  that  Don  Pedro  Lascurain  had 
turned  over  the  written  resignation  of  Madero  into 
Huerta’s  hands. 

What  happened  was  told  by  Lascurain  himself. 
As  soon  as  General  Huerta  heard  that  Pedro  Lascu- 
rain had  Madero’s  resignation  in  his  possession,  he 
asked  to  see  him  and  begged  him  with  great  insist- 
ence to  give  him  the  valuable  paper.  Don  Pedro 
Lascurain  was  obdurate,  so  the  cunning  old  Indian, 
knowing  that  Lascurain  was  a devout  Catholic, 
fished  out  the  holy  medallion  hanging  by  a chain  to 
his  neck.  “ See  this  medallion,”  said  Huerta.  “ It 
is  the  most  precious  thing  I possess;  it  was  given 
to  me  by  my  mother  when  I was  a little  boy.  I 
promise  you  on  all  that  is  holy  and  sacred  to  me,  I 
swear  on  the  white  head  of  my  sainted  mother,  the 


Plotting  which  Overthrew  Madero  75 

memory  of  this  holy  image,  that  if  you  give  me  the 
President’s  resignation,  I shall  guarantee  his  life,” 
and  as  he  finished  the  sentence  he  kissed  the  holy 
medallion. 

Don  Pedro  Lascurain,  convinced,  handed  him  the 
paper  with  the  resignation  of  Madero  and  Suarez. 
The  next  day  General  Huerta  was  visited  by  the 
Belgian,  Spanish  and  Japanese  Ministers  who  asked 
him  to  guarantee  the  life  of  the  ex-President  and 
Vice-president.  Huerta  answered: 

“ Gentlemen,  will  you  guarantee  to  me  that  if  I 
permit  Madero  and  Suarez  to  go  out  of  Mexico, 
that  they  will  not  start  another  revolution  against 
my  government  in  the  United  States?  ” The  three 
diplomats  declared  that  they  could  not  give  such 
promises. 

“ Then,”  he  exclaimed,  “ gentlemen,  how  can  I 
be  made  responsible  for  their  lives?”  The  diplo- 
mats left  the  general  without  answering. 

As  the  price  of  blood,  the  generals  and  the  civil- 
ians demanded  the  heads  of  Madero  and  Suarez; 
the  most  insistent  of  all  was  Don  Rodolfo  Reyes, 
who  called  for  victims  to  avenge  the  death  of  his 
father  in  front  of  the  National  Palace.  Adolfo 
Basso’s  life  was  also  sacrificed  with  that  of  Gustavo 
Madero’s.  The  Huerta  Cabinet  went  into  power 
like  a Black  Hand  Cabinet,  after  the  assassination 
of  its  enemies.  This  infamous  list  should  be  re- 
membered by  all  who  are  interested  in  the  recon- 
struction of  Mexico,  and  who  speak  of  amnesty. 


76 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


General  Huerta,  Provisional  President. 
L.  de  la  Barra,  Foreign  Affairs. 

A.  Garcia  Granados,  Interior. 

Rodolfo  Reyes,  Justice. 

T.  Esquivel  Obregon,  Finance. 

General  Mondragon,  War. 

J.  Vera  Estanol,  Instruction. 

A.  Robles  Gil,  Fomento. 


CHAPTER  V 


HUERTA  IN  POWER THE  LANDING  OF  AMERICAN 

MARINES  IN  VERA  CRUZ 

\X7HEN  we  speak  of  revolutions  we  must  con- 
’ * sider  three  facts.  First,  that  in  Mexico’s 
history  there  have  been  only  three  real  revolutions : 
the  revolution  which  overthrew  Spanish  rule,  the 
three  years’  war  (1857-60),  and  the  Madero  revo- 
lution, which  began  with  the  overturning  of  the 
Diaz  regime  and  was  continued  by  the  Carranza 
revolution  and  the  flight  of  Huerta.  Secondly,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  all  other  political  and 
military  upheavals,  of  long  or  short  duration,  can- 
not be  called  revolutions  but  are  in  fact  either  muti- 
nies or  revolts  or  coups  d’etat  or  as  the  Mexicans 
call  them  “ cuartelazos.”  And  lastly,  that  no  revo- 
lution can  hope  of  success  unless  it  is  backed  by  the 
majority  of  the  middle  class,  and  no  successful  revo- 
lution can  be  organized  with  foreign  and  especially 
American  money  with  concessionary  strings  attached 
to  it. 

General  Huerta  with  a soldier’s  training  and  tem- 
perament, and  an  unsympathetic  knowdedge  of  his 
country’s  history,  thought  that  for  the  sake  of  get- 
ting and  staying  in  power  the  control  of  the  army 

77 


78 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


was  the  only  possible  road.  Not  only  Huerta,  but 
his  most  prominent  supporters  made  the  mistake  of 
confusing  cruelty,  brutality  and  treachery  with 
power. 

Huerta’s  cunning  was  believed  to  be  statesman- 
ship, but  very  soon  his  Machiavellian  “ double 
crossing  ” of  Felix  Diaz,  Rodolfo  Reyes  and  Gen- 
eral Mondragon,  pointed  to  his  methods  of  pro- 
cedure. The  elimination  of  his  more  powerful  ene- 
mies and  the  mysterious  disappearance  of  the  less 
known  enemies,  showed  that  wholesale  assassina- 
tions were  as  frequent  as  under  Diaz’s  rule.  Never- 
theless, if  Diaz  was  ruthless  he  was  at  least  more 
careful  of  public  opinion.  The  foolish  excuse  that 
a rescuing  party  had  been  responsible  for  the  acci- 
dental death  of  Madero  and  Suarez,  laid  bare  to 
the  world  the  inner  circumvolution  of  Huerta’s  po- 
litical brain. 

A simpleton  could  have  advised  him  that  Madero 
murdered  was  much  more  to  be  feared  than  Ma- 
dero alive.  Madero  the  martyr  was  remembered 
through  his  virtues  and  ideals,  and  all  his  faults, 
weaknesses  and  blunders  were  forgotten.  What 
Madero  alive  could  not  achieve,  Madero  dead, 
united  under  one  idea,  one  effort,  one  banner. 

Huerta’s  supporters  lacked  what  is  essential  in 
politics,  psychological  perception  of  public  opinion. 
Huerta,  the  double-edged  sword  of  the  clericals,  de- 
stroyed by  his  blunders  the  last  vestige  of  clerical 
power  which  supported  the  militarists  and  reaction- 


Huerta  in  Power 


79 


aries.  Terrible  sacrifices  were  enacted  to  strike  ter- 
ror into  the  hearts  of  political  opponents.  Secret 
agents  lured  the  political  victims  into  automobiles 
to  a solitary  spot  near  Mexico  City,  close  to  Guada- 
lupe; then  they  were  stabbed  to  death  and  hastily 
buried  on  the  spot. 

The  Huerta  executioners  were  themselves  in  dan- 
ger of  being  murdered  for  knowing  too  much,  but 
their  suspicion  enabled  them  to  escape  death,  and 
during  Carbajal’s  short  rule  they  were  caught  and 
lived  to  tell  the  details  of  their  gruesome  work. 

Dr.  Urrutia,  once  minister  of  the  interior  in 
Huerta’s  cabinet  was  the  chief  executioner  of  the  dic- 
tator. Senator  Dominguez  because  he  had  at- 
tacked Huerta  in  the  Senate  and  accused  him  of  the 
murder  of  Madero  and  Suarez,  and  Mr.  Rendon 
were  driven  gagged  to  Dr.  Urrutia’s  sanatorium  in 
the  suburbs.  They  were  put  to  sleep  under  the  in- 
fluence of  ether,  their  bodies  were  atrociously  muti- 
lated and  when  awakened  to  consciousness,  they 
died  of  the  loss  of  blood  and  the  tremendous  nerv- 
ous shock. 

Such  savage  methods  accelerated  the  disruption 
of  the  reign  of  terror  and  drove  all  elements  into 
active  co-operation  under  the  leadership  of  Car- 
ranza. Secret  agents  were  also  sent  to  murder  Car- 
ranza, Villa,  Obregon,  Gonzalez,  but  the  game  was 
too  risky.  The  federal  General  Rabago  succeeded 
in  catching  Abraham  Gonzalez,  governor  of  Chi- 
huahua under  Madero,  and  he  was  murdered  by 


8o 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


being  pushed  under  the  wheels  of  a moving  train. 

A supporter  of  General  Huerta  when  he  foresaw 
the  end  of  his  friend  went  into  exile.  He  claimed 
that  he  had  escaped  two  dangers  by  leaving  Mex- 
ico, one  was  a term  in  jail  and  the  other  a portfolio 
in  Huerta’s  cabinet. 

There  was  never  a period  in  the  history  of  Mex- 
ico when  such  a congregation  of  incompetents,  of 
grafters,  and  murderous  fools  held  sway;  even  in  the 
world’s  history  there  is  difficulty  in  finding  a paral- 
lel. We  have  to  go  back  to  Nero  and  Caracalla 
to  find  such  a depth  of  infamy,  cowardice  and 
Sadism. 

Victoriano  Huerta  appeared  as  a demoniacal 
clown  let  loose  on  the  political  circus  of  Mexico 
City,  in  an  infernal  saturnalia  of  gore,  drunken- 
ness and  prostitution.  Huerta  was  the  Avatar  of 
greed,  lust  and  alcoholism,  a moral  hyena  laughing 
diabolically  at  the  amazed  world,  a white-livered  sol- 
dier pickled  in  cognac,  a mental  baboon  grinning 
inanely  at  his  own  political  antics. 

His  own  cabinet  was  chosen  from  among  the  best 
saloons,  in  the  houses  of  prostitution  and  from  the 
prisons.  A meeting  of  the  Cabinet  was  like  a con- 
fab between  maniacs,  idiots  and  drunkards.  A 
prominent  Mexican  who  asked  to  be  heard  by  the 
members  of  the  Cabinet  reported  that  he  was  in- 
terrupted by  a minister  before  he  could  finish: 
“ This  is  no  time  for  reforms,”  said  he;  “ we  must 
drown  the  whole  country  in  blood.”  Another  sug- 


Huerta  in  Power 


8 1 


gested  American  intervention  as  the  best  method 
of  uniting  the  warring  revolutionary  elements. 
“ Then,”  he  added,  smiling,  “ the  fool  gringos  will 
do  the  dirty  work  for  us  and  our  lives  and  property 
will  be  respected.”  A third  member  advised  a 
repetition  of  the  system  of  reconcentration  as  was 
inaugurated  in  Cuba  by  General  Weyler. 

Cabinet  meetings  took  place  in  a house  several 
miles  from  Mexico  City  and  later  in  the  red  light 
district  and  the  famous  Cafe  Colon,  whose  proprie- 
tor was  made  a general.  All  the  ministers  were 
also  made  generals  and  had  to  appear  in  their  uni- 
forms. Everybody  in  the  employ  of  the  govern- 
ment was  created  an  officer  in  uniform,  even  the 
teachers  and  clerks.  Bartenders  were  made  ser- 
geants and  it  was  reported  that  Doha  Lupe  of  the 
Salto  del  Agua  was  appointed  honorary  Rear-Ad- 
miral of  a squadron  of  cruisers.  The  sons  of  the 
ministers,  especially  those  of  General  Blanquet  and 
the  sons  and  relatives  of  General  Huerta  received 
concessions  for  running  gambling  houses,  for  the 
sale  of  human  beings  into  the  army  at  so  much  per 
head,  and  contracts  for  the  sale  of  arms,  ammuni- 
tion, uniforms  and  victuals  to  the  War  Department. 

A naturalized  American  named  Ratner  was  indi- 
rectly responsible  for  the  landing  of  the  marines  in 
Vera  Cruz.  Ratner  was  the  president  of  the  Tam- 
pico News  Co. ; during  Madero’s  time  he  was  caught 
selling  arms  to  Zapata  and  was  deported  under  Ar- 
ticle 33  of  the  Constitution. 


82 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


When  General  Huerta  became  dictator  Ratner 
came  back.  Being  fertile  and  unscrupulous  in  ex- 
pedients, he  became  a favorite  of  the  general.  One 
day  he  advised  the  dictator  to  buy  all  the  arms  and 
ammunition  for  sale  then  in  the  United  States,  and 
for  six  months  ahead  so  as  to  prevent  the  Consti- 
tutionalists from  getting  any  at  any  price.  It  was 
discovered  that  the  sum  required  for  the  purpose 
was  too  great  so  the  order  was  limited  to  machine 
and  field  guns  and  ammunition.  Twenty-five  mil- 
lion dollars  in  gold  was  the  price  for  this  corner 
in  war  engines.  Ratner  engineered  the  whole 
scheme  and  shipped  the  material  to  Odessa  in  Rus- 
sia. From  Odessa  they  were  sent  to  Hamburg  and 
there  reshipped  for  Vera  Cruz. 

The  United  States  secret  service  agents,  who  had 
been  watching  closely  the  sales  of  American  manu- 
facturers, did  not  at  first  understand  the  meaning 
of  the  elaborate  and  expensive  shipping  and  reship- 
ping. 

When  the  Ypiranga  headed  for  Vera  Cruz  the 
whole  matter  became  clear.  Huerta’s  idea  was  to 
get  first  all  the  field  guns  in  the  United  States  so 
as  to  prevent  the  revolutionists  from  getting  them; 
thereupon  to  force  the  United  States  to  intervene 
in  Mexico,  counting  on  the  patriotism  of  the  Mex- 
icans to  fight  the  invaders.  His  idea  was  to  con- 
centrate all  the  revolutionary  chiefs  in  the  battles 
against  the  Americans  and  to  eliminate  them  one 
by  one  when  they  could  be  reached  more  easily  and 


Huerta  in  Power 


83 


without  arousing  suspicion.  If  that  plot  did  not 
succeed,  he  had  decided  to  permit  the  Ameri- 
cans to  occupy  Mexico  City,  knowing  that  they 
would  respect  the  lives  and  properties  of  all  fac- 
tions. 

The  Huerta  conspiracy  fell  through  because  the 
Constitutionalists  believed  in  the  word  and  friend- 
ship of  President  Wilson  and  they  mistrusted  the 
word  and  patriotism  of  Huerta.  It  was  soon  after- 
wards that  the  dictator  made  up  his  mind  to  resign. 
By  the  acceptance  of  the  A.B.C.  mediation,  the  game 
was  ended  and  he  had  decided  to  retire  before  it 
was  too  late.  Ratner  had  succeeded  in  his  under- 
taking and  his  commission  was  a million  and  a half 
in  gold. 

Senor  Don  Fernando  Iglesias  Calderon  related 
that  while  he  was  a prisoner  in  the  castle  of  San 
Juan  de  Ulloa  he  heard  that  an  order  had  been 
telephoned  from  the  Commander  of  Vera  Cruz  to 
the  Commander  of  the  fort,  to  release,  arm  and 
dress  about  300  convicts  in  civilian  clothes.  They 
were  landed  in  Vera  Cruz  the  night  before  the 
landing  of  American  marines.  In  the  morning 
General  Maas,  his  officers  and  soldiers  hastily  re- 
treated to  the  hills  near  Soledad. 

The  blue  jackets  found  no  Federals,  but  the  Mex- 
ican snipers  who  made  such  a desperate  resistance 
were  mostly  ex-convicts  who  were  promised  their  lib- 
erty if  they  fought  the  Americans.  The  shooting 
which  emanated  from  the  Naval  Academy  was  di- 


84 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


rected  by  ex-prisoners  and  a few  cadets  who  fought 
very  bravely. 

Two  days  after  the  landing  of  the  marines  Gen- 
eral Navarrete  of  the  staff  of  General  Maas  passed 
through  the  American  lines  into  the  fort  of  Ulloa, 
where  he  tried  to  induce  F.  Iglesias  Calderon  to 
join  Huerta  in  Mexico  City  and  publish  a manifesto 
uniting  all  factions  against  the  hated  Americans. 

Don  Fernando  Iglesias  answered  that  he  could 
not  believe  any  promises  made  by  Huerta  and  that 
he  was  quite  certain  that  the  Constitutionalists 
would  not  join  the  dictator  even  if  they  were  forced 
to  resist  an  American  invasion  in  the  north.  A few 
days  later  the  Commander  of  the  fort  under  the  ad- 
vice of  Don  Fernando  Iglesias  released  all  the  po- 
litical prisoners. 

The  Vera  Cruz  incident  showed  up  the  Federals 
as  a despicable,  cowardly  lot, — they  had  to  arm  a 
few  hundred  ex-convicts  and  civilians  to  do  the  fight- 
ing for  them. 

The  retirement  of  the  Federals  to  Soledad  like- 
wise proved  that  there  was  no  serious  intention  to 
resist  an  advance  of  American  soldiers  to  Mexico 
City,  as  the  general  line  of  march  could  never  have 
been  taken  by  way  of  Soledad,  but  only  through  the 
Cerro  Gordo  on  the  road  to  Jalapa  by  the  Inter- 
oceanic  Railroad,  the  same  itinerary  used  by  Scott 
in  1847.  By  advancing  through  the  Cerro  Gordo, 
Jalapa,  Perote  and  Puebla,  the  American  troops 
could  have  ignored  or  driven  the  Federals  at  Sole- 


Huerta  in  Power 


85 


dad  into  the  mountains  and  by  the  capture  of 
Esperanza  cut  off  their  communications  in  the  rear. 
That  would  automatically  have  forced  them  to 
evacuate  Soledad,  Cordoba,  and  Orizaba.  The 
whole  campaign  would  have  been  a repetition  of 
the  treachery  of  Santa  Anna  in  1847.  Fortunately 
for  the  Americans  and  Mexicans,  President  Wilson 
was  too  wise  to  fall  into  such  a trap,  and  the  Con- 
stitutionalists were  too  patriotic  to  play  into  the 
hands  of  Huerta. 


Note. — The  details  about  the  arming  of  prisoners  in  Ulloa  and 
the  landing  of  American  marines  in  Vera  Cruz  were  given  to  the 
writer  by  Don  Fernando  Iglesias  Calderon. 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  FINANCIAL  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE 
REVOLUTION 

"INTERESTED  observers  among  the  Americans 
and  foreigners  were  wondering  how  the  Consti- 
tutionalists could  keep  up  a revolution  against  an 
organized  military  dictatorship  like  Huerta  which 
had  millions  at  its  disposal;  and  strange  to  relate 
instead  of  getting  weaker  the  revolutionists  grew 
stronger  and  better  organized;  they  seemed  to  have 
money  to  buy  arms  and  ammunition,  to  run  their 
local  governments  and  even  to  send  representatives 
to  the  United  States,  and  Paris,  London,  Madrid 
and  Barcelona,  as  well  as  social  and  political  inves- 
tigators into  America  and  Europe.  The  Huerta 
Government  was  as  surprised  as  the  foreigners; 
they  were  certain  that  after  a year  of  fighting,  the 
backbone  of  the  revolution  would  be  broken,  but 
instead,  the  offensive  became  so  dangerous  that  Gen- 
eral Huerta  invited  American  intervention  so  as  to 
save  himself  as  well  as  his  partisans  from  complete 
political  annihilation. 

The  Huerta  agents  in  America  accused  the  Con- 
stitutionalists of  having  borrowed  money  from  great 
trusts  or  syndicates,  and  a New  York  paper  pub- 

86 


Financial  Organization  87 

lished  stolen  letters  to  prove  that  Carranza  had 
succeeded  in  getting  loans  from  corporations.  The 
letters  served  no  other  purpose  than  to  advertise 
the  lawyer  who  had  been  in  the  service  of  the  Ma- 
dero  revolution,  but  as  far  as  the  source  of  financial 
support,  it  was  as  mysterious  as  ever. 

“ How  can  they  fight,  eat  and  dress  without 
money?  ” was  asked.  “ How  can  they  get  the  fight- 
ing material  across  the  border  when  it  is  patrolled 
by  American  soldiers?”  Everybody  asked  the 
question  and  nobody  could  answer  it  satisfactorily. 
But  the  suspicion  was  in  the  air  that  the  revolution- 
ists with  their  agents  in  the  United  States  had  re- 
ceived millions  at  a high  rate  and  bartered  in  return 
for  it  oil,  mining  and  railroad  concessions.  The 
senatorial  investigation  which  had  labored  for 
months  and  published  its  results  in  a voluminous  re- 
port did  not  prove  that  Madero  had  financed  the 
revolution  of  1910  with  the  help  of  American 
money.  The  money  used  by  Gustavo  Madero  to 
finance  his  brother’s  revolution  seemed  so  small  that 
the  senators  looked  for  greater  sums  borrowed  from 
the  United  States  to  convince  them  in  their  suspicion 
that  all  Central  American  revolutions  were  started 
in  Wall  Street.  But  they  forgot  that  Madero’s 
revolution  was  not  initialed  in  New  York’s  financial 
centre,  and  that  no  great  movement  can  succeed  un- 
less the  lower  or  middle  class  fight  for  it. 

The  fact  is  clear  that  no  Mexican  political  leader 
or  military  chief  could  afford  to  be  linked  in  any 


88 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


shape  or  manner  with  any  foreign  corporation,  as 
that  would  have  discredited  him  forever  in  the  eyes 
of  his  countrymen. 

As  a convincing  example  illustrating  this  asser- 
tion, the  Madero  revolutionary  loan  can  be  referred 
to.  When  Francisco  I.  Madero  came  into  power 
his  brother,  Gustavo,  put  in  a bill  for  750,000  pesos 
($375, ooo)  for  expenses  incurred  by  him  during 
the  revolution.  As  no  vouchers  or  explanations 
wrere  offered  as  to  the  origin  of  the  money,  accusa- 
tions were  made  against  Gustavo  Madero  that  he 
had  borrowed  money  at  a high  rate  of  interest  from 
an  American  oil  company  and  given  in  exchange  val- 
uable oil  concessions  to  the  detriment  of  a British 
oil  company.  After  Gustavo’s  death  it  was  discov- 
ered that  he  had  misappropriated  $375,000  from 
the  funds  of  a railroad  company,  organized  in  Mex- 
ico and  financed  in  Paris  to  build  a railroad  from 
Camacho  to  Gomez  Farias,  and  instead  of  using 
the  money  for  railroad  construction  he  had  sunk  it 
to  buy  arms  and  ammunition  for  his  brother’s  revo- 
lution. By  his  desperate  and  bold  action,  Gustavo 
Madero  had  risked  his  reputation  and  liberty  and 
was  saved  in  the  nick  of  time  from  extradition  pro- 
ceedings by  the  success  of  the  revolution. 

Later,  instead  of  telling  the  truth,  Gustavo  Ma- 
dero kept  silent  and  in  Mexico  his  enemies  went  so 
far  as  to  accuse  him  of  having  practically  delivered 
his  brother’s  government  into  the  hands  of  a Yankee 
corporation.  Those  accusations  cast  a shadow  on 


Financial  Organization  89 

the  whole  Madero  regime  and  were  a great  handi- 
cap to  its  success. 

Carranza,  who  is  an  older  man  of  political  and 
financial  experience,  realized  from  the  beginning 
that  he  could  not  borrow  money  from  American  or 
foreign  companies  and  decided  to  rely  entirely  on 
the  resources  of  his  own  country.  Impoverished  as 
Mexico  was  by  two  successive  revolutions,  the  work 
was  slower  and  entailed  great  loss  of  lives  and  for- 
eign property.  Nevertheless,  Carranza  reasoned 
that  if  Mexico  could  not  organize  a revolution  with- 
out foreign  help  it  might  as  well  give  up  the  task 
and  bend  under  the  yoke  of  the  dictator.  The  faith 
of  Carranza  in  the  resources  of  his  country  proved 
that  he  was  right. 

It  demonstrated  first,  that  Mexico  would  go  to 
any  length  rather  than  submit  to  the  murderous 
regime  of  Huerta;  secondly  by  forcing  his  adher- 
ents to  organize  local  governments  in  every  con- 
quered state  and  city  for  the  purpose  of  contribu- 
tion and  order,  Carranza  facilitated  and  accelerated 
the  final  political  reconstruction  of  the  government 
when  his  troops  should  enter  Mexico  City,  and  third 
and  last  he  would  create  for  himself  and  his  sup- 
porters an  impregnable  position  from  the  foreign 
as  well  as  the  Mexican  enemies  of  his  cause. 

Carranza  is  fifty-five  years  old,  young  enough 
to  take  the  field  personally  and  wise  enough 
not  to  walk  into  pitfalls  and  mistakes  excusable  but 
not  pardonable  in  a younger  man.  The  blunders 


90 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


of  the  Madero  regime  were  not  lost  upon  him.  Two 
of  the  most  grievous  mistakes  committed  by  the 
Madero  revolutionist  leaders  were  the  acceptance  of 
foreign  financial  assistance  and  a compromise  with 
the  power  which  was  being  overthrown. 

As  revolutions  cost  money  and  none  was  forth- 
coming or  could  be  had  after  the  murder  of  Presi- 
dent Madero  and  Vice-president  Suarez,  Carranza 
convened  the  state  legislation  of  Coahuila  demand- 
ing from  it  the  refusal  of  allegiance  asked  by  Gen- 
eral Huerta,  and  a vote  to  turn  over  to  him  the 
money  of  the  state  treasury  for  revolutionary  pur- 
poses. Then  he  rode  with  a few  followers  on 
horseback  through  the  federal  lines  across  the 
mountains  of  the  States  of  Durango  and  Sinaloa 
into  Sonora,  a State  not  connected  directly  by  rail 
with  Mexico  City.  Being  more  free  there  from  mo- 
lestation by  federal  soldiers  than  the  other  border 
States  he  helped  to  organize  the  government  and 
made  his  headquarters  for  a while  in  Hermosillo, 
Sonora.  The  seizure  of  the  border  towns  of  No- 
gales and  Agua  Prieta  opened  the  way  to  the  im- 
portation of  arms  and  ammunition  and  to  the  re- 
ceipts of  the  custom  houses.  As  the  revolutionary 
troops  on  the  border  States  captured  more  custom 
houses,  as  happened  in  Juarez,  Ciudad  P.  Diaz, 
Nuevo  Laredo,  Matamoros  and  finally  the  seaport 
of  Tampico,  the  revenues  increased  as  well  as  the 
facilities  for  the  importation  of  foodstuffs,  clothing 
and  ammunition. 


) 


Financial  Organization  91 

Carranza  and  his  sub-chiefs  had  five  different 
methods  of  acquiring  financial  support  in  northern 
Mexico. 

1.  The  interior  war  tax,  which  was  paid  by  Mex- 
ican and  foreign  commercial  mining  and  industrial 
firms  doing  business  in  the  northern  States,  besides 
the  taxes  paid  by  the  “ haciendados  ” or  land  own- 
ers, farmers. 

2.  Custom  house  duties  at  all  the  border  towns 
on  imports  and  exports,  that  is  to  say  on  foodstuffs, 
cattle,  ore,  metal,  clothing,  etc.,  which  were  paid 
in  gold  as  arms  and  ammunition  bought  by  the  rebels 
had  to  be  paid  in  gold. 

3.  Forced  loans  from  the  enemies  of  the  Consti- 
tutionalists. 

4.  Voluntary  loans  by  the  friends  of  the  revolu- 
tion such  as  rich  Mexican  landowners,  capitalists 
and  miners. 

5.  The  creation  of  an  interior  debt  by  the  issue 
of  paper  money  to  be  circulated  in  all  the  territory 
under  the  power  of  the  revolution  and  the  prohibi- 
tion to  circulate  the  bills  issued  by  the  Banco  Na- 
tional of  Mexico  City  on  February  18th,  1913,  at 
the  order  of  General  Huerta. 

In  a pamphlet  of  recent  date  there  will  be  found 
the  decrees  and  other  transactions  of  the  Constitu- 
tionalist army.  The  official  publication  born  in 
Chihuahua,  1914,  prints  the  date  of  each  one  of  the 
decrees  permitting  the  printing  of  paper  money. 
The  first  issue  of  paper  money  was  emitted  for  5,- 


92 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


000,000  pesos  on  the  26th  of  April,  1913,  the  sec- 
ond one  for  fifteen  millions  on  February  28th,  1913, 
and  the  third  one  for  ten  millions  on  February  12th, 
1914,  for  bills  of  five,  ten,  fifty  and  hundred  pesos 
denominations.  As  the  circulation  of  those  three 
issues  tended  to  raise  prices  in  general  by  paralyzing 
the  transactions  with  fractional  money,  Carranza  au- 
thorized three  more  issues  of  paper  money.  One 
for  two  hundred  thousand,  the  second  for  eight 
hundred  thousand  and  the  third  for  one  million,  for 
five  and  ten  cents  denominations,  on  the  26th  of 
April,  28th  of  December,  1913,  and  on  February 
12th,  1914. 

Up  to  May,  1914,  altogether  thirty-two  million 
pesos  in  paper  money  were  issued  to  cover  the  ex- 
penses of  the  revolution. 

The  governors  and  military  chiefs  were  empow- 
ered to  do  the  same  in  the  States  under  their  juris- 
diction: Generals  Villa  and  Chao  in  the  State  of 
Chihuahua,  Governor  Riveros  in  Sinaloa,  General 
Caballeros  in  Tamaulipas  and  Villareal  in  Nuevo 
Leon. 

When  it  is  considered  that  the  Constitutionalists 
had  almost  100,000  men  under  arms,  the  Madero 
revolution  by  comparison  will  seem  an  amateurish 
and  insignificant  affair. 

General  Obregon  was  supposed  to  have  20,000, 
General  Villa  another  20,000,  General  Gonzalez 
22,000,  General  Carrera  20,000,  General  Natera 


Financial  Organization  93 

and  the  Arrietas  6,000,  without  counting  the  Zapa- 
tistas with  over  20,000  men. 

On  an  average  and  in  fairly  round  figures  the 
revolution  cost  about  $200,000  a week  or  $800,000 
a month.  For  a revolution  which  has  lasted  over 
a year  and  three  months  the  performance  is  quite 
wonderful  and  shows  remarkable  organizing  quali- 
ties in  Carranza  and  the  amazing  vitality  of  Mexico. 

When  General  Huerta  waded  through  Madero’s 
blood  into  the  dictator’s  chair  he  was  able  to  get 
over  fifty  million  dollars  in  gold  from  American  and 
French  bankers,  besides  voluntary  and  enforced  con- 
tributions from  the  Catholic  clergy,  foreign  corpora- 
tions and  commercial  and  industrial  concerns  with 
headquarters  in  Mexico  City  and  unwilling  loans 
from  Mexican  haciendados.  Huerta  had  all  the 
power  of  the  government  concentrated  in  Mexico 
City  in  his  hands,  the  support  of  all  the  foreign 
powers  with  the  exception  of  the  United  States,  and 
in  spite  of  all  he  failed. 

American  bankers  who  had  hastily  but  unwisely 
loaned  several  millions  to  General  Huerta  in  the 
forlorn  hope  that  he  could  prove  a second  Diaz  to 
subdue  Mexico,  lost  faith  in  the  dictator’s  ability 
and  sent  an  agent  to  offer  six  million  dollars  to  Car- 
ranza if  he  would  promise  to  guarantee  Huerta’s 
loans.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  offer  was 
rejected. 

Another  committee  of  American  bankers  sent  an 


94 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


emissary  to  Mexico  City  to  offer  General  Huerta 
three  million  dollars  if  he  would  only  resign  and 
get  out.  In  the  first  case  the  aforementioned 
banker  learned  to  his  surprise  that  the  revolution- 
ary chief  was  a man  of  principles  and  could  not  be 
bought;  the  mistake  would  have  been  avoided  if 
the  American  financier  had  read  the  answer  of  Car- 
ranza to  Felix  Diaz  and  General  Huerta  offering 
him  a huge  bribe  to  retract  his  challenge  against 
the  dictatorship.  In  the  second  instance  they  of- 
fered Huerta  three  millions  when  he  had  decided 
to  throw  up  the  sponge,  and  instead  of  accelerating 
his  exit  from  Mexico,  only  retarded  it  long  enough 
for  Huerta  to  pocket  their  money. 

In  both  cases  the  American  bankers  have  shown 
a fundamental  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  Mexican 
situation  and  of  Mexican  ways. 

The  Mexican  revolution  was  essentially  a Mex- 
ican affair  and  even  a superficial  review  of  Mexican 
history  would  have  revealed  a great  similarity  be- 
tween it  and  the  Three  Years’  War.  It  took  the 
name  of  Constitutionalist  Revolution  from  the  Con- 
stitution of  1857,  for  which  the  Liberals  of  that 
period  were  fighting  as  against  the  clerical  dicta- 
torship. 

Even  if  General  Huerta  had  been  able  to  borrow 
150  million  dollars  in  Paris  as  he  expected  to  do, 
he  would  have  been  defeated  in  the  end;  it  would 
have  taken  longer  to  destroy  his  power,  but  the 
result  would  have  been  the  same.  It  would  pay 


Financial  Organization  95 

American  bankers  to  seek  the  advice  of  unbiased 
observers,  men  who  are  in  sympathy  with  Mexican 
aims  and  ambitions,  who  have  a thorough  knowl- 
edge of  the  people  and  their  history,  and  not  from 
agents  or  individuals  who  are  interested  concession- 
aires and  foreigners  or  Americans  who  in  spite  of 
their  long  residence  in  the  country  are  as  ignorant 
of  Mexican  conditions  as  on  the  first  day  of  their 
arrival  in  Mexico. 


CHAPTER  VII 


CIVIL  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  REVOLUTION 

/~\NE  of  the  causes  which  defeated  the  work  of 
the  Madero  revolution,  was  the  lack  of  or- 
ganization of  civil  governments  within  the  States 
conquered  by  the  Maderistas.  Rebel  bands  wan- 
dered hither  and  thither,  taking  anything  they 
needed  and  signing  vouchers  to  be  repaid  at  the  end 
of  the  revolution. 

The  Judges,  “ Jefes  Politicos  ” and  minor  offi- 
cials, with  the  exception  of  marked  men,  stayed  in 
office  during  the  revolution,  and  after  Madero  came 
into  power.  The  machinery  of  Diaz  remained,  the 
army  and  all  the  officials,  with  the  exception  of 
the  President,  cabinet  members  and  the  governors. 

Carranza  learned  a lesson  and  decided  to  or- 
ganize the  local  government  wherever  he  went  and 
wherever  the  Constitutionalists  were  masters  of 
States.  As  the  chief  of  the  revolution,  Carranza 
directed  the  movement  of  the  three  army  divisions, 
that  is  to  say,  the  great  strategic  lines,  and  the  gen- 
erals took  care  of  the  tactical  movements.  Thus 
was  the  first  chief  able  to  devote  his  energy  to  the 
creation  of  civil  government,  instead  of  personally 
directing  or  fighting  battles.  Many  critics  have 

96 


Civil  Organization  of  the  Revolution  97 

wondered  what  Carranza  had  done  in  the  Revolu- 
tion. It  is  quite  comprehensible  that  the  patient, 
unremitting  task  of  organizing  the  civil  government 
of  conquered  States,  does  not  appear  in  the  same 
romantic  light  as  the  attacking  and  storming  of  a 
city,  although  it  is  as  important  and  useful,  and 
more  enduring  work. 

In  many  States  in  the  south — Morelos,  Guer- 
rero— where  the  Huerta  officials  had  all  fled  and 
the  only  rulers  were  the  Zapatista  soldiers,  the  In- 
dians had  instinctively  organized  a patriarchal  and 
tribal  rule  of  their  own.  Very  significant  of  the 
patience,  and  law-abiding  sentiment  of  the  average 
Mexican,  is  the  fact  that  in  those  regions,  where 
for  over  two  years  no  government  existed,  crimes 
were  less  frequent  than  where  the  government  held 
sway. 

Carranza  began  to  organize  the  postal  and  tele- 
graph systems  in  Durango,  Sinaloa  and  Sonora. 
Headquarters  were  in  Hermosillo,  as  the  federals 
always  kept  either  to  border  towns  or  seaports, — 
the  rest  of  the  State  was  under  the  control  of  the 
Constitutionalists.  Wherever  possible  the  trains 
were  run  on  schedule  time, — telegrams  and  mail 
were  sent  and  received.  Judges  and  all  the  munici- 
pal governments  of  the  larger  and  smaller  cities 
were  created.  When  the  border  towns  were  taken, 
a simple  system  of  tariff  was  enacted  working  both 
ways,  for  exports  as  well  as  imports.  The  Minis- 
ter who  helped  Carranza  as  Secretary  of  the  In- 


98 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


terior,  was  Rafael  Zubaran  Capmany,  who  after- 
wards was  sent  to  Washington  as  a confidential 
agent  for  the  Constitutionalists. 

Those  who  have  had  an  opportunity  to  follow 
the  operations  of  Carranza  through  the  official 
paper,  El  Constitucionalista,  and  the  pamphlet 
which  contains  his  decrees,  can  pursue  step  by  step 
all  his  official  acts  and  his  reconstructive  policy. 

Don  F.  Iglesias  Calderon,  after  escaping  from  the 
fortress  of  San  Juan  de  Ulloa,  told  the  writer  that 
he  crossed  the  border  at  Juarez  for  Chihuahua, 
Torreon,  Saltillo,  Monterey,  and  back  to  the  bor- 
der, and  very  much  to  his  surprise  he  travelled  on 
schedule  time.  At  that  time  the  whole  north  was 
in  the  hands  of  the  Constitutionalists. 

The  foreign  press  could  not  understand  why  Car- 
ranza did  not  hasten  at  once  to  Mexico  City  after 
the  flight  of  Huerta.  Carranza  could  not  leave  a 
single  State  between  Mexico  City  and  the  border 
unorganized,  that  is  to  say,  without  placing  Consti- 
tutionalist officials  in  charge.  Otherwise  the  Huerta 
officials  would  later  have  created  local  strife.  The 
first  Chief  had  to  put  new  wine  in  new  bottles, 
in  order  to  succeed  in  any  future  reform  which 
might  be  enacted  by  Congress. 

With  Carranza  it  was  not  only  a question  of 
conquest.  His  idea  was  to  rebuild,  reconstruct 
Mexico,  not  merely  conquer  it. 


DON  RAFAEL  ZUBARAN  CAPMANY 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  with  Carranza,  also  Representative 
of  Carranza  in  Washington 


CHAPTER  VIII 


DIPLOMATIC  WORK  IN  WASHINGTON 

TTROM  the  inception  of  the  Constitutionalist  revo- 
A lution,  Carranza  appreciated  the  necessity  of 
having  a representative  in  Washington.  Alberto 
Pani  and  Roberto  V.  Pesqueira  organized  a junta 
which  would  counteract  the  campaign  waged  against 
the  Constitutionalists  by  the  Huerta  agents  in  con- 
junction with  the  American  interests,  in  the  vain 
hope  of  a recognition  of  the  Huerta  regime  by  the 
Democratic  administration.  Pesqueira  paid  the  ex- 
penses of  the  office  out  of  his  own  pocket  until  Car- 
ranza was  able  to  devote  some  of  the  money  at  the 
disposal  of  the  revolution,  to  other  purposes  besides 
the  buying  of  arms  and  ammunition. 

The  intelligent  and  effective  work  done  by  the 
two  constitutionalist  ambassadors  concentrated  the 
attention  of  the  American  public  upon  a struggle 
which  had  appeared  one-sided  and  hopeless. 

After  a succession  of  defeats  by  the  federal  gen- 
erals in  the  north,  Huerta  recognized  that  the  great 
army  at  his  disposal  was  swiftly  crumbling  to  pieces, 
and  the  three  divisions  under  the  Constitutionalist 
generals  were  determinedly  closing  in  upon  him,  he 
became  afraid,  and  with  the  same  unscrupulousness 

99 


IOO 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


of  former  reactionary  despots  in  Mexico,  he  plucked 
a leaf  from  the  history  of  Mexico,  attempting  to 
repeat  the  feat  successfully  carried  out  by  the  cler- 
icals in  1847,  when  American  intervention  was 
forced,  and  in  1861  when  French  intervention  was 
deliberately  invited,  to  save  clericalism  from  utter 
annihilation. 

Carranza  foresaw  the  move,  as  the  members  of 
Huerta’s  cabinet  had  openly  boasted  to  bring  about 
American  intervention  to  save  their  interests  and 
their  lives.  With  Carranza  in  Hermosillo  was  a 
Mr.  Rafael  Zubaran  Capmany,  a young  Mexican 
lawyer  from  Campeche,  who  acted  as  his  Secretary 
of  the  Interior  in  the  Provisional  Cabinet.  Car- 
ranza picked  out  Mr.  Zubaran  as  the  one  man  in 
Mexico  to  play  the  diplomatic  game  in  Washington 
which  would  ward  off  American  intervention,  even 
after  the  American  troops  had  occupied  Vera  Cruz. 

It  is  quite  true  that  the  landing  of  American  ma- 
rines meant  intervention,  but  President  Wilson  had 
declared  that  it  was  done  against  General  Huerta, 
the  Dictator,  and  not  against  the  Mexican  people; 
that  American  soldiers  would  be  satisfied  to  occupy 
the  Mexican  port  until  the  usurper  was  driven  out. 

To  make  the  average  Mexican  understand  this 
complicated  situation,  and  to  convince  the  Amer- 
icans that  Carranza’s  protest  was  not  only  neces- 
sary but  was  the  only  manly  and  patriotic  act  pos- 
sible for  any  Mexican  leader,  was  the  task  which 
befell  Sr.  Zubaran. 


Diplomatic  Work  in  Washington  ioi 

The  lifting  of  the  embargo  on  arms  and  am- 
munition at  the  border,  without  arousing  the  hos- 
tility of  the  War  Department  in  Washington,  was 
another  difficult  mission. 

To  prevent  the  Mexican  constitutionalists  from 
crossing  the  American  border,  thereby  playing  into 
the  hands  of  Huerta,  was  as  perilous  and  risky  a 
game  as  putting  out  a lighted  fuse  near  a powder 
magazine. 

A talented  writer  and  lawyer,  Don  Luis  Cabrera, 
ably  assisted  Rafael  Zubaran.  The  sympathetic  at- 
titude of  President  Wilson  and  Secretary  Bryan 
helped  to  crown  the  efforts  with  success.  Also,  the 
unofficial  and  friendly  co-operation  of  ex-Governor 
Lind  was  of  incalculable  value  to  the  Mexican  dip- 
lomats. 

But  any  other  less  experienced  and  less  discreet 
personality,  a mind  less  acute,  keen  and  masterly, 
would  have  failed  ignominiously.  Americans  as 
well  as  Mexicans  are  discovering  that  diplomatic 
victories,  although  silent  and  modest,  are  as  effec- 
tive and  useful  as  military  achievements. 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE  CONSTITUTIONALISTS  IN  PARIS 
LTHOUGH  the  diplomatic  and  financial  bat- 


tle for  great  loans  of  the  Huerta  regime  was 
waged  and  lost  in  the  United  States,  as  a result  of 
the  attitude  of  the  Wilson  administration,  Huerta 
was  nevertheless  enabled  to  make  a loan  in  Wall 
Street,  ostensibly  to  pay  the  interest  on  the  Rail- 
road Merger.  The  real  battle  for  financial  assist- 
ance, however,  was  fought  in  Paris. 

The  Parisian  bankers  were  always  favorably  in- 
clined to  the  existing  governments  of  Mexico.  Diaz 
had  always  been  considered  financially  solvent,  with 
Limantour  at  his  side. 

The  French  and  English  bankers,  who  had  made 
fortunes  on  Mexican  loans,  always  spoke  with  re- 
gret and  almost  pique  at  the  overthrow  of  “ the 
grand  old  man.”  Foreign  bankers  not  being  by 
nature  sentimental  or  radical,  had  no  sympathy  or 
understanding  for  the  tremendous  popular  upheaval 
in  Mexico.  The  whole  great  libertarian  move- 
ment was  quite  misuhderstood  or  ignored.  The 
Huerta  regime  seemed  like  a reversion  to  the  good 
old  fat  times  under  Limantour.  Huerta  exhibited 
all  the  ear-marks  of  the  strong  man  on  horseback. 


102 


The  Constitutionalists  in  Paris  103 

To  the  superficial  bankers,  the  Mexican  Caracalla 
was  bound  to  stay  and  ask  for  more  loans,  and  offer 
more  profits. 

In  London,  the  press  did  not  pay  much  attention 
to  the  Constitutionalists,  as  the  English  oil  interests 
saw  to  it  that  stories  were  circulated  about  the  ban- 
dits, cut-throats  and  robbers  who  were  infesting 
Mexico  under  the  excuse  of  fighting  against  the  de 
facto  government. 

As  the  English  oil  interests  were  closely  connected 
with  the  English  government,  they  having  signed  a 
contract  to  supply  the  British  navy  with  oil,  Huerta 
gladly  gave  all  the  concessions  asked  for,  and  con- 
firmed the  previous  ones.  Although  the  English 
oil  interests  denied  in  the  press  that  they  were  in- 
volved in  politics,  certain  facts  came  to  the  notice 
of  the  Constitutionalists  in  Paris,  which  proved  the 
contrary.  Dr.  Atl,  who  was  living  in  Paris,  vouches 
for  the  data  furnished. 

Dr.  Atl  had  been  very  friendly  to  Dr.  Urrutia 
years  ago,  as  the  famous  surgeon  politician  had 
saved  his  life.  While  Dr.  Atl  was  in  the  hospital, 
he  became  intimate  with  General  Huerta,  and  being 
a “ compadre  ” to  Dr.  Urrutia,  there  were  no  se- 
crets between  them.  After  the  assassination  of 
Madero  and  Suarez,  Dr.  Urrutia  bethought  him- 
self of  the  friendship  and  gratitude  of  his  friend, 
and  without  much  ado  telegraphed  Dr.  Atl  that  one 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  were  at  his  dis- 
posal at  the  Mexican  legation  in  Paris:  he  was  to 


104  Carranza  and  Mexico 

use  it  to  influence  the  French  press.  Although  Dr. 
Atl  was  broke,  as  befits  a sincere  artist,  he  sent  an 
answer  which  is  not  fit  for  publication,  but  which 
does  credit  to  his  patriotism  and  his  integrity. 

Dr.  Atl  discovered  that  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
he  was  considered  almost  a confrere  among  the 
French  journalists,  owing  to  the  fact  that  he  pub- 
lished an  art  paper  in  French,  and  wrote  for  most 
literary  magazines  and  papers  in  Paris, — when  it 
came  to  offering  material  on  the  subject  of  the  Con- 
stitutionalist cause  of  Mexico,  the  pages  of  the  peri- 
odicals were  without  exception  closed  to  him. 
Finally  reporters  admitted  to  him  that  the  English 
oil  interests  had  been  paying  enormous  sums  of 
money,  aggregating  the  sum  of  seven  million  francs. 
He  was  even  pointed  out  an  agent  of  the  same  oil 
interests,  who  had  left  to  the  editor  of  the  paper  the 
sum  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  francs  as 
a friendly  reminder. 

After  the  refusal  of  Dr.  Atl  to  work  for  the 
Huerta  regime,  a brother  of  de  la  Barra  took  up  the 
task.  Not  a word  could  slip  into  the  French  papers 
about  the  defeats  of  the  Federals,  and  strenuous 
efforts  were  being  made  to  finance  a loan  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  million  dollars  for  Huerta.  Dr. 
Atl  had  heard  that  the  loan  would  be  effected  within 
a week.  In  despair  he  walked  from  one  office  to 
the  other  and  succeeded  only  in  getting  snubs  and 
rebuffs.  To  make  matters  worse,  it  rained  cats  and 
dogs.  Our  peripatetic  artist,  soaking  wet,  tired  and 


The  Constitutionalists  in  Paris  105 

hungry,  not  having  eaten  a morsel  of  food  for  two 
days,  was  on  the  point  of  giving  up  the  struggle, 
when  he  decided  to  try  the  only  newspaper  in  Paris 
which  was  above  venality,  the  socialist  paper, 
L’Humanite.  He  presented  himself  at  the  office, 
and  insisted  on  speaking  to  Monsieur  Jaures,  who 
was  the  editor.  The  veteran  socialist  finally  con- 
sented to  see  him.  “ I am  not  representing  any 
financial  interests,”  spoke  up  Dr.  Atl,  “ I am  only  a 
poor  Mexican  artist,  who  expects  you  to  tell  the 
truth  about  a matter  of  interest,  not  only  to  Mexico, 
but  especially  to  French  investors.  Huerta  is  ex- 
pected to  wind  up  a loan  of  750  million  francs;  I 
want  to  inform  you  that  Carranza,  Chief  of  the 
Constitutionalists,  has  communicated  a letter  to  the 
press  in  the  United  States,  and  to  us,  that  if  the 
revolution  is  successful,  the  French  loan  to  Huerta 
will  not  be  recognized  by  the  successful  Constitu- 
tionalists. As  I know  that  you  are  honest  and  do 
not  want  to  see  the  French  investors  risk  losing  their 
money,  I beg  of  you  to  publish  the  statement  made 
by  Carranza.” 

Jaures  published  the  letter  the  next  day.  Mex- 
ican bonds  went  down  ten  points,  and  the  loan  fell 
through.  Dr.  Atl  is  now  Director  of  the  National 
Art  School  in  Mexico  City. 


CHAPTER  X 


INVESTIGATION  WORK  INTO  THE  MUNICIPAL  CITY 
GOVERNMENTS  AND  THE  RURAL  SCHOOL  SYSTEM, 
FACTORIES  AND  INDUSTRIAL  CENTRES  IN  THE 
UNITED  STATES 

BY  MODESTO  C.  ROLLAND 

PUTTING  aside  my  humble  personality,  not  of 
A much  importance  to  the  reader,  I am  going  to 
relate  my  life  since  the  Mexican  revolution,  for  in 
this  manner  I can  more  clearly  place  in  relief  some- 
thing of  the  history  and  social  conditions  in  Mex- 
ico, which  should  be  known  by  all  who  desire  in- 
formation on  what  has  taken  place  and  what  we 
wish  to  do. 

Convinced  as  we  were  of  the  tremendous  social 
inequality  that  has  existed  in  Mexico  under  the  au- 
thority of  the  capitalists  and  of  the  clerical  party, 
before  the  apparition  of  Madero,  the  idea  was 
launched  of  not  permitting  a re-election  with  a view 
to  compelling  Porfirio  Diaz  to  verify  the  necessary 
evolution,  fearing  as  we  did  the  effects  of  a revo- 
lution. 

We  thought,  inexperienced  sociologists,  that  it 
was  possible  to  conquer  a tyrant  by  persuasion,  so 

106 


MODESTO  C.  ROLLAND 
Engineer,  School  Teacher,  Member  of  the  Cabinet 


♦ 


Investigation  Work  107 

as  to  permit  the  democratic  practices  necessary  to 
choose  the  President.  We  made  a mistake,  and 
the  anti-re-electionists  had  to  combat  a revolution. 
Madero  expounded  the  doctrines  which  were  spread 
over  the  country,  and  was  at  the  head  of  the  revo- 
lution that  imperiously  triumphed. 

Many  of  us  Mexicans  thinking  it  was  time  to 
take  part  in  public  affairs,  united  and  formed  an 
Engineers’  Club  with  a view  to  studying  national 
problems.  In  a word,  we  worked  for  the  national- 
ization of  the  National  Railways,  and  for  the  es- 
tablishment of  postal  savings.  Nearly  all  of  our 
efforts  were  shattered  by  reason  of  the  inertia  dis- 
played by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  headed  by 
Messrs.  Ernesto  Madero  and  Jaime  Gurza. 

The  Catholic  party,  seeing  the  approach  of  an 
epoch  of  social  reforms  which  they  could  not  admit, 
conspired  with  the  army  and  taking  advantage 
through  Huerta,  for  Felix  Diaz  turned  out  to  be 
weak,  finally  assassinated  Madero  and  grasped  the 
power. 

Then  they  enjoyed  their  clerical  rule  and  their 
laws  regarding  public  instruction.  The  army 
served  them  to  kill  the  people  and  to  defend  their 
great  estates.  The  war  was  kindled  with  more 
fury,  headed  by  Venustiano  Carranza.  We  in  the 
capital  suffered  day  by  day  from  the  insults  of  the 
soldiery.  All  persons  who  did  not  favor  the  gov- 
ernment were  known  to  the  authorities,  and  at  any 
moment  were  likely  to  be  detained. 


io8  Carranza  and  Mexico 

After  the  ten  days’  tragedy,  I went  to  the  Mili- 
tary College,  where  I was  a professor,  with  the 
intention  of  speaking  for  the  last  time  to  my  pupils. 
I explained  to  them  the  course  that  the  army  would 
pursue,  and  that  they  would  be  the  instrument  of  a 
traitor  to  shed  the  blood  of  Mexicans.  That  same 
afternoon  I was  dismissed  from  my  charge.  From 
that  time  on  I was  persecuted. 

Being  independent  and  my  ideas  being  known,  I 
could  not  long  remain  free.  The  idea  contrary  to 
the  dictatorial  system  was  what  they  persecuted 
most.  At  length  one  day  they  took  me  out  of  my 
office  and  conveyed  me  to  the  penitentiary  where 
they  held  me  in  a dark  dungeon  for  a month  in 
solitary  confinement. 

My  friends  arranged  for  Minister  Garza  Aldape 
to  speak  with  me.  I explained  to  him  frankly  why 
I could  not  be  with  the  Huertistas  for  I could  not 
conform  with  the  politics  of  the  outbreak,  and  the 
consequences  of  the  same.  I made  him  understand 
that  I was  not  an  active  conspirator,  for  having  to 
keep  in  favor  with  two  parties  is  truly  crazy  and 
like  throwing  oneself  into  the  wolf’s  mouth. 

He  permitted  me  to  go  out  into  the  street,  but 
it  was  impossible  for  me  to  work.  My  business 
affairs  were  shattered;  every  move  was  constantly 
watched,  and  at  any  time  I might  be  sent  back  to 
the  penitentiary,  as  were  many  others. 

I decided  to  get  out  of  the  country.  I went  to 
Vera  Cruz  and  with  some  difficulty  boarded  a boat 


Investigation  Work  109 

as  a contraband,  and  it  was  in  the  position  of  table- 
steward  that  I finally  arrived  in  this  country. 

This  is  the  history  of  thousands  of  men  in  Mex- 
ico. Thousands  of  families  remained  until  they 
had  nothing  left  to  live  on,  and  even  the  women 
were  in  danger  of  being  put  in  jail,  as  many  were. 

With  great  eagerness  I went  toward  the  north 
of  the  republic  with  a view  to  putting  myself  in  con- 
tact with  the  revolution.  There  I met  many  friends 
who  had  travelled  the  path  ahead  of  me,  and  under 
various  conditions  were  serving  the  cause.  There 
I could  speak  with  Carranza,  first  chief  of  the  revo- 
lution. It  was  in  Juarez  City  where  I was  pre- 
sented by  the  Hon.  Mr.  Zulara,  Minister  of  Com- 
munications. Mr.  Carranza  spoke  with  me  of  the 
reconstruction  of  Mexico.  At  that  period  of  the 
struggle  so  much  confidence  was  felt  in  the  triumph 
of  the  revolution  that  the  first  chief  looked  ahead 
to  prepare  the  era  of  reconstruction. 

He  talked  with  me  of  the  agrarian  problem,  as 
a touchstone  of  all  the  social  unbalance  of  our  peo- 
ple, and  I was  convinced  that  that  serene  man, 
economist  by  experience  and  liberal  by  conviction 
ought  to  be  the  personification  of  the  national  unity. 

He  spoke  to  me  above  all  else  of  the  schools. 
The  great  desire  of  Mr.  Carranza  is  to  develop  a 
school  system  in  Mexico.  He  expressed  himself 
with  the  enthusiasm  of  the  man  who  has  long  been 
in  contact  with  the  needs  of  the  people,  and  I was 
convinced  still  further  of  the  necessity  of  working 


I IO 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


without  hesitation  under  the  influence  of  such  a man. 
The  supreme  chief  being  convinced  that  another  sol- 
dier was  not  needed  in  the  battlefield,  and  taking 
advantage  of  my  experience  as  a schoolmaster  and 
as  an  engineer,  he  arranged  for  me  to  go  to  the 
United  States  with  a view  to  studying  municipal  and 
school  systems.  In  this  way  I joined  a body  of 
students  of  Administrative  service,  which  Mr.  Car- 
ranza had  been  forming  in  this  country  and  in 
Europe.  I have  put  my  heart  in  my  work,  and  hap- 
pily I have  found  in  this  nation  the  greatest  facili- 
ties for  attaining  our  object.  I have  visited  the 
principal  cities  of  the  East.  New  York  particu- 
larly has  served  me  practically. 

SCHOOLS 

The  Department  of  Education  furnished  me  with 
all  the  methods  for  studying  the  schools,  and  in  this 
manner  I obtained  most  interesting  information  re- 
garding the  organization  and  educative  systems  of 
these  schools,  where  from  the  first  step  a child  takes, 
he  is  taught  something  about  democracy.  The  im- 
pression which  this  spirit  of  the  American  schools 
made  upon  me  will  never  be  forgotten.  The  con- 
tinued effort  of  the  teachers  to  form  the  free  will 
of  the  child  is  excellent.  The  soul  of  this  nation 
palpitates  in  its  schools.  There  the  body  and  the 
mind  are  fortified,  intensifying  the  customs  of  soci- 
ability. These  things  are  facts,  not  theories,  in  the 
American  schools.  The  way  in  which  all  this  edu- 


Investigation  Work  III 

cative  labor  is  consummated  with  ingenuity  and 
honesty,  was  what  impressed  me  above  everything. 

Regarding  the  material  organization  it  is  already 
known  how  able  Americans  are.  Organization  is 
nearly  always  the  secret  of  success,  and  that  is  above 
all  what  the  Latins  need  to  learn. 

The  organization  of  the  Department  of  Educa- 
tion is  notable,  which  makes  possible  the  co-ordina- 
tion of  an  infinity  of  data,  so  as  to  see  schematically 
the  working  of  the  mechanism.  I can  judge  at  sight 
of  the  weak  point  so  that  the  same  may  be  perfected. 
The  weak  spot  in  the  Mexican  school  system  being 
the  rural  school  system,  I was  asked  by  Carranza 
to  investigate  especially  that  phase  in  the  United 
States.  The  result  of  my  inquiries  brought  forth 
the  fact  that  the  States  of  Wisconsin  and  Massa- 
chusetts have  the  best  organized  rural  system  for 
schools  in  America.  These  two  States  are  going  to 
be  the  pattern  which  will  be  used  for  Mexico’s  Min- 
ister of  Education  to  work  from. 

It  is  well-known  that  the  scholastic  family  is  ami- 
able over  the  entire  world,  but  I believe  that  the 
American  teacher  especially  is  a model  of  courtesy. 
Wherever  I went  I was  treated  with  such  kindness 
that  I shall  always  remember  my  visits  with 
pleasure. 

MUNICIPAL  SERVICES 

The  revolution  was  eager  to  change  the  social 
state  of  Mexico  and  that  naturally  comprised  the 


I I 2 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


sanitary  condition  of  the  people.  In  Mexico  it  is 
necessary  to  change  the  hygienic  state  of  the  people 
who  have  been  always  treated  with  a spirit  of  ex- 
ploitation by  the  privileged  castes. 

We  know  that  sunshine  on  the  earth  does  away 
with  the  services  of  the  doctor,  for  which  we  shall 
work  so  that  the  sewers  called  casas  de  vecindad 
may  be  dispensed  with;  in  these  tuberculosis  pros- 
pers, while  the  rich  owner  assisted  through  the 
lenity  of  the  laws  is  occupied  only  in  collecting  the 
rents.  Pure  water,  air  and  light, — the  people 
need  these  and  Mexico  will  give  them. 

New  York  has  given  me  great  experience  and  has 
furnished  a wide  field  of  observation,  in  respect  to 
the  Municipal  services;  and  I wish  to  set  forth  my 
report  so  as  to  profit  by  the  many  good  subjects  I 
have  studied.  Naturally,  here  as  in  other  places 
there  are  many  matters  which  have  not  yet  been  sat- 
isfactorily settled,  as  for  example  that  relative  to 
the  “ casas  de  vecindad,”  but  anyway  the  efforts  of 
this  people,  so  materially  progressive  will  help  us 
in  a high  degree. 

The  resolution  of  the  problem  of  the  “ casas  de 
vecindad  ” as  it  is  understood  in  Glasgow,  is  our 
ideal  and  we  shall  feel  proud  on  the  day  that  we 
can  present  a city  with  comfort  for  the  poor. 

In  the  conscience  of  all  the  revolutionaries  is 
the  profound  conviction  that  to  guarantee  the  tri- 
umph of  the  revolution  it  is  necessary  to  change  the 
social  status  of  Mexico,  and  for  that  reason  they 


Investigation  Work 


113 

will  not  hesitate  to  pass  laws  affecting  the  land  to 
further  wrorks  of  irrigation,  to  establish  schools  and 
to  contribute  to  hygienic  homes. 

The  example  of  this  nation  is  valuable  for  us  and 
we  shall  not  fail  to  utilize  the  same.  We  are  anx- 
ious to  push  our  people  forward  through  more  demo- 
cratic paths,  and  are  certain  that  this  nation  knows 
how  to  appreciate  our  efforts. 

In  Mexico,  where  it  may  be  said  that  humanity 
is  making  a trial  of  adaptation,  we  shall  make  a 
trial  of  what  this  country  has  shown  us,  and  if  I 
myself  put  into  practice  what  I have  learned  here 
I shall  consider  myself  happy,  welcoming  all  the 
annoying  details,  for  nothing  is  worth  more  than 
the  esteem  of  a nation. 


CHAPTER  XI 


GENERAL  OUTLINE  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST 
HUERTA 


O get  a clear  conception  of  the  strategic  work 


achieved  by  the  three  divisions  of  the  East, 
North  and  West,  it  is  advisable  to  look  at  the  map 
of  Mexico. 

Mexico  is  broadest  at  the  American  border  and 
tapers  exactly  like  a cornucopia  at  the  Isthmus  of 
Tehuantepec.  Mexico  City  lies  in  a valley  7,400 
feet  high,  within  twelve  hours’  ride  from  Vera  Cruz, 
and  being  the  centre  of  all  the  railroads  of  Mexico, 
is  therefore  of  the  utmost  strategical  importance. 

Huerta,  from  Mexico  City,  could  reach  all  his 
troops  anywhere  in  Mexico,  either  by  rail  or  water. 
The  Constitutionalists  in  Sonora  were  separated 
from  the  Northern  division  by  a high  range  of 
mountains,  and  the  Northern  division  from  the 
Eastern  division  by  another  range.  Zapata  could 
not  communicate  very  easily  with  the  three  north- 
ern divisions,  and  was  not  able  to  assist  them  di- 
rectly. 

Huerta’s  strategy  consisted  in  keeping  his  sol- 
diers in  the  large  cities,  at  the  border  towns,  always 
hugging  the  railroad  lines.  The  federals  very  sel- 


Outline  of  Campaign  Against  Huerta  1 1 5 

dom  attacked  in  the  open,  as  the  lack  of  horses  de- 
tracted from  their  mobility. 

The  Western  division  had  for  its  object  the  con- 
trol of  the  railroad,  starting  from  Nogales,  through 
Hermosillo  to  Guaymas  in  Sonora,  then  to  Culia- 
can,  Mazatlan  in  Sinaloa,  through  San  Bias,  Tepic 
into  the  State  of  Jalisco,  to  the  capital  Guadalajara. 
Once  Guadalajara  was  captured,  the  aim  of  the 
campaign  was  achieved,  and  Obregon  had  only  to 
wait  for  the  arrival  and  junction  of  the  Northern 
and  Eastern  division  near  Celaya,  to  march  to  Mex- 
ico City.  The  difficulties  encountered  by  the  West- 
ern and  Eastern  divisions  were  trebled  by  a condi- 
tion which  did  not  exist  in  the  case  of  the  Northern 
division  under  Villa,  the  fact  that  the  seaports  on 
the  Pacific  and  Atlantic  which  were  always  at  the 
mercy  of  the  federals,  could  feed  and  supply  and 
augment  the  contingent  of  soldiers  in  the  ports. 

On  the  Pacific  side,  the  Federals  controlled 
Guaymas,  Topolobampo,  Altata,  Mazatlan,  San 
Bias  and  Manzanillo, — and  on  the  Atlantic  side 
they  controlled  Matamoros,  Tampico,  Tuxpan, 
Vera  Cruz  and  Puerto  Mexico. 

The  Western  division,  under  Obregon,  captured 
one  by  one  all  the  border  towns,  and  later  most  of 
the  seaports, — and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Guay- 
mas stuck  to  the  last,  the  Western  division  had  so 
effectively  cooped  up  the  Federals  in  that  port,  that 
they  were  not  interfering  with  their  downward 
course  towards  Guadalajara.  General  Gonzalez 


ii  6 Carranza  and  Mexico 

acted  on  the  same  principle.  He  first  captured  the 
border  towns,  and  then  Victoria  the  capital  of  Ta- 
maulipas.  With  the  fall  of  Tampico,  the  Federals 
in  San  Luis  Potosi  were  outflanked. 

General  Villa  did  the  same.  After  he  controlled 
the  border  cities,  he  concentrated  all  his  energies 
on  the  capture  of  Torreon. 

The  three  chiefs  of  divisions,  East,  North  and 
West,  co-operated  with  one  another  under  the  di- 
rection of  Carranza.  They  were  supplied  with 
money,  arms  and  ammunition  by  the  organization 
created  by  Carranza  in  the  different  States,  and  di- 
rected by  the  efforts  of  the  members  of  the  provi- 
sional cabinet. 

Zapata  by  his  activity,  aided  by  that  of  Genovevo 
de  la  O and  several  other  chiefs  in  the  South,  forced 
Huerta  to  keep  about  forty  thousand  soldiers  in  the 
South. 

The  railroads  created  new  strategic  lines  — 

i st.  From  Nogales  at  the  border,  the  railroad 
goes  almost  uninterruptedly  through  Sonora,  Sina- 
loa and  Tepic,  with  the  exception  of  a gap  between 
Tepic  and  Guadalajara. 

2d.  From  Juarez  the  railroad  runs  through  Chi- 
huahua, Durango  and  Zacatecas  into  Aguascalien- 
tes. 

3d.  From  Ciudad  Porfirio  Diaz  through  Coa- 
huila  into  Nuevo  Leon,  and  to  San  Luis  Potosi,  and 
from  Monterrey  to  Tampico. 

They  represent  the  lines  which  had  to  be  con- 


Outline  of  Campaign  Against  Huerta  117 

trolled  by  the  three  divisions.  Then  there  were 
lines  connecting  Torreon  with  Saltillo  and  Mon- 
terrey,— and  Aguascalientes  with  San  Luis  Potosi. 

The  assertion  that  either  one  of  the  three  chiefs 
of  the  divisions  was  solely  responsible  for  the  suc- 
cess of  the  revolution  is  absurd  and  inexact. 

Let  us  admit  for  instance,  that  Obregon  had 
reached  Guadalajara,  and  tried  to  march  through 
Celaya  to  Mexico  City  alone,  before  Villa  had 
taken  Aguascalientes,  or  General  Gutierrez  taken 
San  Luis  Potosi.  He  would  then  have  been  at- 
tacked in  the  rear  by  the  Federals. 

In  Villa’s  case,  if  he  had  captured  Aguascalientes 
and  tried  to  march  south  to  Mexico  City,  without 
waiting  for  Obregon  to  take  Guadalajara,  or  Gen- 
eral Gutierrez,  San  Luis  Potosi,  he  would  have  also 
been  attacked  in  the  rear. 

General  Gonzalez  in  his  turn,  could  not  march 
south  as  long  as  San  Luis  Potosi  was  in  the  posses- 
sion of  Federals. 

The  three  chiefs  had  to  work  together,  and  the 
utter  defeat  of  either  of  the  three  separately,  spelled 
disaster  for  the  rest.  It  is  fortunate  for  Mexico 
that  this  campaign  should  have  created  four  strong 
soldiers  “ on  horseback  ” for  the  danger  to  Mexico’s 
liberties  always  appeared  with  one  man  as  the  hero, 
who  subsequently  turned  to  be  the  “ villain.”  When 
there  is  more  than  one  savior  or  liberator,  they  are 
apt  to  be  so  busy  watching  one  another,  that  Mex- 
ico’s liberties  are  more  likely  to  be  respected. 


CHAPTER  XII 


CAMPAIGN  OF  GENERAL  OBREGON  IN  THE  WEST 
BY  COL.  I.  C.  ENRIQUEZ 

T)ERHAPS  the  most  interesting  chapter  of  the 
Constitutionalist  revolt  against  the  dictator 
Huerta  is  the  campaign  of  rebellion  led  by  the  brave 
citizens  of  the  State  of  Sonora.  When  they  de- 
cided to  fight  the  bloody  dictator  and  resist  his 
murderous  deeds,  they  were  confronted  by  a very 
strong  and  well  organized  army.  The  Federal 
troops  were  well  equipped  with  ammunition  and 
guns.  Their  positions  were  well  established,  while 
the  Constitutionalists  had  nothing  more  than  desire 
of  justice,  backed  by  reckless  bravery.  They  had 
neither  guns  nor  ammunition,  and  certainly  no 
trained  army,  and  in  spite  of  all  this,  they  were  the 
victors. 

After  the  assassination  of  Senor  Francisco  I. 
Madero  and  Senor  Jose  Maria  Pino  Suarez,  a 
dreadful  feeling  of  fear  spread  through  the  country. 
This  was  especially  evident  among  the  civilians. 
What  but  death  had  they  to  expect  from  such  a 
brutal  dictator  as  Huerta?  For  this  reason  alone, 
there  were  at  the  beginning  very  few  men  who  were 

118 


GENERAL  ALVARO  OBREGON 
Chief  of  the  Western  Division 


Campaign  of  General  Obregon  in  the  West  119 

willing  to  take  up  arms  against  him.  Even  among 
the  governors,  twenty-seven  in  number,  only  one 
dared  to  throw  down  the  glove  of  challenge  to  the 
assassin.  He  was  Don  Venustiano  Carranza,  at 
that  time  governor  of  the  State  of  Coahuila.  Half 
an  hour  after  the  news  of  the  assassination  reached 
him,  he  called  the  state  legislature  into  session,  de- 
nounced the  dictator  Huerta  and  demanded  that  they 
should  not  recognize  Huerta’s  authority.  He  was 
the  only  man  with  sufficient  moral  courage  to  openly 
revolt  against  Huerta. 

At  that  time,  Carranza  was  not  the  only  one  who 
had  the  historic  opportunity  of  coming  out  as  a de- 
fender of  his  country’s  honor.  The  same  message 
was  transmitted  to  Senor  Jose  M.  Maytorena,  then 
the  governor  of  the  State  of  Sonora,  but  unlike  Car- 
ranza, he  did  not  take  up  the  cause  of  his  down- 
trodden countrymen.  He  saw  at  a glance  the  dan- 
ger of  such  a move,  and  realized  that  the  struggle 
against  Huerta  would  be  a very  unequal  one. 
Thinking  of  his  own  safety  first,  he  left  Deputy 
Ignacio  L.  Pesqueira  as  acting  governor,  and  fled  to 
the  United  States. 

At  that  time,  in  Hermosillo,  capital  of  Sonora, 
there  were  five  hundred  men  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Obregon,  who  later  in  the  cam- 
paign became  a famous  general  under  Carranza. 
Major  Salvador  Alvarado,  now  general,  had  com- 
mand of  four  hundred  troops  of  the  Yaqui  region, 
while  in  the  southern  part  of  the  State,  five  hundred 


120 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


men  were  under  the  command  of  Generals  Juan 
Cabral,  Benjamin  Hil  and  Sosa.  Many  of  the  of- 
ficers and  soldiers  of  this  army  had  participated  in 
the  revolution  of  1910,  consequently  they  were  op- 
posed to  the  dictatorship  of  Huerta.  This  marked 
the  beginning  of  the  Sonora  revolution. 

Even  before  the  assassination  of  Madero,  there 
were  a number  of  chiefs  who  waged  a relentless 
war.  They  were  Col.  Pedro  F.  Bracamonte,  Col. 
Plutarco  Elias  Calles,  and  Major  Campos.  They 
began  to  recruit  people  on  their  own  authority  in  the 
northern  part  of  the  State,  and  the  cutting  of  railway 
communication.  They  also  began  an  open  attack 
on  the  Federals  in  many  places.  When  the  Sonora 
revolution  was  started,  the  chiefs  became  united, 
and  opened  hostilities. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Sonora  revolution,  the 
Federals  had  a force  of  2,650  troops  distributed 
throughout  the  State,  from  the  frontier  to  the  coast. 
Bearing  this  in  mind,  the  Constitutionalists  mapped 
out  a careful  campaign.  General  Obregon  was  ap- 
pointed to  direct  the  military  operations,  as  he  had 
distinguished  himself  in  the  campaign  of  1912 
against  the  Orozquistas. 

The  difficult  task  that  the  Constitutionalists  were 
confronted  with,  was  the  prevention  of  the  concen- 
tration and  the  union  of  the  entire  Federal  army. 
They  knew  that  as  long  as  the  Federal  army  was 
divided  and  spread  throughout  the  State,  their 
chances  were  more  than  equal.  Thus  they  had  a 


Campaign  of  General  Obregon  in  the  JVest  121 

double  task:  first,  to  prevent  the  union  of  the  Fede- 
ral troops,  and  secondly  to  fight  them  in  small 
groups.  The  main  object  of  the  Constitutionalists 
was  to  secure  the  border  positions  of  the  State. 

As  the  revolution  progressed  and  the  fighting  con- 
tinued, the  Constitutionalists  found  their  plans  per- 
fectly suited  to  their  needs.  They  marched  from 
one  city  to  the  next,  sometimes  under  terrible  diffi- 
culties, but  always  victorious.  All  those  in  com- 
mand, and  also  the  troops,  fulfilled  their  duties  ad- 
mirably. Soon,  however,  they  were  confronted  with 
new  and  unexpected  troubles. 

The  taking  of  Naco,  as  also  the  greater  part  of  the 
towns  on  the  frontier,  involved  many  unnecessary 
dangers.  As  it  was  situated  on  the  international 
line,  it  could  only  be  attacked  from  the  east  and 
west, — if  it  was  assailed  from  the  south  many  pro- 
jectiles would  pass  over  to  the  American  side.  The 
Constitutionalist  chiefs  were  always  careful  to  re- 
spect the  rights  of  the  American  people,  and  avoided 
as  much  as  possible  the  damage  and  troubles  that  a 
war  waged  at  such  close  quarters,  would  be  likely  to 
occasion  them.  The  Federal  generals,  realizing  the 
position  of  the  Constitutionals,  took  advantage  of 
their  noble  intentions  and  stuck  close  to  the  inter- 
national line.  The  Constitutionalists  did  not  wish 
to  attack  them  in  the  town  — but  were  anxious  to 
meet  them  in  the  open  country,  where  there  would  be 
no  danger  of  inflicting  suffering  to  families,  espec- 
ially those  of  American  citizens. 


122 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


Knowing  that  the  Federals  intended  to  join  their 
comrades  of  Chihuahua,  the  Constitutionalists  de- 
cided to  lay  in  wait  for  them.  For  more  than  a 
week,  they  lay  concealed  behind  ridges  and  in  the 
mountains,  but  the  blow  they  had  suffered  a few  days 
before  was  a lesson  General  Ojeda  could  not  forget, 
and  all  the  attempts  of  the  Constitutionals  to  lure 
them  out  in  the  open  country  failed. 

The  chiefs  of  the  Constitutionalists  then  decided 
not  to  wait  any  longer.  They  demanded  of  Gen- 
eral Ojeda,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  Huerta  troops, 
that  he  come  out  of  the  city.  They  explained  to 
him  the  injustice  of  fighting  near  a town,  where  many 
innocent  people  and  non-combatants  might  be  in- 
jured, but  Ojeda’s  reply  was  characteristic  of  all  the 
Huerta  generals.  As  long  as  he  was  safe,  General 
Ojeda  said,  the  whole  human  race  might  be  slaugh- 
tered. Furthermore,  he  would  not  come  out  of 
his  fortified  town  position  — the  Constitutionals 
could  attack  him  there  if  they  wanted  to. 

The  Constitutionals,  realizing  that  they  would 
have  to  attack,  although  he  was  entrenched  in  a 
position  very  disadvantageous  to  such  action  on  their 
part,  began  preparations  for  the  battle.  The  Fed- 
erals were  located  in  a position  occupying  a semi- 
circle. Their  six  hundred  men,  cannon  and  rapid- 
fire  guns,  could  easily  defend  their  positions.  They 
could  sweep  the  open  country  with  a deadly  fire, 
there  being  no  protection  for  the  assailants. 

After  a few  days  of  reconnoitring,  during  which 


Campaign  of  General  Obregon  in  the  West  123 

small  skirmishes  took  place,  the  final  decisive  bat- 
tle took  place,  on  the  night  of  the  1st  of  April.  It 
lasted  more  than  twenty-four  hours,  after  which  the 
Federals  were  forced  to  their  barracks  for  protec- 
tion, while  General  Ojeda  fled  to  the  American  side. 
The  remaining  troops  surrendered,  and  the  fighting 
stopped.  This  victory  gave  the  Constitutionals 
complete  control  of  the  frontier  towns,  assuring 
them  a base  of  operations. 

One  of  the  remarkable  features  of  the  Sonora 
Campaign  was  the  wonderful  manner  in  which  the 
Federals  after  each  battle,  left  behind  ammunition, 
guns  and  equipment  which  the  Constitutionalists  so 
badly  needed.  The  reply  of  the  Constitutional 
chiefs  to  their  complaining  soldiers  usually  was: 
“ Never  mind,  boys,  Huerta  himself  will  give  us 
arms  and  ammunition  to  fight  him  with.”  This 
statement  has  proved  true  all  through  the  revolt. 

Before  the  Constitutionals  had  a chance  to  re- 
cover from  the  hardships  of  the  Naco  victory,  a still 
greater  danger  threatened  them.  A strong  force  of 
Federals,  four  thousand  in  number,  well-equipped, 
was  coming  from  the  south  by  way  of  the  Pacific 
coast,  General  Luis  Medina  Barron  was  in  charge 
of  them.  Before  leaving  Guaymas,  he  pledged  on 
his  “ military  honor  ” that  he  would  be  in  Hermo- 
sillo  in  fifteen  days.  He  said  he  would  have  the 
head  of  Obregon  stuck  upon  the  point  of  his  sword 
and  that  he  would  banquet  at  the  Hotel  Arcadia. 
But  the  Constitutional  chiefs  were  not  frustrated  by 


I24 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


the  boastings  of  General  Barron,  and  quickly  reor- 
ganizing their  army,  they  took  positions  between 
Ortiz  and  Guaymas  at  Santa  Rosa,  a flag  station 
on  the  Southern  Pacific  Railroad  of  Mexico. 

Confident  of  their  ultimate  victory,  the  Federals 
marched  towards  the  Constitutionalists.  Early  in 
the  morning  of  the  9th  of  May  they  opened  a vigor- 
ous fire.  The  attack  lasted  three  days. 

The  Constitutionalists  realizing  the  value  of  the 
springs  and  wells  in  that  torrid  zone,  fought  desper- 
ately for  their  possession.  Once  the  water  supply 
was  captured,  it  meant  the  defeat  of  the  Federals. 
On  the  second  day  of  the  battle,  this  was  accom- 
plished and  the  Federals  were  forced  back  to  the 
Railroad  tanks,  which  could  supply  them  with  water 
no  longer  than  one  day.  After  the  third  day’s  fight- 
ing, the  Federals,  worn  out  with  thirst,  retired,  leav- 
ing a large  number  of  dead  and  wounded.  In  their 
hasty  retreat  they  left  behind  a great  quantity  of 
armaments  and  provisions.  The  boasting  General 
Barron  escaped  to  Guaymas,  wounded  by  the 
enemy,  while  many  of  his  chiefs  were  taken  to  Her- 
mosillo  as  prisoners  of  war. 

While  Obregon  was  fighting  against  General 
Barron,  General  Hill  had  not  remained  idle.  He 
was  appointed  to  carry  on  operations  in  the  south- 
ern part  of  the  State.  This  he  accomplished  ad- 
mirably, especially  the  wiping  out  of  the  “ Battalion 
of  Death.”  This  battalion  carried  a black  flag,  with 
a skull  and  cross  bones  upon  it  and  their  method  was 


Campaign  of  General  Obregon  in  the  West  125 

to  terrorize  the  townspeople  by  killing  innocent 
women  and  children.  When  they  met  General  Hill 
in  open  battle  they  were  completely  wiped  out. 

Later  General  Hill  drove  450  from  the  town  of 
Torin,  forcing  them  back  to  Guaymas,  thus  clear- 
ing the  southern  part  of  the  State.  After  his  suc- 
cesses in  this  locality,  he  joined  General  Obregon, 
in  the  hope  of  attacking  Generals  Ojeda  and  Barron. 
The  following  move  of  the  Constitutionalists  is  one 
of  the  most  effective  of  the  whole  campaign.  It 
was  a decisive  battle  for  the  main  water  supply, 
which  the  troops  were  badly  in  need  of  and  took 
place  at  Santa  Maria. 

The  plans  of  Generals  Obregon,  Alvarado  and 
Dieguez  once  more  proved  very  effective.  The  Fed- 
erals,  finding  the  water  supply  taken,  were  forced  to 
assume  the  offensive.  They  felt  confident  of  success, 
and  burdened  themselves  with  all  kinds  of  unneces- 
sary impediments.  But  the  Constitutionalists  were 
not  to  be  taken  by  surprise;  instead  of  waiting  for 
the  Federals  to  advance,  they  went  out  to  meet 
them:  by  this  manoeuvre  the  Federals  found  them- 
selves face  to  face  with  the  Constitutionalists  much 
sooner  than  they  had  expected. 

For  the  Federals,  it  was  a fight  for  existence. 
They  were  face  to  face  with  death  from  thirst,  and 
felt  that  unless  they  regained  the  wells  a miserable 
death  would  be  their  lot.  With  them,  it  was  not  a 
fight  for  the  honor  of  Huerta  — they  fought  from 
sheer  desperation.  Under  such  conditions,  the  bat- 


126 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


tie  could  not  last  long.  Four  desperate  assaults 
were  made  upon  the  Constitutionalists’  positions, 
and  were  repulsed.  One  of  these  assaults  lasted 
more  than  twenty-four  hours,  resulting  in  a hand  to 
hand  fight.  In  those  hand  to  hand  frays  one  could 
not  help  admiring  the  remarkable  way  in  which  the 
Yaquis  handled  their  daggers.  The  Federal  army 
was  wiped  out  completely  in  a very  short  time. 

While  much  credit  is  due  to  the  soldiers  who 
fought  in  the  ranks  of  the  Constitutionalists,  many 
of  their  victories  are  due  to  the  remarkable  strategy 
of  the  generals.  One  instance  will  illustrate  this. 
General  Alvarado,  realizing  the  terrible  thirst  of  the 
Federal  soldiers,  drove  them  into  a watermelon 
field.  He  knew  fully  well  the  result  of  such  a move. 
No  sooner  had  they  reached  the  watermelon  field, 
when  all  the  fighting  on  their  part  ceased.  The 
Federal  officers  had  to  force  them  to  fight  at  the 
point  of  their  bayonets,  but  even  that  did  little  good. 
Once  they  had  entered  the  melon  field,  they  were  the 
easy  victims  of  the  Constitutional  fire.  At  the  close 
of  the  battle,  General  Ojeda  fled  from  the  scene, 
abandoning  his  officers  and  soldiers.  He  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  officers,  while  a small  group  of  sol- 
diers, braver  than  their  chiefs,  kept  on  fighting  till 
they  reached  Guaymas. 

The  Constitutionals  did  not  realize  how  great  a 
victory  they  really  had  won,  and  waited  a whole 
day  thinking  that  the  retreat  of  the  Federals  was 
nothing  but  a trap  set  for  them.  But  when  they 


Campaign  of  General  Obregon  in  the  West  127 

marched  forward  they  found  nothing  but  dead  and 
wounded,  and  a great  quantity  of  ammunition  and 
supplies.  They  had  left  behind  all  the  cannons, 
twelve  rapid-firing  guns  and  sixteen  hundred  rifles, 
also  a large  number  of  horses  and  trappings.  But 
the  Constitutionalists  had  no  time  to  lose,  and  they 
immediately  went  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy. 

While  I was  overjoyed  at  our  tremendous  victory, 
pity  and  sorrow  embittered  the  cup  of  joy.  The 
scenes  of  horror  and  misery  which  I saw  are  still 
engraved  in  my  memory.  I saw  the  disastrous  re- 
sults brought  about  by  a tyrannical  dictator  who,  in 
his  effort  to  perpetuate  himself  in  absolute  power, 
was  willing  to  sacrifice  everything  and  everybody. 
It  was  dreadful  to  see  the  battlefield  littered  with 
the  dead  and  wounded,  men  who  meant  well  but  who 
understood  little. 

On  the  other  hand  there  were  the  patriotic,  well- 
intentioned  men,  full  of  self-sacrifice,  willing  to  die 
for  liberty  and  the  prosperity  of  their  native  country. 
Alongside  these  sturdy  young  fighters  were  also  the 
poor  women  and  children,  innocent  sufferers  in  the 
great  strife.  They  were  the  greatest  sufferers, — 
they  bore  the  greater  burden. 

The  campaign  of  General  Obregon  through  the 
State  of  Sonora,  marks  only  the  beginning  of  the 
great  struggle  which  led  him  victoriously  to  the  city 
of  Mexico.  This  campaign,  although  never  men- 
tioned by  the  newspaper  correspondents,  was  never- 


128 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


theless  as  important  as  the  campaign  of  General 
Villa.  General  Obregon  not  only  had  to  fight  an 
army  much  larger  than  his  own,  but  the  geograph- 
ical location  of  his  territory  constantly  endangered 
his  rear  wings.  Unlike  Villa,  he  was  constantly 
compelled  to  guard  from  rear  attacks,  as  well  as 
from  frontal  attacks.  This  ever  existing  danger 
made  the  campaign  much  more  difficult,  multiplying 
the  dangers  which  constantly  confronted  him. 

The  remark  of  General  Obregon  to  Don  Venus- 
tiano  Carranza  when  the  First  Chief  marked  out 
the  three  lines  of  struggle,  illustrates  the  nature  of 
the  fighting  General  Obregon.  When  Carranza 
was  about  to  depart  from  Nogales,  in  February, 
1914,  Obregon  said  to  him:  “First  Chief,  tell 

Generals  Villa  and  Gonzales  to  hurry  up  in  their 
march,  for  I am  going  to  get  busy  and  get  to  Mex- 
ico.” And  true  to  his  word,  several  months  later, 
although  beset  by  many  more  difficulties  than  the 
other  generals,  he  reached  Mexico  City  before  any 
of  them.  After  the  Federal  troops  were  routed  and 
driven  back  in  great  disorder  to  Guaymas,  the  State 
of  Sonora  was  practically  cleared  from  Huerta 
troops.  But  that  only  meant  the  beginning  of  the 
great  fight. 

During  the  months  of  July  and  August,  General 
Obregon  was  preparing  for  his  advance  South.  He 
had  little  time  to  waste,  for  even  before  he  was 
through  with  his  preparations,  he  was  forced  to 


Campaign  of  General  Obregon  in  the  West  129 

advance  on  San  Bias,  Sinaloa.  A strong  detach- 
ment of  Federals  were  sent  up  from  Mexico  City 
to  reinforce  the  defeated  Huerta  troops  who  landed 
at  Topolobampo.  But  General  Obregon  was  not 
taken  by  surprise.  Having  assigned  Generals  Hill 
and  Iturbe  to  proceed  against  the  Federals,  he  him- 
self continued  his  march  further  south.  His  ob- 
jective point  was  the  city  of  Sinaloa.  In  the  mean- 
time Generals  Hill  and  Iturbe  had  succeeded  in  de- 
feating the  Federal  troops  which  landed  in  Topolo- 
bampo, and  joined  General  Obregon  in  his  attack 
upon  the  city  of  Sinaloa. 

The  storming  of  Sinaloa  was  one  of  the  fiercest 
battles  of  the  entire  campaign.  It  lasted  nearly  five 
days  and  again,  as  in  all  the  previous  battles,  the 
Federals  retreated  so  hastily  that  they  did  not  have 
time  to  take  their  guns  and  ammunition  with  them. 
A great  quantity  of  ammunition  and  provisions  were 
left  behind  by  them,  of  which  the  Constitutionalists 
were  much  in  need. 

One  of  the  great  difficulties  which  constantly  con- 
fronted General  Obregon  was  the  guarding  of  the 
frontier  and  the  positions  all  along  the  coast.  The 
slightest  error  in  the  guarding  of  those  positions 
might  have  caused  the  annihilation  of  his  entire 
army  by  a rear  attack.  So  that,  whenever  he  took  a 
city  from  the  Federals,  he  was  confronted  with  the 
question  of  protecting  that  point.  He  was  forced 
to  always  leave  troops  behind  him,  to  guard  those 


130  Carranza  and  Mexico 

conquered  cities.  Had  he  not  done  so,  the  Federals 
might  have  sent  up  new  forces  by  way  of  the  Pacific 
and  re-taken  the  conquered  posts. 

The  most  important  of  all  the  battles  of  the  en- 
tire campaign  was  the  storming  of  Culiacan.  The 
Federals,  realizing  the  dangers  of  Obregon’s  swift 
march,  massed  a strong  force  of  troops  in  that  city, 
numbering  about  seven  thousand.  Needless  to  say, 
they  were  much  better  equipped  than  the  Consti- 
tutionals, who  always  had  more  men  than  rifles  and 
guns.  When  General  Obregon,  who  personally  con- 
ducted the  battle,  reached  the  city,  the  Federals  were 
well  fortified  in  their  positions.  The  fight  lasted  a 
whole  week,  and  fighting  continued  day  and  night, 
almost  without  cessation.  At  the  end  of  that  time, 
the  Federals  were  badly  beaten  and  were  forced  to 
retire  to  Mazatlan.  The  taking  of  Culiacan  meant 
to  the  Constitutionalists  more  than  just  an  ordinary 
victory.  It  meant  the  success  of  the  operations  to- 
wards their  goal,  and  the  weakening  and  disintegra- 
tion of  the  Huerta  troops.  The  winning  of  this 
battle  enabled  the  Constitutional  forces  to  move 
further  south  to  the  Territory  of  Tepic,  where  Gen- 
eral Obregon  took  the  city  of  Acaponeta  and  San 
Bias  by  storm. 

The  rapidity  with  which  he  moved  and  the  per- 
sistency of  his  attacks  won  him  most  of  his  battles. 
He  lost  no  time, — he  did  not  wait.  As  soon  as  he 
had  taken  San  Bias,  he  did  not  even  wait  long 
enough  to  give  his  tired  soldiers  a good  rest.  He 


Campaign  of  General  Obregon  in  the  West  13 1 

moved  on  to  his  destination  immediately.  With  his 
characteristic  rapid  fire  action,  he  moved  towards 
Guadalajara  in  the  State  of  Jalisco.  The  most  in- 
teresting thing  about  the  storming  of  that  city  was 
the  capture  of  fifty-six  train  loads  of  supplies. 
Never  before  had  they  had  such  luck.  The  trains 
were  packed  with  all  kinds  of  provisions,  guns, 
rifles,  cannon  and  ammunition.  It  was  one  of  the 
richest  hauls  they  ever  made. 

The  conclusion  of  his  march  towards  the  capital 
was  marked  by  a series  of  successful  battles,  in  spite 
of  the  difficulties  he  had  in  guarding  his  base  of  sup- 
plies and  the  frontier  towns.  After  his  victory  at 
Guadalajara,  he  marched  on  towards  Irapuato, 
where  he  again  succeeded  in  routing  the  Federal 
troops,  and  thence  proceeded  to  the  city  of  Mexico. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


VILLA  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  NORTH 

CO  much  has  been  written  about  Francisco  Villa 
^ that  only  a few  preliminary  remarks  are  neces- 
sary to  describe  the  personality  of  the  famous  gen- 
eral. The  enemies  of  Villa  made  the  accusation 
that  the  rebel  chief  was  not  respectable  because  he 
had  been  an  outlaw  under  the  Diaz  regime. 

Those  who  have  studied  the  Diaz  rule  with  a 
mind  unbiased  by  profits  and  interests,  will  have  dis- 
covered that  if  Villa  was  a bandit  under  the  Diaz 
reign,  he  certainly  must  have  been  an  honest  one; 
for  almost  without  exception  all  the  officials  from 
the  President  down  to  the  lowest  Jefe  Politico,  were 
robbers,  cut-throats  and  grafters. 

Villa  is  not  better  nor  worse  than  the  average 
Mexican,  but  his  weaknesses  are  those  of  his  un- 
fortunate countrymen,  and  his  strength  is  the  latent 
strength  of  his  people. 

Villa,  although  directly  responsible  for  the  mutiny 
at  Juarez  in  19 11,  when  with  Orozco  he  almost  suc- 
ceeded in  eliminating  F.  I.  Madero,  discovered  that 
the  three  cientifico  agents  in  El  Paso  were  the  in- 
stigators of  the  plot.  Ever  since  then  Villa  re- 

132 


GENERAL  S.  ALVARADO 
Second  in  Command  under  General  Obregon 


Villa  and  His  Campaign  in  the  North  133 

mained  loyal  to  Madero  and  continued  to  fight 
against  Huerta,  in  memory  of  Madero. 

All  the  biographers  of  Villa  spoke  of  him  as  a 
Napoleon,  who  had  created  an  army  out  of  nothing. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  out  of  one  hundred 
and  thirty  thousand  soldiers  who  fought  against  the 
military  dictatorship,  there  were  at  least  forty  gen- 
erals who  created  armies  out  of  nothing.  They, 
too,  were  without  money,  ammunition,  arms  and 
with  even  less  experience  than  Villa. 

During  his  ten  or  more  years  as  an  outlaw,  Villa 
was  roaming  all  over  the  States  of  Chihuahua  and 
Durango,  as  a leader  of  lesser  outlaws,  and  his  guer- 
rilla experience  was  invaluable  to  him  later. 

In  the  case  of  most  other  Generals,  like  Obregon, 
Gonzales,  Gutierrez,  Natera,  Herrera,  Chao,  Cal- 
les,  Hill,  Caballero,  their  experience  was  insignifi- 
cant. Most  of  the  chiefs  who  fought  the  Federals 
were  either  farmers,  lawyers,  engineers,  clerks  who 
had  never  before  handled  a gun  in  their  lives  till 
the  last  revolution. 

When  Villa  crossed  the  American  border  into 
Mexico  in  the  spring  of  1913,  he  marched  up  and 
down  the  States  of  Chihuahua,  Coahuila  and  Dur- 
ango. He  gathered  men,  attacking  small  cities  and 
doing  very  much  the  same  as  other  revolutionists 
did  — surprising  small  detachments  of  Federals  in 
outlying  districts,  and  capturing  the  arms,  ammuni- 
tion, and  horses  which  were  so  badly  needed.  With 
him  were  co-operating  the  Herrera  brothers,  Chao, 


134 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


Rosalio  Hernandez,  and  in  Durango,  the  Arrieta 
brothers,  Contreras,  Triana,  Carrillo  and  Urbina. 
They  looted  the  banks  to  buy  arms  and  ammunition 
from  the  United  States,  and  stole  horses  and  saddles 
to  creat  a mobile  force  and  killed  cattle  to  feed  them- 
selves. 

The  first  important  battle  won  by  Villa  was  fought 
in  San  Andres  with  eight  hundred  men  against 
fourteen  hundred  Federals,  who  were  defeated  on 
October  4th,  1913.  He  attacked,  captured  and 
sacked  Torreon.  Near  Chihuahua  he  again  de- 
feated the  Federals,  but  as  Juarez  was  still  in  their 
power,  he  had  to  take  the  border  towns  before  at- 
tempting to  fight  towards  the  south. 

How  he  outwitted  the  commander  of  Juarez  by 
stealing  a ride  north  of  Chihuahua  on  a train  loaded 
with  coal,  and  surprised  and  drove  the  commander 
across  the  border,  has  been  told  before. 

The  battle  of  Tierra  Blanca,  when  he  defeated 
five  thousand  Federals  who  came  from  Chihuahua 
to  relieve  Juarez,  was  his  first  important  strategical 
battle,  and  as  far  as  the  campaign  is  concerned,  is 
the  most  important,  even  without  excepting  the  bat- 
tle of  Torreon,  in  April,  1914.  Without  the  battle 
of  Tierra  Blanca,  no  other  successes  could  have  had 
any  decisive  value.  In  Torreon,  Villa  had  all  the 
men,  arms  and  ammunition  he  wanted,  and  with 
great  recklessness,  he  sacrificed  his  men,  counting 
only  upon  results. 

After  the  capture  of  Torreon,  Saltillo  and  Mon- 


Villa  and  His  Campaign  in  the  North  135 

terrey  automatically  fell  into  his  power,  for  Torreon 
was  the  strategic  key  which  opened  the  way  south 
to  his  army,  i.  e.,  the  Northern  division. 

In  another  chapter,  the  causes  and  details  of  the 
Carranza-Villa  quarrel  will  be  discussed.  The 
character  of  General  Villa  must  be  studied,  in  order 
to  understand  the  underlying  causes  of  the  quar- 
rel. 

Villa,  like  Zapata,  is  a man  of  the  peasant  class. 
Physically  strong,  with  great  will  power  and  a good 
deal  of  horse  sense.  In  men  of  this  type,  due  to 
their  utter  lack  of  education,  and  inexperience  in 
politics,  they  are  an  easy  prey  to  their  secretaries, 
friends,  advisers  and  hangers-on.  Being  funda- 
mentally honest,  they  take  it  for  granted  that  their 
entourage  is  likewise,  and  being  unable  to  read  or 
write,  they  are  constantly  deceived  by  their  secre- 
taries. In  the  case  of  the  other  generals,  like  Ob- 
regon,  Gonzales,  etc.,  their  education  and  political 
experience  put  them  on  their  guard  against  petty, 
scheming  politicians,  and  unscrupulous  tools  of  the 
reactionaries. 

Villa’s  ideas  outside  of  stratagems,  spoils  and 
the  game  of  war,  are  primitive,  and  not  always  clear. 
His  appetites  and  his  contempt  for  human  life  is 
equal  to  that  of  the  Apaches  and  Comanches;  his  atti- 
tude toward  life  is  anarchistic,  rebellious.  Towards 
people  he  is  cunning,  suspicious,  ostensibly  good- 
natured  and  at  times  tyrannical.  An  uncontrollable 
temper  is  softened  by  a keen  sense  of  humor,  and  a 


j36 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


lavish  generosity  is  encouraged  by  a propensity  to 
acquisitiveness. 

Villa  is  so  terribly  suspicious  of  everything  and 
everybody,  that  he  has  been  accused  of  being  not 
quite  so  brave  as  he  wants  to  appear.  General 
Maclovio  Herrera  is  admired  for  his  courage  and 
is  nicknamed  “ the  Lion  ” : Villa  has  an  unbounded 
respect  for  him,  tinged  with  a little  envy.  Villa’s 
enemies  claim  that  he  went  to  Aguascalientes  escorted 
by  eighteen  thousand  soldiers,  because  he  was  afraid, 
— - although  the  other  generals  had  none  but  body- 
guards. 

When  Obregon  was  sent  by  Carranza  to  join 
Villa  in  a solution  of  the  Sonora  controversy  between 
Maytorena  and  Hill,  he  went  alone.  Villa  soon 
lost  his  temper  and  had  Obregon  arrested,  and 
threatened  to  have  him  shot  by  his  soldiers  unless 
he  acceded  to  his  demands.  Obregon,  calm  and 
cool,  answered:  “ My  life  belongs  to  Mexico, — if 

you  believe  that  my  death  is  necessary  to  the  solution 
of  the  question,  I am  ready  to  sacrifice  it.  I came 
here  to  meet  Villa  the  patriot:  I find  a savage 

Villa  who  calls  himself  the  savior  of  Mexico.”  The 
manly  and  courageous  attitude  of  Obregon  con- 
quered Villa,  who  instead  of  ordering  an  execution, 
gave  a ball  in  his  honor. 

When  Carranza  was  in  Chihuahua  with  Villa 
after  the  fall  of  Torreon,  he  heard  that  Villa  had 
ordered  the  execution  of  General  Chao,  Governor 
of  Chihuahua.  Villa  was  asked  to  appear  before 


Villa  and  His  Campaign  in  the  North  137 

Carranza,  who  demanded  an  explanation.  “ I have 
shot  CKao,”  grinned  Villa.  Carranza  was  very  in- 
dignant, and  protested  vehemently.  Then  Villa 
laughed,  and  admitted  that  the  order  had  not  been 
carried  out.  Carranza  ordered  him  to  free  Chao 
immediately,  and  said  to  him:  “ You  have  no  right 

to  arrest  and  shoot  an  official  not  under  your  im- 
mediate command,  without  my  authority,  especially 
a governor  who  is  under  my  jurisdiction.  Am  I 
the  chief  of  the  revolution  or  am  I not?”  Villa 
was  impressed  and  he  ordered  the  release  of  Chao. 
He  excused  himself  by  saying  that  Chao  had 
grafted.  Later  it  was  discovered  that  Villa’s  secre- 
tary had  sent  orders  to  Chao,  Villa  not  being  able  to 
read  what  he  had  signed,  and  the  whole  scheme  was 
engineered  by  Villa’s  secretary  to  get  rid  of  Chao, 
who  was  his  personal  enemy.  Villa  embraced  Chao 
as  a result. 

One  of  Villa’s  many  wives  was  enterprising 
enough  to  induce  Villa  to  let  her  sign  some  treasury 
notes,  which  were  honored  by  the  officials,  who  did 
not  dare  refuse. 

Once,  Villa  gave  an  order  for  the  exportation 
through  Juarez  of  $5000  worth  of  material.  The 
Secretary  changed  the  order  from  five,  to  fifty  thou- 
sand, which  without  his  knowledge  had  been  tele- 
graphed to  the  official  in  charge  of  the  Custom 
House  in  Juarez.  The  honest  official  refused  to  let 
the  goods  pass  the  border,  and  the  irate  Villa  almost 
shot  him  for  disobedience.  Finally  the  matter  was 


138  Carranza  and  Mexico 

cleared  up,  and  Villa  declared  that  he  had  ordered 
five,  and  not  fifty,  thousand  dollars’  worth.  “ But 
here  is  the  order  signed  by  you,'”  said  the  official. 
Villa  had  been  deceived  again,  as  he  has  been  all 
along  by  his  secretaries.  The  two  following  tele- 
grams, one  from  Villa,  and  the  answer  of  the  Ar- 
rieta  Brothers,  will  throw  a very  clear  light  on  the 
attitude  of  Villa  toward  Carranza.  It  will  also 
prove  that  the  majority  of  the  generals  do  not  sym- 
pathize with  Villa,  as  he  is  making  a personal  ques- 
tion, or  better  said,  an  alleged  insult  to  his  division, 
a pretext  to  overthrow  Carranza,  and  become  the 
political  dictator  of  Mexico. 

TELEGRAM. 

Chihuahua,  General  Headquarters, 

Sept.  23d,  1914. 

Urgent. 

Generals  Mariano  and  Dominco  Arrieta. 

Durango,  Dgo. 

Venustiano  Carranza  having  deeply  offended  the  honor 
and  dignity  of  the  Northern  Division  under  my  command, 
and  not  being  able  to  tolerate  any  longer  his  whims  and 
inconsequences,  which  would  have  sunk  our  country  in 
ruins,  disseminating  anarchy,  while  creating  distrust  with 
foreign  nations, — since  yesterday,  all  my  generals  and 
myself  have  decided  to  repudiate  him  as  Chief  of  the  Na- 
tion. 

For  we  are  convinced  that  because  of  his  alliance  with  the 
cientificos  and  his  noted  tendencies  to  favor  a certain  per- 
sonal group  which  surrounded  him,  and  prevented  the  solu- 


Villa  and  His  Campaign  in  the  North  139 


tion  of  the  real  revolutionists,  and  to  fulfil  the  promises 
made  to  the  people. 

As  a consequence  we  have  decided  to  fight  only  against 
the  personality  of  Venustiano  Carranza,  and  to  drive  him 
out  of  the  country,  without  antagonizing  or  molesting  the 
other  chiefs  who  have  fought  to  overthrow  the  usurping 
government  which  has  just  fallen.  Therefore  we  repeat 
that  our  movement  is  solely  against  the  personality  of 
Venustiano  Carranza. 

As  we  have  always  understood  that  you  have  been  ani- 
mated by  patriotic  sentiments,  like  ourselves,  we  address 
ourselves  to  you,  showing  you  the  matter  clearly,  and  we 
hope  that  in  view  of  the  right  which  is  on  our  side,  you  will 
be  with  us,  and  will  help  by  offering  your  services  to  the 
cause  of  the  people. 

Already  the  Governor  of  the  State  of  Sonora  and  his 
forces,  have  repudiated  Venustiano  Carranza,  and  we  hope 
that  you  will  act  likewise  and  will  define  your  position  in- 
forming us  if  you  are  with  us  or  with  Carranza. 

!We  beg  you  to  answer  as  soon  as  possible.  Greetings. 

The  General  in  Chief, 

Francisco  Villa. 

Answer  to  the  above  telegram. 

Durango  to  Chihuahua,  Sept.  24th,  1914. 
Senor  General  Don  Francisco  Villa, 

Chihuahua. 

We  are  in  receipt  of  your  telegram,  in  which  you  declare 
that  the  division  under  your  command  has  repudiated  the 
authority  as  Provisional  President,  of  Don  Venustiano  Car- 
ranza, because  of  insults  to  the  dignity  of  said  Division  and 
for  not  having  fulfilled  the  promises  made  to  the  people. 


140 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


We  discover  in  your  telegram  a certain  ambiguity,  as 
we  have  no  knowledge  of  the  insults  to  which  you  refer. 

Concerning  the  promises  made  to  the  people,  we  con- 
sider your  pretentions  premature,  as  a convention  has  been 
named  to  meet  on  the  first  of  October,  in  which  clearly  and 
explicitly  the  programme  of  the  government  will  be  dis- 
cussed and  studied,  so  as  to  solve  the  various  problems  which 
will  benefit  the  proletariat. 

Therefore  we  would  be  grateful,  if  you  would  communi- 
cate to  us  the  nature  of  the  insults  to  which  you  refer,  and 
the  cause  of  the  people  which  has  been  frustrated,  so  that  we 
can  intelligently  come  to  a decision. 

And  lastly  we  appeal  to  your  patriotism  and  the  interest 
of  the  country  which  through  this  break  would  be  more 
weakened,  and  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  American  nation, 
which  has  not  retired  its  troops  from  Vera  Cruz.  We  beg 
of  you  if  you  are  a real  patriot,  to  calm  your  temper  and 
meditate  on  the  evils  which  would  befall  our  country  with 
this  civil  war  — which  would  bring  about  as  a consequence 
a foreign  war. 

1st.  We  are  of  the  opinion  that  you  should  sacrifice 
your  self-love  for  the  good  of  the  country,  and  you  should 
not  take  notice  of  said  insults,  even  if  they  existed. 

Secondly.  That  we  hope  that  the  Convention  which  is 
to  take  place  on  the  first  of  October,  when  all  the  Consti- 
tutionalist forces  will  be  represented,  to  solve  the  great 
problems  of  our  country,  will  put  them  into  effect  with  the 
assistance  of  the  arms  which  we  will  not  relinquish  until 
our  ideals  have  been  fulfilled. 

Hoping  for  an  answer  to  give  our  definite  resolution,  we 

salute  you  affectionately.  „ ^ . 

General  Domingo  Arrieta, 

General  Mariano  Arrieta. 


Villa  and  His  Campaign  in  the  North  141 

As  an  answer,  Villa  sent  General  Urbina  against 
the  Arrieta  Brothers.  Urbina  and  his  forces  were 
defeated,  and  the  general  badly  wounded.  Inno- 
cent, well-meaning,  but  utterly  deceived  Villa ! If 
he  only  knew  that  the  Cientificos  whom  he  accuses 
of  having  affiliated  with  Carranza,  are  really  pull- 
ing their  wires  from  New  York,  and  using  him 
(Villa)  as  the  tool  to  eliminate  Carranza,  and  this 
because  the  first  chief  intends  to  carry  out  all  the 
radical  reforms  of  the  revolution. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


CAMPAIGN  OF  GENERAL  GONZALEZ  IN  THE  EAST 

T IKE  most  of  the  campaigns  in  the  north  of  Mex- 
ico,  where  the  strategic  objectives  are  the 
border  towns,  so  the  campaign  of  General  Gonzalez 
was  fought,  first  for  the  possession  of  Piedras  Ne- 
gras  (Ciudad  Porfirio  Diaz),  Nuevo  Laredo,  Ca- 
margo  and  Matamoros,  and  later  for  the  control 
of  Tamaulipas. 

The  first  battle  of  the  revolution  against  Huerta 
was  fought  at  Anhelo  and  ended  in  a defeat.  Then 
Venustiano  Carranza,  with  his  brother  Jesus  Car- 
ranza, and  Pablo  Gonzalez,  took  Piedras  Negras. 

Huerta,  as  well  as  his  generals,  were  of  the  opin- 
ion that  if  Carranza  was  captured  and  shot,  it  would 
end  the  constitutionalist  revolution  then  and  there. 
Therefore,  they  concentrated  all  their  efforts  upon 
Piedras  Negras,  which  was  defended  by  four  hun- 
dred men.  More  than  9,000  Federals  were  sent 
against  them,  and  although  the  revolutionists  were 
forced  to  leave,  the  enemy  did  not  succeed  in  cap- 
turing the  leaders. 

Then  Pablo  Gonzalez,  with  the  help  of  Jesus 
Carranza,  roamed  all  over  the  States  of  Coahuila 

142 


GENERAL  PABLO  GONZALEZ 

Chief  of  the  Eastern  Division 


Campaign  of  General  Gonzalez  in  the  East  143 

and  Nuevo  Leon  defeating  over  twenty  Federal  gar- 
risons and  capturing  the  much  needed  arms  and  am- 
munition, which  were  so  scarce  and  hard  to  get  at 
the  beginning  of  the  struggle. 

It  is  a fact  worth  noticing  that,  in  the  three  cam- 
paigns in  the  North,  Centre  and  South,  the  revo- 
lutionists captured  many  cities,  and  then  departed. 
To  the  lay  mind  it  seems  absurd  to  fight  so  hard 
to  capture  a city,  and  then  to  let  it  go  almost  im- 
mediately without  even  waiting  for  the  Federals  to 
retake  it.  Nevertheless,  it  was  good  tactics.  The 
Federal  garrisons  offered  big  stores  of  war  material, 
while  the  cities  supplied  them  with  food,  clothing 
and  money. 

Monterrey  was  attacked  twice  without  success, 
and  there  was  no  chance  of  victory  until  Torreon, 
Piedras  Negras,  Nuevo  Laredo,  Matamoros  and 
Tampico  were  in  the  hands  of  Pablo  Gonzalez. 
When  that  was  done,  Monterrey  was  automatically 
evacuated  by  the  Federals. 

Tampico  was  attacked  several  times  and  besieged 
by  Caballero.  The  Federals  had  a great  advan- 
tage, as  they  controlled  the  city  with  their  gunboats. 
Another  drawback  was  the  presence  of  foreign  war 
ships,  of  foreign  Consuls  and  representatives  of 
the  great  oil  corporations.  The  Dutch,  English  and 
American  Oil  Companies  protested  most  vigorously 
against  the  attack  on  Tampico,  and  the  Federals 
took  good  care  to  use  this  protection  to  great  ad- 
vantage. 


144  Carranza  and  Mexico 

When  Pablo  Gonzalez  was  ordered  to  take  Tam- 
pico at  all  costs,  he  did  so  after  only  four  days’  bat- 
tle. When  the  Federals  began  their  retreat,  they 
threatened  to  burn  and  destroy  all  the  oil  tanks  and 
property  of  the  foreigners,  if  they  were  followed  by 
the  Revolutionists. 

Like  many  of  the  important  moves  in  the  cam- 
paign against  Huerta,  the  great  significance  of  the 
capture  of  Tampico  was  pointed  out  by  a civilian. 
In  this  instance,  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  in  Car- 
ranza’s revolutionary  Cabinet,  Don  Rafael  Zu- 
baran,  was  the  wise  counsellor. 

The  first  reason  given  was  that  Huerta  had  prac- 
tically given  away  many  very  valuable  oil  conces- 
sions to  an  English  company,  in  return  for  cash. 
That  the  export  tax  on  each  barrel  of  oil  was 
doubled  from  sixty  cents  to  $1.20  and  calculating 
that  over  half  a million  barrels  of  oil  were  exported 
daily,  it  will  be  seen  what  a rich  source  of  income 
would  have  been  taken  away  from  Huerta. 

The  second  reason  was  that  the  seizure  of  Tam- 
pico would  eliminate  a great  source  of  friction  be- 
tween the  foreign  powers  and  the  revolutionary 
government,  besides  relieving  the  anxiety  felt  in 
Washington  as  to  the  constant  danger  of  foreign 
marines  landing  in  Tampico  to  protect  the  interests 
of  their  countrymen. 

The  third  reason  was  that  Tampico,  besides  be- 
ing the  most  important  seaport  in  Mexico  after 
Vera  Cruz,  was  also  a great  strategic  point.  It  cut 


Campaign  of  General  Gonzalez  in  the  East  145 

off  Monterrey  and  Saltillo  from  the  coast,  and 
endangered  and  flanked  their  communications. 
Huerta  considered  the  possession  of  Tampico  of 
such  value  that  when  it  was  threatened  by  the  rebels, 
and  he  knew  that  it  wa9  lost  to  him,  he  decided  to 
force  American  intervention  by  arresting  some  ma- 
rines who  had  landed  at  the  Tampico  wharf  on 
routine  business.  The  action  was  deliberate  and 
was  meant  to  concentrate  the  attention  of  the  revo- 
lutionists on  American  aggression,  so  that  they 
would  discontinue  their  attacks.  The  State  and 
Navy  Department  very  wisely  kept  the  American 
warship  outside  of  the  Panuco  River  so  as  to  offer 
as  few  pretexts  as  possible  for  attacks.  It  can  be 
asserted  that  the  fall  of  Tampico  sounded  the  end 
of  Huerta’s  rule  in  Mexico. 


CHAPTER  XV 


ZAPATA  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  SOUTH 

TTNDOUBTEDLY  there  is  no  Mexican  who 
has  been  talked  about,  described,  praised  and 
vilified  more  than  Emiliano  Zapata,  in  the  last  four 
years.  Now  everybody  can  pronounce  his  name  in 
America,  for  it  has  become  a byword  of  the  revo- 
lution in  Mexico. 

Innumerable  articles  have  been  written  in  Amer- 
ica on  Zapata  but  I have  only  met  two  men  who  had 
seen  him, — one  was  a Mexican  newspaperman  and 
the  other  was  a federal  major  who  slept  in  the  same 
room  w'ith  him,  unconscious  of  the  fact  that  a few 
feet  from  his  bed  there  was  the  man  he  was  sup- 
posed to  capture  dead  or  alive  for  Huerta,  with 
three  thousand  soldiers.  When  he  did  discover  this 
interesting  fact,  Zapata  was  miles  away.  This  in- 
cident proved  conclusively  that  the  southern  chief 
could  not  be  caught  by  force,  and  that  the  Indians 
in  Morelos  would  as  soon  think  of  committing  sui- 
cide as  to  betray  him. 

The  nature  of  the  volcanic  country  in  the  State 
of  Morelos  makes  it  very  hard  for  a body  of  sol- 
diers to  march  through  it  without  danger  of  being 

146 


Zapata  and  His  Campaign  in  the  South  147 

surprised  and  ambushed  almost  every  hundred 
yards.  Every  peon  in  Morelos  and  many  other 
southern  States  is  a Zapatista. 

No  man  could  have  held  such  power  as  Zapata 
over  the  population  of  almost  three  States,  by  offer- 
ing in  return  only  the  spoils  of  war  or  brigandage. 
No  bandit  ever  controlled  thirty  thousand  men  on 
the  mere  results  or  promise  of  loot  or  theft.  The 
Zapatistas,  with  few  exceptions,  are  all  for  the 
abolition  of  all  forms  of  slavery  and  for  the  distri- 
bution of  lands.  Although  Zapata  is  not  the  intel- 
lectual leader  of  the  Zapatistas,  his  name  has  be- 
come a legend.  Many  people  claim  that  he  never 
existed,  others  claim  that  Genovevo  de  la  O was 
the  braver  and  more  intelligent  of  the  two,  and  the 
real  leader. 

There  were  several  leaders  who  fought  Diaz  be- 
fore Zapata  became  prominent,  but  the  Morelian 
chief  represented  the  deepest  yearnings,  the  most 
profound  aspirations  and  all  the  unspoken  desires 
of  a miserable,  downtrodden,  but  patient,  long-suf- 
fering and  kindly  race.  Any  one  who  has  visited 
that  Garden  of  Eden  of  Mexico,  the  State  of  More- 
los, will  bear  testimony  to  the  simplicity,  morality 
and  patience  of  the  Morelian  Indians,  their  love  of 
the  soil  which  is  almost  a passion,  their  sterling 
qualities. 

The  injustices,  robberies  and  cruelties  perpetrated 
on  the  Indians  are  almost  incredible,  and  almost  un- 
believable in  our  century.  Until  the  European  war 


148 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


started,  civilized  people  did  not  believe  that  sol- 
diers could  be  so  cruel,  reckless  and  ruthless  against 
an  enemy. 

Zapata’s  and  Villa’s  wholesale  shooting  of  pris- 
oners, the  looting  of  haciendas,  banks  and  stores  in 
captured  cities,  their  retaliation  against  federal  of- 
ficers, now  seem  like  kid-glove,  pink-tea  affairs,  after 
the  stories  of  German  atrocities.  In  the  light  of 
these  atrocities,  Villa  might  be  a Mexican  Chester- 
field, and  Zapata  a scrupulous  Morelian  hidalgo  of 
the  most  fastidious  tastes.  Strange  to  relate,  the 
most  virulent  attacks  against  Mexican  civilization, 
methods  of  warfare  and  revolutionary  barbarities, 
were  written  by  German  editorialists.  The  Mex- 
icans had  no  Treitschkes,  Nietzsches,  von  Bern- 
hardis  to  sing  the  paeans  of  war,  of  the  destruction 
and  annihilation  of  enemies,  and  inoffensive  non- 
combatants  in  the  name  of  a higher  culture  and  a 
greater  civilization. 

The  precedents  of  cruelties  and  wanton  destruc- 
tion were  created  by  the  federal  officers  under  Diaz 
and  Huerta.  Where  the  Federals  passed,  they  left 
a trail  of  death  and  desolation.  To  prove  that  they 
had  fought  valiantly  the  Federals  killed  peaceful 
peons  and  sent  the  ears  of  the  Indians  as  vouchers 
to  the  War  Department. 

Whole  villages  passed  through  fire  and  sword  — 
in  others  all  the  men  were  impressed  into  the  army, 
and  the  women  and  children  concentrated  in  the 
cities.  Thousands  of  fruit  trees  that  had  been 


Zapata  and  His  Campaign  in  the  South  149 

growing  for  years,  bearing  fruit,  and  which  were 
the  sole  source  of  income  of  families  of  peons,  were 
ruthlessly  cut  down  to  be  sold  for  firewood  by 
greedy  Jefes  Politicos.  A whole  population  was 
decimated  because  it  would  not  stay  under  the  leash 
of  the  slave  driver  on  the  sugar  and  tobacco  plan- 
tations owned  by  half  a dozen  rich  families. 

Their  day  of  reckoning  has  almost  arrived,  and 
no  matter  what  Zapata  or  any  other  leader  may  do 
politically,  the  peons  of  Morelos  know  that  the  lands 
are  theirs  for  the  taking. 

Morelos  is  one  of  the  smallest  States  in  Mexico, 
and  one  of  the  richest,  and  has  an  area  of  2,734 
square  miles  and  a population  of  179,114.  As 
many  as  thirty  thousand  soldiers  with  machine  guns 
and  cannon  were  sent  to  conquer  Zapata  and  his 
army,  but  Zapata  remained  unconquered.  All  the 
generals,  including  Huerta,  who  had  won  laurels  in 
many  battlefields,  invariably  lost  them  in  Morelos. 
The  Federals  fought  according  to  book-strategy, 
while  Zapata  and  his  chiefs  fought  with  the  same 
fabian  tactics  which  defeated  Hannibal  in  Italy  and 
Napoleon  in  Spain.  When  the  patient,  ignorant, 
but  physically  powerful  Indians  discovered  that  they 
could  shoot  and  fight  as  well  as  the  trained  Fed- 
erals, and  that  a few  thousand  Indians  banded  to- 
gether could  keep  at  bay  a whole  army  of  Federals, 
the  struggle  for  land  was  won. 

But  there  is  the  reverse  of  the  medal.  As  all 
strong  people  have  their  compensation  in  some  flaw, 


150  Carranza  and  Mexico 

so  has  Zapata  a great  weakness  which  prevents  him 
from  becoming  the  greatest  factor  for  good  in  his 
country.  His  illiteracy,  coupled  with  a lack  of 
knowledge  of  politicians  of  the  middle  and  higher 
class,  make  him  an  easy  prey  to  all  sorts  of  schemers 
and  intriguers. 

For  years  Zapata  kept  up  his  guerrilla  warfare, 
accompanied  by  a staff  of  officers  and  several  secre- 
taries. One  of  the  most  famous  was  a certain  Mon- 
tano, a school-teacher  who  wrote  the  first  plan  which 
Zapata  endorsed.  The  second  plan,  which  was 
written  by  a certain  Palafox,  another  secretary,  and 
was  named  the  Plan  of  Ayala,  which  acknowledged 
Orozco  as  the  provisional  president,  when  he  re- 
belled against  Madero,  assisted  by  Cientifico  money. 

After  Madero’s  murder,  Orozco  joined  the  stand- 
ard of  Huerta,  who,  true  to  his  usual  methods,  tried 
to  use  Orozco’s  influence  with  Zapata,  to  eliminate 
him.  Orozco  went  to  Morelos  for  the  purpose  of 
conferring  with  Zapata,  but  the  wily  Morelian  had 
discovered  that  the  meeting  was  not  meant  to  bring 
peace,  but  to  facilitate  his  capture  and  murder.  As 
Orozco  was  not  very  brave,  and  his  conscience  not 
very  clear,  instead  of  going  personally  to  the  meet- 
ing, he  sent  instead  his  father  and  two  other  agents. 
As  an  answer  to  the  contemplated  plot,  Zapata  took 
Orozco’s  father  and  his  two  agents  as  prisoners. 
Later  they  were  found  dead,  after  an  attack  by  the 
Federals. 

Orozco  vowed  vengeance,  but  he  left  Cuernavaca 


Zapata  and  His  Campaign  in  the  South  15 1 

in  great  haste  under  the  pretext  of  going  North  to 
fight  the  Constitutionalists,  where  he  was  defeated 
at  every  encounter.  Any  one  who  had  read  Mex- 
ican newspapers  would  have  known  how  discredited 
Orozco’s  personality  was,  but  Zapata’s  secretaries 
wanted  a continuation  of  conditions  wherein  they 
would  run  the  Morelian  chief  for  their  own  benefit. 

When  Carranza  arrived  in  Mexico  City  with  the 
constitutionalist  government,  he  sent  two  agents  to 
Zapata,  with  power  to  settle  the  agrarian  question 
in  Morelos,  once  for  all.  The  following  letter  by 
Gen.  A.  I.  Villareal  will  show  how  Zapata’s  secre- 
taries spoiled  the  settlement. 

Mexico,  Sept.  5th,  1914. 

General  Emiliano  Zapata: 

Cuernavaca,  Mor. 

Esteemed  General: 

I had  the  pleasure  of  receiving  the  last  letter,  which 
you  were  kind  enough  to  send  through  Mr.  Reyes  and 
in  which  you  express  the  fact  that  you  were  to  blame  for 
the  incident  at  Huitzilac.  I must  advise  you  that  this 
matter  was  not  one  of  much  importance,  and  it  seems  that 
they  gave  you  exaggerated  reports  of  the  same.  What  we 
consider  a grave  affair,  and  was  really  a sad  one  regard- 
ing which  we  went  to  consult  you  with  the  object  of  arriv- 
ing at  an  agreement  between  the  revolutionary  elements  of 
the  North  and  the  South,  was  the  unjustified  conduct  and 
belligerent  attitude  of  your  secretary,  Mr.  Manuel  Palafox, 
in  respect  to  whom  I intend  to  speak  in  this  letter  with  the 
most  absolute  and  honest  frankness;  believing  in  this  way 


152 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


that  I may  do  you  a good  turn,  not  alone  yourself  person- 
ally but  also  the  cause  of  the  well-being  of  the  public  which 
we  must  all  defend  and  also  the  peace  of  the  nation. 

If  you  critically  analyze  the  happenings  which  occurred 
during  our  visit  in  this  city,  and  to  which  I beg  to  call 
your  attention,  you  will  discover  in  a moment  that  all  the 
difficulties,  all  the  petty  misunderstandings,  all  the  threats 
of  war,  emanated  principally  from  Mr.  Palafox  supported 
by  Mr.  Serratos,  who  also  in  our  opinion  is  carrying  on 
work  right  in  your  office  that  is  very  far  from  being  patriotic 
and  loyal. 

It  is  always  the  case  that  when  various  people  come  to- 
gether to  settle  great  or  small  differences  which  may  exist 
between  them,  it  is  understood  if  they  work  in  good  faith 
and  the  matters  treated  of  are  thoroughly  talked  over,  that 
some  points  are  ceded  by  one  party  and  some  by  the  other 
party;  there  must  be  reciprocity  in  the  arrangements,  and 
a definite  conclusion  reached  regarding  the  subject  under 
discussion.  To  continue,  conferences  held  with  regard  to 
any  matter  must  not  be  reduced  to  the  party  on  one  side 
imposing  a settlement  and  the  parties  on  the  other  side 
accepting  the  same  without  discussing  the  propositions  for 
and  against  and  coming  to  a mutual  agreement. 

Unfortunately,  in  our  case  this  which  was  the  rational 
and  just  method  of  procedure  did  not  take  place,  because 
as  you  will  remember  Mr.  Palafox,  who  was  the  spokesman 
during  the  discussions  almost  prevented  us  from  setting 
forth  our  side  of  the  subject,  and  attempted  to  impose  upon 
us  certain  conditions  which  would  have  to  be  accepted  un- 
conditionally as  preliminaries  before  arriving  at  a resolu- 
tion. 

You  will  recollect  that  Mr.  Palafox  demanded  as  a first 


Zapata  and  His  Campaign  in  the  South  153 

condition  that  as  revolutionaries  of  the  North  we  should 
accept  without  discussion  the  Plan  of  Ayala  as  the  Supreme 
Law  of  the  Republic,  declaring  that  otherwise  it  would  be 
impossible  to  treat  of  other  matters. 

This  is  in  direct  contradiction  to  your  declarations,  that 
you  had  no  ambition  for  power;  for  in  one  of  the  clauses 
of  the  Plan  of  Ayala  it  states  that  General  Pascual  Orozco 
is  recognized  as  leader  of  the  revolution,  and  in  case  he  is 
not  able  to  discharge  that  task,  you  will  be  eligible;  and  as 
our  complete  submission  to  the  Plan  of  Ayala  is  demanded 
it  would  intimate  that  we  ought  to  place  you  in  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Supreme  Chief  of  the  Nation  and  in  a more 
or  less  covert  manner,  you  would  be  Provisional  President 
of  the  Republic. 

I believe  in  the  sincerity  of  your  words  when  you  say 
that  you  have  no  ambition  to  command,  that  all  you  want 
is  the  settlement  of  the  agrarian  question  and  the  economic 
betterment  of  the  lower  classes  for  which  you  have  struggled 
so  bravely.  But  back  of  this  is  Mr.  Palafox,  who  has  the 
ambition  to  rule,  and  who  is  desirous  to  see  you  raised  to 
supreme  power  so  that  he  may  enjoy  a privileged  position 
in  your  office  in  his  character  of  Secretary  and  Councillor. 
The  same  object  animated  Mr.  Serratos  more  or  less  who 
also  enjoys  a certain  amount  of  influence  regarding  your 
affairs,  and  doubtless  awaits  the  auspicious  moment  of  utiliz- 
ing the  same  for  his  own  benefit. 

You  will  remember  that  Don  Luis  Cabrera  and  I set 
forth  very  clearly  that  wTe  were  authorized  to  accept  es- 
sentially the  Plan  of  Ayala;  that  is,  the  land  question,  the 
satisfaction  of  the  popular  needs,  the  betterment  of  the 
poor.  We  hereby  declare  that  we  agree  fully  with  the 
principles  set  forth  in  the  Plan  of  Ayala,  and  only  desire 


154  Carranza  and  Mexico 

that  its  form  may  be  modified,  and  that  there  may  be  added  to 
the  gubernatorial  programme  which  we  might  draw  up  some 
clauses  relative  to  the  needs  of  the  Northern  States  and  the 
States  in  the  centre  of  the  Republic,  which  are  not  in  the 
same  condition  as  those  of  the  south.  Messrs.  Palafox  and 
Serratos  refused  to  accept  our  cordial  and  just  propositions, 
and  insisted  in  a blind,  unquestionable,  despotic  manner 
that  the  Plan  of  Ayala  be  accepted,  without  the  change  of  a 
word  or  a comma. 

Convinced  that  the  influence  of  Messrs.  Palafox  and 
Serratos  over  you  would  make  sterile  all  our  efforts  for 
coming  to  an  agreement  in  the  form  which  we  proposed,  we 
declined  to  start  a discussion  which  only  might  have  served 
to  embitter  our  souls  and  to  give  rise  to  more  ill-feeling 
than  what  we  suffered  in  the  course  of  our  conversation  with 
you.  For  our  part  we  found  ourselves  in  a visibly  hostile 
atmosphere,  and  we  lacked  the  liberty  necessary  for  the 
free  expression  of  our  opinions. 

When  Mr.  Sarabia  spoke  with  you  for  the  first  time,  he 
wrote  me  stating  that  your  attitude  was  cordial  and  that  he 
saw  that  your  propositions  of  peace  wTere  sincere.  On  the 
occasion  of  our  meeting  with  you  our  surprise  was  great 
to  find  you  different  from  what  Mr.  Sarabia  had  represented. 
This  may  be  easily  explained  that  the  first  time  you 
spoke  with  Mr.  Sarabia  you  were  guided  by  your  own  im- 
pulses and  by  your  good  intentions,  and  the  second  time 
you  were  under  the  influence  of  the  unhealthy  machinations 
of  Mr.  Palafox. 

The  question  then  is  reduced  to  the  following  facts: 
On  our  part  the  greatest  and  most  sincere  cordiality,  the 
recognition  of  the  justice  of  your  cause,  the  acceptance  of  the 
principles  of  the  plan  of  Ayala  relating  to  the  division  of 


Zapata  and  His  Campaign  in  the  South  155 

lands  and  the  social  betterment ; on  your  part,  good  impulses, 
no  ambition  for  power,  and  the  exclusive  desire  for  the 
welfare  of  the  public;  and  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Palafox  and 
Mr.  Serratos  a spirit  of  intrigue  that  distorts  the  best  in- 
tentions, ambitions  for  power  in  your  hands  with  a view 
to  thriving  in  your  shadow,  and  a decided  object  of  pro- 
voking war  if  their  ambitions  should  not  be  satisfied. 

Is  not  this  sad,  General  Zapata?  Is  it  not  deeply  to  be 
lamented  that  all  the  patriotic  efforts  of  honorable  men 
shall  go  to  pieces  before  the  caprices  of  two  intriguers? 
Is  it  not  bitter  and  even  shameful  that  a movement  as  great 
and  unselfish  as  yours  after  four  years  of  struggle  should 
degenerate  by  reason  of  an  instrument  of  vile  ambition  and 
in  an  ignoble  weapon  for  bringing  war  a second  time  on  a 
country  already  exhausted  in  its  struggle  for  independence? 

I make  a supreme  appeal  to  your  honor,  to  your  patriot- 
ism, to  your  love  of  the  people,  who  would  be  in  the  last 
analysis  those  who  would  suffer  most  from  a war,  that  you 
take  into  consideration  what  we  said  when  we  were  with 
you,  and  which  I again  repeat  in  this  letter,  that  we  may 
arrive  at  a good  understanding  with  the  revolutionaries  of 
the  north  and  the  south,  who  in  reality  are  brothers. 

We  know  that  we  have  done  all  in  our  power  to  arrive 
at  a peaceful  solution,  and  if  at  length  it  might  be  found 
impossible  to  reach  it,  it  will  not  be  through  our  fault. 

God  grant  that  to-morrow  I may  not  have  to  tell  you 
that  through  attending  to  the  intrigues  of  an  ambitious  party 
more  than  to  the  dictates  of  patriotism,  you  may  be  to 
blame  for  the  beginning  of  a war  which  would  be  thoroughly 
unjustifiable,  which  no  one  wants  and  which  would  do  no 
one  any  good ! 

I believe  that  after  what  I have  said  it  is  only  necessary 


1 56 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


to  add  the  following:  That  while  Palafox  continues  at 

your  side  enjoying  the  influence  that  he  does,  it  will  be 
impossible  for  us  to  return  to  see  you  at  Cuernavaca,  nor 
for  us  to  send  other  representatives,  for  we  consider  that  we 
would  not  have,  as  we  did  not,  the  necessary  liberty  to  treat 
with  frankness  and  amplitude  the  transcendental  subject 
which  is  under  our  discussion. 

We  would  be  very  thankful  to  know  that  you  had  re- 
solved to  act  independently  of  your  harmful  counsellor;  and 
in  such  a case  we  consider  that  it  would  be  easy  enough  to 
arrive  at  a settlement. 

In  place  of  Mr.  Palafox  you  should  be  able  to  consult 
your  principal  chiefs,  who  have  struggled  faithfully  for  the 
cause,  and  you  will  surely  find  among  them  better  standards 
and  better  counsel  than  from  your  ancient  secretary. 

I know  that  the  majority  of  your  chieftains  hold  Mr. 
Palafox  in  scant  esteem  and  do  not  care  for  him ; and  if  they 
have  not  so  expressed  themselves  to  you  it  has  been  perhaps 
through  lack  of  opportunity  or  excess  of  discipline.  Now 
it  would  be  convenient  that  you  consult  them  regarding  this 
matter. 

I trust,  Mr.  General,  in  your  good  judgment  and  sense 
of  right,  to  kindly  bear  in  mind  with  a spirit  of  serenity  and 
justice  what  we  have  set  before  you,  and  unite  your  efforts 
to  ours  with  a view  to  realizing  the  peace  which  our  Re- 
public needs  so  much,  without  lessening  the  agrarian  ideals 
for  which  you  have  struggled  for  so  long  a time. 

I am  happy  to  sign  myself, 

Yours  affectionate  and  loyal  friend, 

Antonio  I.  Villarreal. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

ONE  HUNDRED  YEARS’  STRUGGLE  FOR  LAND  AND 
DEMOCRACY,  AGAINST  CLERICALISM 

IN  August,  1521,  Cortez  consummated  the  con- 
A quest  of  New  Spain  and  in  August,  1821,  under 
Iturbide,  the  independence  of  Mexico  was  wrested 
from  the  mother  country. 

For  exactly  three  hundred  years  Spain  governed 
Mexico  with  soldiers  and  priests.  Ten  prelates  of 
the  Dominican  order,  out  of  a list  of  sixty-two  vice- 
roys, had  ruled  New  Spain,  which  was  surrounded 
with  a ring  that  was  mightier  than  a Chinese  wall. 

Education,  outside  of  religious  teaching,  was  dis- 
couraged. Communication  with  the  outside  world 
was  forbidden.  Spain  fed  New  Spain  commercially, 
politically  and  intellectually. 

The  Mexican  born  was  allowed  no  privileges,  no 
rights.  The  Spaniards,  soldiers,  priests  and  aris- 
tocrats monopolized  everything;  all  the  offices,  the 
commerce,  the  property,  were  theirs.  Four-fifths 
of  the  lands  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Church. 

In  18 1 1 an  ex-priest,  Hidalgo,  unfurled  the  ban- 
ner of  the  revolution  by  the  shouts  of:  “ Long  live 
Religion!  Death  to  bad  Government!  Death  to 
the  Gachupines ! ” (Spaniards). 

157 


158  Carranza  and  Alexico 

The  revolution  for  freedom  from  Spanish  rule 
was  initiated  by  an  ex-priest.  Morelos,  Mata- 
moros,  Dr.  Cos,  and  Navarrete,  who  continued  the 
struggle,  were  all  ex-priests.  Great  personalities 
appeared  in  the  ten  years’  revolution,  such  as  Al- 
varez, Guerrero,  Bravo,  Victoria.  The  Mexican 
revolutionists  were  battling  for  political  liberty  and 
land. 

When  the  Church  realized  that  Mexico  was  lost 
to  Spain,  it  put  forward  a Spanish  officer,  Iturbide, 
as  the  Liberator.  Iturbide  betrayed  his  own  king, 
and  after  accepting  the  first  Constitution,  betrayed 
the  revolution  and  became  emperor  by  means  of  a 
military  “ cuartelazo  ” (mutiny). 

The  Mexican  liberals  fought  continuously  the  en- 
croachments of  the  Church,  which  used  the  army 
to  support  it  politically.  The  military  strength  cre- 
ated by  the  Church  and  landowners  was  maintained, 
not  to  protect  the  nation  from  foreign  aggression, 
but  to  guard  the  government  from  the  assaults  of 
the  people. 

The  climax  of  the  struggle  took  place  during  the 
three  years’  war,  1857-1860,  when  the  liberal  lead- 
ers enforced  the  laws  of  the  reform,  which  entitled 
the  nation  to  possess  all  the  properties  of  the  clergy, 
both  religious  and  secular,  and  the  Church  was  de- 
nied the  right  to  own  real  estate. 

Religious  orders  as  contrary  to  public  welfare 
were  dissolved.  Church  and  State  were  absolutely 


One  Hundred  Years'  Struggle  159 

separated,  and  religious  freedom  was  fully  and 
firmly  established. 

Benito  Juarez,  a pure-blooded  Indian,  continued 
the  strife  of  the  Liberals,  initiated  by  Gomez  Farias, 
Melchior  Ocampo  and  other  martyrs  of  the  cause. 
After  the  three  years’  war,  the  Church  was  osten- 
sibly eliminated  as  a political  power.  The  land 
which  had  been  absorbed  by  the  Church  from  the 
Indians,  and  known  as  “ egidos,”  communal  lands, 
reverted  to  them,  and  over  three  million  Indians  be- 
came small  landowners. 

Defeated  but  not  discouraged,  the  clericals  then 
brought  about  French  intervention  and  placed  on 
the  throne  of  Mexico  a clerical,  Emperor  Maxi- 
milian, who  met  his  defeat  and  death  in  Queretaro 
in  1867. 

Porfirio  Diaz  came  into  power  as  a liberal 
through  a revolution,  and  ended  as  a clerical.  Under 
his  regime  of  spoliation,  all  the  lands  which  belonged 
to  the  Indians  were  taken  away  from  them  by  trick- 
ery and  legal  frauds,  and  distributed  among  Diaz’ 
generals  and  political  supporters.  Government  land 
was  sold  to  foreigners. 

Through  the  influence  of  Carmelita  Diaz,  the 
wife  of  General  Diaz,  the  religious  orders,  foreign 
priests,  friars  and  nuns,  came  back  to  Mexico  and 
acquired  property,  and  the  clericals  began  reorgan- 
izing themselves  and  taking  breath  for  another 
struggle  which  they  knew  was  coming  soon.  When 


160  Carranza  and  Mexico 

Diaz  was  tottering  to  his  fall,  the  Church  placed  the 
clerical,  De  la  Barra,  in  the  provisional  presidency. 
The  Madero  cabinet  was  composed  of  clericals  and 
neo-Cientificos  who  sat  tight  in  a passive  policy  of 
non-intervention  in  Mexican  internal  affairs,  as  if 
the  government  reforms  were  none  of  their  business. 

Meanwhile,  the  clericals  were  very  active  polit- 
ically and  financially;  they  contributed  millions  of 
dollars  to  the  downfall  of  the  Madero  government. 
As  usual,  the  clericals  corrupted  the  army  chiefs, 
and  succeeded  in  having  the  reform  government 
overthrown. 

Dr.  Urrutia,  a pupil  of  the  Jesuit  College,  was 
the  instigator  and  chief  plotter.  He  picked  out 
Huerta  as  the  most  convenient  tool  for  the  Church. 
Huerta,  although  a Catholic,  was  a most  unscrupu- 
lous and  ambitious  man,  and  used  the  Church  as  a 
stepping-stone.  He  received  millions  of  dollars 
from  the  clergy,  from  the  landowners,  and  the  for- 
eigners, such  as  bankers  and  mining  and  oil  inter- 
ests. During  Huerta’s  regime,  Dr.  Urrutia  was  the 
Mephisto  and  Iago  of  Huerta. 

As  soon  as  Huerta  was  in  power  and  the  higher 
clergy  began  to  notice  the  unpopularity  of  the  dic- 
tator, they  began  plotting  his  assassination  or  over- 
throw. Huerta,  who  trusted  Dr.  Urrutia  more 
than  any  other  man  in  Mexico  except  General  Blan- 
quet,  made  him  Minister  of  the  Interior,  and  upon 
his  shoulders  fell  the  responsibility  of  the  murder 


One  Hundred  Years'  Struggle  161 

of  scores,  nay,  hundreds,  of  political  enemies  of  the 
Huerta  regime. 

As  long  as  Dr.  Urrutia  and  his  friends,  Mora 
the  Archbishop  of  Mexico,  Jenaro  Mendez,  Arch- 
bishop of  Michoacan,  Eulogio  G.  Gillow,  Arch- 
bishop of  Oaxaca,  Ramon,  Archbishop  of  Puebla  — 
in  fact,  almost  all  the  archbishops  of  Mexico,  were 
plotting  with  Dr.  Urrutia  for  the  elimination  of 
the  enemies  of  the  dictatorship,  Huerta  seems  to 
have  made  no  objection.  The  following  letter,  ad- 
dressed to  Dr.  Urrutia,  Minister  of  the  Interior,  by 
the  Archbishop  of  Mexico  City,  silences  the  state- 
ments made  by  Catholics  in  America  and  Mexico, 
that  the  Church  was  neutral  and  did  not  play 
politics. 

LETTER  FROM  ARCHBISHOP  MORA  TO  URRUTIA 

Mexico,  July  nth,  1913. 

My  dear  Minister  and  friend : 

Thanking  you  for  the  kind  terms  of  your  favor  of  the 
9th  inst.  which  I received  yesterday,  I beg  to  assure  you 
once  more  that  all  the  curates  and  priests  under 
my  jurisdiction,  in  compliance  with  their  duty,  will  make 
every  effort  in  order  to  bring  about  as  soon  as  possible,  the 
fulfilment  of  the  aspirations  of  all  the  good  people  in  this 
republic,  who  desire  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of  the  be- 
loved country. 

I say  that  they  do  so  in  compliance  with  their  duty  be- 
cause the  Church  desires  peace,  and  to  avoid  bloodshed,  and 
that  all  co-operate  to  the  ultimate  object  of  society,  which  is 
the  well-being  of  all  its  members. 


162 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


In  this  sense,  I shall  continue  to  animate  them  to  lose  no 
opportunity  to  exhort  their  parishioners  to  help  to  obtain 
this  great  boon. 

In  order  to  proceed  in  all  justice,  I would  like,  if  you  have 
no  objection,  to  know  the  name  of  the  person  who  is  work- 
ing against  the  government.  One  word  from  you  on  the 
subject  will  be  sufficient. 

I enclose  a Memo,  of  something  which  may  be  of  use  to 
you,  and  which  has  come  to  my  knowledge  from  trust- 
worthy sources. 

With  kindest  greetings,  and  assuring  you  of  my  thank- 
fulness, friendship  and  respect,  I beg  to  remain, 

Very  respectfully, 

Jose,  Archbishop  of  Mexico. 

Dr.  Urruita,  emboldened  by  his  success  in  elim- 
inating so  many  enemies  by  assassination,  and  in  his 
formidable  and  terror-inspiring  position  as  official 
executioner  of  Huerta,  became  ambitious.  The 
high  clergy  of  Mexico  encouraged  his  pretentions, 
and  began  sending  out  feelers  to  discover  if  he 
would  be  willing  and  ready  to  oust  Huerta  and  place 
himself  in  Huerta’s  stead  as  dictator.  But  Huerta 
was  wide-awake,  and  as  soon  as  he  discovered  the 
plot,  he  gave  orders  to  have  Urrutia  arrested. 
Urrutia  escaped  by  the  skin  of  his  teeth;  disguised 
as  an  Indian  peon  he  crossed  the  American  lines  to 
Vera  Cruz,  where  he  was  almost  lynched  by  the  in- 
furiated Mexicans. 

The  following  letter  from  the  Archbishop  of 
Michoacan  proves  irrefutably  that  the  Mexican 


One  Hundred  Years’  Struggle  163 

clergy  had  plotted  to  place  one  of  the  most  das- 
tardly, cruel  and  infamous  men  in  Mexico,  in  the 
culminating  position  of  Chief  Executive  of  the  Re- 
public, as  a protege  and  tool  of  the  Church  in 
Mexico. 

LETTER  OF  THE  ARCHBISHOP  OF  MICHOACAN  TO 
MINISTER  URRUTIA 

September  nth,  1913. 

My  dear  compadre: 

The  timely  measures  taken  by  you  saved  this  city  from 
being  ravaged  by  the  rebel  gangs  which  have  been  concen- 
trating in  these  localities  to  the  number  of  over  a thou- 
sand strong,  but  now,  I think  I can  assure  you  that  if  the 
detachment  which  has  just  arrived,  pursues  them,  this  part 
of  the  State  will  soon  be  pacified. 

The  principal  object  of  this  letter  is  to  ask  you  to  relieve 
me  of  a great  anxiety  under  which  I am  laboring,  and  which 
has  been  caused  by  the  aggressive  and  almost  scandalous 
attitude  taken  in  public  by  Mr.  Calero  and  a small  group 
of  porristas,  against  your  good  self.  I can  well  see  that  their 
object  is  to  tarnish  the  glory  which  you  have  so  justly  won, 
and  to  alienate  your  adherents  all  over  the  republic. 

But  they  will  not  accomplish  anything,  because  all  the 
sensible  men  know  very  wrell  the  envy  and  intrigues  that 
animate  these  degraded  people.  Although  I am  at  ease 
on  that  score,  my  profound  sympathy  and  affection  for  you 
make  me  fear  that  these  men’s  intrigues  might  put  obstacles 
on  the  path  that  Our  Lord  and  His  Blessed  Mother  have 

PUT  BEFORE  YOU  TO  CLIMB  TO  THE  CULMINATING  POSITION 
OF  CHIEF  EXECUTIVE  OF  THE  REPUBLIC,  which  position 


164  Carranza  and  Mexico 

will  require  of  you  the  greatest  sacrifice,  but  will  at  the 
same  time  lay  before  you  a vast  field  in  which  to  exercise 
your  activity  for  the  glory  and  honor  of  God,  and  for  the 
benefit  of  our  beloved  country. 

In  the  meantime  I beg  of  you  to  tell  me  confidentially  if 
this  threat  of  Calero  is  to  be  feared,  or  whether  you  think  it 
will  be  easy  for  you  to  humiliate  the  efforts  of  these  up- 
starts. 

Your  compadre  etc., 

Jenaro  Mendez, 
Archbishop  of  Michoacan. 

The  flight  of  several  archbishops  from  Mexico 
was  not  due  so  much  to  their  fear  of  the  persecu- 
tions of  the  Constitutionalists  but  more  to  the  terror 
of  the  retaliations  of  General  Huerta.  The  Mex- 
ican clergy  enlisted  the  sympathy  of  the  American 
Catholics  and  of  the  Pope  in  Rome,  in  their  ap- 
peals for  protection.  The  impression  has  been 
given  that  the  Mexican  clergy  is  a victim  of  the 
persecutions  of  the  Constitutionalists,  who  want  to 
destroy  religion. 

What  the  Mexican  liberals,  as  well  as  the  leaders 
among  the  Indians,  are  after,  is  the  elimination  of 
the  clergy  from  the  political  arena.  The  political 
activities  of  the  clericals  will  only  result  in  disas- 
trous effects  — their  abstention  from  it  will  only  en- 
hance their  spiritual  supremacy. 

At  Aguascalientes,  one  of  the  delegates  of  Za- 
pata, Paulino  Martinez,  said  before  the  assembled 
generals:  “ The  Indian,  the  peon,  the  workingman 


One  Hundred  Years ’ Struggle  165 

of  all  the  factories,  the  artisans  in  the  cities,  were 
all  exploited  by  that  odious  trinity  formed  by  the 
cacique,  the  military  man  and  the  priest. 

Carranza  never  said  a more  profound  truth,  than 
when  he  stated,  at  the  beginning  of  the  revolution 
against  Huerta — “We  are  fighting  the 
Three  Years’  War  all  over  again.” 

The  religious  question  in  Mexico  has  to  be  set- 
tled once  for  all  by  the  Mexicans  themselves,  and 
the  pernicious  interferences  by  the  Mexican  clergy, 
which  tries  to  enlist  the  sympathy,  influence  and  in- 
tervention of  the  American  or  foreign  Catholics,  will 
only  revert  to  the  disadvantage  of  all  the  fair  think- 
ing, just  Catholics,  who,  if  they  are  sincere  in  their 
claims  that  they  do  not  mix  in  politics,  will  find  that 
the  safest  and  most  practical  thing  to  do  is  to  keep 
neutral  in  a family  quarrel.  Otherwise  they  might 
burn  their  fingers. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


ATTEMPTS  AT  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  LAND 
QUESTION 

OEVERAL  attempts  have  been  made  during  the 
^ last  four  years  to  solve  the  land  problem  in  the 
States  of  Morelos,  Tamaulipas,  Chihuahua.  Other 
States  have  followed  in  the  wake  in  a more  or  less 
radical  manner  according  to  the  conditions  of  the 
peons  and  the  necessity  for  cultivating  the  land  to 
feed  the  population. 

The  most  interesting  of  all  attempts  was  initiated 
by  Gen.  Lucio  Blanco  who  was  fighting  under  Gen. 
Pablo  Gonzalez  in  the  division  of  the  East.  Any 
one  taking  the  trouble  to  look  up  the  map  of  Mex- 
ico will  observe  that  the  State  of  Tamaulipas 
touches  the  border  of  the  United  States  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  (Matamoros)  to  Nuevo 
Laredo.  Along  the  line  of  that  strip,  on  the  most 
fertile  parts  which  can  be  irrigated  by  the  waters 
of  the  Rio  Grande,  were  lands  which  belonged  to 
small  tenants  and  in  many  cases  were  communal 
lands  “ egidos  ” belonging  to  Indians. 

Under  the  Diaz  regime  in  the  last  ten  years  of 
his  rule,  Felix  Diaz,  the  nephew  of  the  dictator, 


Attempts  at  Solution  of  the  Land  Question  167 

was  able  to  expropriate  most  of  those  lands  with 
the  assistance  of  the  governor  and  the  jefes  politi- 
cos of  Tamaulipas.  The  company  which  expropri- 
ated the  lands  and  paid  the  expenses  was  under  the 
patronage  of  Felix  Diaz.  Roughly  speaking  there 
were  about  75,000  acres  under  the  control  of  that 
company. 

As  soon  as  Gonzalez’s  and  Blanco’s  troops  had 
driven  the  Federals  and  the  jefes  politicos  from  the 
border,  Lucio  Blanco  originated  the  idea  of  selling 
the  lands  of  Felix  Diaz  to  the  peons  of  Tamauli- 
pas. 

He  asked  the  engineers  fighting  under  him  to 
survey  the  land  in  question  and  divide  it  into  small 
lots  from  ten  to  sixty  acres.  Then  he  offered  them 
at  public  auction,  giving  the  preference  to  the  sol- 
diers under  his  command.  The  effect  was  surpris- 
ing; peons  came  from  everywhere  to  watch  the  pro- 
ceedings. Most  of  the  land  was  sold  to  the  highest 
bidder  at  a very  low  price,  on  the  installment  plan, 
with  a small  sum  to  be  paid  in  cash.  The  most  as- 
tonishing and  significant  result  of  the  experiment 
was  that  over  400  peons  bought  the  land  besides  a 
great  many  soldiers  who,  having  acquired  small 
lots,  refused  to  continue  fighting.  Their  logic  was 
irrefutable : they  had  taken  up  arms  to  get  back 
the  land  and  now  that  they  were  in  possession  of 
it,  why  fight  any  longer? 

The  problem  was  perplexing  in  the  extreme.  If 
all  the  generals  in  the  revolution  acted  on  the  same 


1 68 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


principle  as  Lucio  Blanco  then  all  the  Constitution- 
alist soldiers  would  stop  fighting. 

This  incident  proves  quite  conclusively  that  the 
revolution  in  Mexico  is  an  economic  more  than  a 
political  upheaval. 

Carranza  was  informed  of  this  land  distribution 
and  its  disastrous  results  in  as  far  as  it  touched  the 
military  question  and  the  result  was  that  Gen.  Lucio 
Blanco  had  to  shift  his  command  to  the  western 
division  under  General  Obregon. 

In  the  State  of  Chihuahua  General  Villa  began 
a distribution  of  lands.  Unlike  General  Blanco, 
he  went  at  the  problem  in  a haphazard,  personal 
way. 

As  the  Terrazas  were  personal  enemies  of  his 
and  owners  of  almost  one-third  of  the  State  of  Chi- 
huahua, he  proclaimed  the  Terrazas  estates  confis- 
cated. The  distribution  was  made  among  some  of 
his  officer’s,  civilians  on  his  staff  and  personal  friends. 

In  Mexico  wherever  there  is  cultivation  of  any 
kind  there  will  be  found  a farmhouse  (hacienda) 
built  like  a fortress.  The  hacienda  proper  is  a 
small  village,  sometimes  a small  city  in  itself,  con- 
taining the  house  of  the  proprietor,  the  manager, 
the  servants  and  the  peons,  a church,  buildings  for 
gathering  the  crops,  often  a factory,  enclosures  or 
stables  for  horses,  cattle,  sheep.  The  whole  is 
surrounded  by  a high  and  very  thick  wall  which  can 
stand  a prolonged  siege  and  can  defy  capture  by 
armed  forces.  Everything  for  its  protection  is 


Attempts  at  Solution  of  the  Land,  Question  169 

found  within  its  walls:  gatling  guns,  rifles,  ammuni- 
tion, food,  clothing,  and  even  wells  of  water. 

Formerly  some  of  the  haciendados  were  able  to 
arm  and  organize  as  many  as  30,000  men  under 
their  command  from  their  haciendas. 

Most  of  the  haciendas  are  now  in  the  hands  of 
the  Revolutionists,  generals,  officers  and  peons  who 
work  the  farms  for  their  own  benefit. 

Land  without  a farmhouse  has  not  the  same 
value,  as  the  farmer  coming  into  a piece  of  land 
would  have  to  build  a house,  unless  the  land  al- 
lotted to  him  happened  to  be  near  his  abode.  Be- 
sides, the  haciendas  contain  everything  needed  for 
the  cultivation,  such  as  plows,  agricultural  imple- 
ments, seeds,  horses,  cattle. 

When  Villa  gave  land  away  he  incorporated  with 
it  a farmhouse.  In  that  sense  he  was  creating  an- 
other landed  aristocracy  to  take  the  place  of  the 
old  one.  Another  factor  which  is  important  in  the 
land  question  is  the  climatic  condition  of  the  State. 
In  Chihuahua  with  the  exception  of  the  western  part 
the  rest  is  dry  and  needs  artificial  irrigation  to  bring 
satisfactory  results.  Artificial  irrigation  has  to  be 
done  by  the  State  or  the  federal  government  and 
cannot  be  carried  on  by  private  individuals  unless 
they  are  very  rich  or  backed  by  capitalists  or  cor- 
porations. 

Most  of  the  Terrazas  estates  thereupon  fell  into 
the  hands  of  a few  scores  of  individuals  instead  of 
one  single  family. 


170 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


When  it  is  taken  into  account  that  the  population 
of  Chihuahua  is  about  405,500,  it  will  be  found  that 
the  distribution  of  the  land  by  Villa  only  touched 
an  infinitesimal  percentage  of  the  population.  Even 
if  it  is  calculated  that  it  is  necessary  that  one-third 
of  the  population  of  Chihuahua  may  be  needed  to 
sustain  the  State  by  agriculture,  then  135,000  peo- 
ple or  a third  of  the  State  would  have  to  come 
into  possession  of  land.  Admitting  that  Villa 
should  succeed  in  giving  away  land  to  all  the  sol- 
diers and  officers  who  have  fought  under  him  or 
about  25,000  men,  still  there  would  be  left  over 
110,000  landless  peons  who  very  likely  would  have 
to  go  to  work  for  the  fortunate  soldiers  of  the  north- 
ern division.  The  peons  could  justly  claim  that  the 
revolution  was  fought  for  all  the  Mexicans  and 
especially  for  the  peons  and  not  solely  for  the  sol- 
diers of  the  northern  division. 

The  solution  of  the  land  question  by  Villa  is 
therefore  unequitable  and  is  likely  to  bring  further 
trouble. 

Zapata  on  the  other  side  solved  the  problem  in 
the  most  drastic  and  so  far  in  the  most  practical 
manner. 

The  State  of  Morelos  is  a very  small  State  and 
has  a population  of  about  180,000  inhabitants.  The 
land  is  very  fertile,  needing  no  irrigation,  as  the 
periodical  rainy  season  and  the  rivers  irrigating 
the  whole  State  makes  the  growth  of  every  kind 
of  fruit  trees,  vegetables,  coffee,  sugar  cane,  to- 


Attempts  at  Solution  of  the  Land  Question  17 1 

bacco,  corn,  etc.,  luxuriant  in  the  highest  degree. 
In  fact  several  crops  can  be  gathered  every  year. 

Zapata  did  not  only  include  the  officers  of  his 
staff  and  army  in  the  land  distribution  but  every  sol- 
dier who  had  fought  for  him  and  every  peon  and 
every  family  of  peons  in  the  State  of  Morelos. 

In  the  case  of  the  big  sugar  plantations  Zapata 
levied  a ransom  which  was  calculated  on  a certain 
percentage  of  the  profits;  to  feed,  clothe  and  arm 
his  soldiers.  The  salaries  of  the  workers  were  in- 
creased and  the  proprietor  of  the  plantation  was 
protected  against  depredations  and  destruction.  If 
the  sugar  planter  refused  to  pay,  then  his  machinery, 
the  buildings  and  the  crops  were  burned.  The 
constant  threat  of  and  fear  of  Zapata’s  army  elim- 
inated the  worst  form  of  slavery:  peonage. 

The  rest  of  the  population  was  empowered  to 
appropriate  and  cultivate  the  land  surrounding  the 
villages  or  near  their  dwellings. 

In  this  fashion  Zapata’s  soldiers  were  fed, 
clothed  and  armed  — every  ablebodied  man,  every 
peon  had  his  rifle  and  his  ammunition  and  was  al- 
ways ready  to  fight  the  aggressions  of  the  federal 
army.  Practically  the  whole  male  population  be- 
tween the  ages  of  twenty  and  thirty  was  under 
arms;  when  the  Federals  were  away  it  attended  to 
the  crops;  when  soldiers  invaded  its  territory  they 
were  driven  out  of  it  or  forced  to  keep  within  the 
limits  of  the  cities. 

Without  having  any  knowledge  of  French  history 


172 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


the  Zapatistas  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  the 
French  revolutionists. 

While  the  leaders  Marat,  Danton,  Robespierre 
were  fighting  their  and  their  parties’  supremacy  and 
eliminating  one  another  with  the  assistance  of  the 
guillotine;  while  the  French  armies  were  fighting 
the  foreign  invaders,  the  French  peasants  after 
burning  a few  chateaux  and  driving  away  the  aris- 
tocratic landowners  settled  down  to  work  the  land 
for  their  own  profits.  As  long  as  the  aristocrat 
could  not  come  back  to  claim  the  land,  the  peasant 
cared  not  who  ran  the  government.  Napoleon  was 
able  to  become  Emperor  because  he  wisely  left  the 
peasants  in  possession  of  lands  which  they  had  con- 
fiscated from  the  aristocrats. 

In  Mexico  the  identical  thing  has  happened  and 
continues  and  will  continue  until  some  sort  of  gov- 
ernment will  be  created  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the 
country.  The  basis  of  future  democracy  in  Mexico 
will  be  founded  on  municipal  self  rule  in  all  the 
cities  and  rural  settlements. 

When  that  is  a fact  there  will  be  little  trouble 
with  the  other  branches  of  the  government.  The 
landowners  in  most  of  the  States  have  been  driven 
out  and  meanwhile  the  peons  are  working  on  the 
land  in  Morelos  as  well  as  in  most  of  the  other 
States.  The  rich  haciendados  have  left  and  the 
poor  peons  have  stayed  behind. 

We  hear  only  about  battles,  the  capture  of  cities, 
the  ambitions  of  leaders,  the  quarrels  among  the 


Attempts  at  Solution  of  the  Land  Question  173 

generals,  but  we  hear  nothing  at  all  of  the  peons 
working  to  feed  the  15,000,000  inhabitants  in  Mex- 
ico, of  the  thousands  of  artisans  and  workingmen 
who  help  to  complete  the  work  of  the  farmer. 

There  may  be  140,000  or  150,000  men  under 
arms  in  Mexico,  but  what  is  that  in  comparison  to 
the  15,000,000  people  who  continue  to  live  with- 
out fighting,  who  have  to  be  fed,  clothed  and  even 
amused?  The  longer  the  revolution  lasts  the  hap- 
pier will  be  the  lot  of  the  average  peons,  for  every 
added  day  will  decrease  the  chances  of  the  reaction- 
ary landowner  to  come  back  and  through  legal 
means  deprive  the  Indian  of  this  land. 

The  French  revolution  lasted  almost  ten  years. 
When  the  Bastille  was  stormed  about  25,000  aris- 
tocrats and  prelates  owned  all  the  land  in  France. 
When  Napoleon  came  into  power  as  Emperor  over 
half  a million  people  owned  land  in  France. 

In  Mexico  over  65,000  haciendados  are  in  pos- 
session of  the  country,  but  a great  majority  of  them 
are  not  on  their  haciendas,  many  are  in  exile.  The 
revolution  has  lasted  about  four  years.  The  longer 
it  lasts  the  more  chances  there  are  that  the  original 
proprietors  will  stay  away  and  the  latifundiae  will 
be  divided  automatically.  The  peons  are  more  in- 
terested in  the  ownership  of  the  land  than  the  ques- 
tion of  peace,  the  ballot,  or  who  is  going  to  be  presi- 
dent or  governor;  they  are  indifferent  as  to  who 
will  loan  or  will  not  loan  money  to  the  Mexican 
government;  if  the  Mexican  consols  are  rising  or 


174 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


dropping  in  value,  as  long  as  the  haciendados  keep 
away  long  enough  to  give  him  a chance  to  claim 
the  land  as  his  own.  A little  cultivation  will  give 
him  all  the  food  he  needs,  what  he  does  not  need  he 
will  sell  and  buy  with  it  a few  necessities. 

For  the  success  of  the  revolution  it  is  vital  that 
it  should  continue  until  every  reactionary  element, 
the  clergy,  the  landowner,  the  army  chiefs  have 
been  so  thoroughly  beaten  that  they  will  have  no 
opportunity  to  come  back  and  play  a political  game 
of  which  they  know  all  the  tricks.  The  reaction- 
ary elements  must  be  so  fearful  of  the  wrath  of 
the  revolutionists,  must  be  made  so  poor,  that  they 
will  never  come  back  again. 

Carranza  is  right  and  so  is  Cabrera  when  they 
say  that  the  land  must  be  taken  wherever  it  can  be 
found;  that  the  revolutionists  must  carry  out  the 
reforms  with  the  power  of  their  bayonets  or  they 
will  never  be  consummated.  That  those  who  speak 
of  a constitutional  government  and  of  elections  are 
the  reactionaries  who  want  to  play  the  game  and 
arrest  the  triumphant  march  of  the  revolution. 

Madero  was  elected  constitutionally,  so  was  a 
congress,  so  were  the  senators  and  the  governors. 
The  ministers  sat  in  council.  What  happened  to 
the  reforms  of  the  plan  of  San  Luis  Potosi?  Re- 
actionaries like  Ernesto  Madero  and  Rafael  Her- 
nandez who  sat  in  the  cabinet  for  two  years,  very 
effectively  canned  all  the  reforms.  The  revolution 
had  to  be  fought  all  over  again. 


Attempts  at  Solution  of  the  Land  Question  175 

If  Villa  backed  by  the  reactionary  elements 
should  control  the  destinies  of  Mexico,  then  it  would 
be  only  a question  of  a few  months  until  a new 
revolution  would  overthrow  his  regime. 

Revolutions  are  the  maladies  of  nations,  they  can- 
not be  arrested  in  their  course  with  impunity,  for 
then  the  disease  will  crop  out  in  a more  virulent 
form. 

Mexico  at  the  end  of  the  Diaz  regime  was  as 
feudal  as  France  under  Louis  XVI.  Mexico  had 
the  aristocratic  landowner,  the  political  clergy  and 
the  military  chiefs  as  well  as  in  France.  They  will 
have  to  be  eradicated  as  thoroughly  as  noxious 
weeds  from  a field  before  cultivation.  After  a 
while  order  will  come  out  of  chaos.  Meanwhile 
the  peon  is  slowly  coming  into  his  own. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


BEHIND  THE  SCENES  OF  THE  CARRANZA-VILLA 
IMBROGLIO 


O make  the  story  very  short  we  could  say  that 


Mexican  and  American  reactionary  interests 
were  behind  Villa,  in  an  endeavor  to  exclude  Car- 
ranza as  a factor  in  Mexican  politics.  But  the 
story  will  be  more  interesting  and  revealing  if  we 
point  out  some  of  the  methods  used  to  engineer  the 
conspiracy. 

During  the  first  six  months  of  the  revolution 
against  Huerta  (1913),  few  authentic  stories  were 
published  about  the  revolution.  Most  of  the  news 
came  from  Mexico  City.  There  was  no  other  po- 
litical personage  who  could  get  more  space  in  the 
first  page  of  the  newspapers  than  Victoriano 
Huerta. 

In  Europe,  the  oil  interests  very  effectively  si- 
lenced the  press  as  to  the  progress  of  the  revolu- 
tion; in  Paris  the  press  was  bought  outright. 

Although  the  American  press  cannot  be  bought, 
there  are  ways  of  circumventing  it  and  cheating  it 
of  the  truth.  The  Huertista  press  agents  knowing 
the  curiosity  of  the  American  people,  fed  them  with 


176 


GENERAL  BENJAMIN  HILL 

(Defender  of  Naco),  under  General  Obregon 


Behind  the  Scenes 


177 


stories  about  Huerta,  and  with  details  of  his  of- 
ficial and  unofficial  actions,  and  more  than  once  his 
very  thoughts  were  reported  and  published.  The 
refrain  was  always:  No  matter  how  bad  Huerta 

may  be,  he  is  nevertheless  President  de  facto, — he 
is  the  strongest  man  in  Mexico  and  he  should  be 
recognized.  A Mexican  and  a foreign  newspaper- 
man spent  four  thousand  dollars  a week  on  pub- 
licity work,  while  another  supporter  of  Huerta  is 
known  to  have  spent  ten  thousand  dollars  for  the 
same  purpose. 

The  Huerta  agents  came  in  contact  with  the 
felicista  and  cientifico  agents,  and  they  put  their 
heads  together  to  devise  a means  of  breaking  up 
the  successful  revolution.  The  reactionary  junta 
watched  the  events  with  keen  interest.  As  soon  as 
Villa  had  proved  his  ability  as  a general,  he  was 
chosen  at  once  as  the  easiest  and  most  convenient 
tool  to  break  up  the  harmony  between  the  revolu- 
tionists. 

All  the  efforts  were  concentrated  on  Villa.  He 
was  furnished  with  money,  ammunition,  friends 
and  advisers.  Villa’s  sincerity,  impulsiveness,  his 
violent  temper  and  cruelty,  his  utter  lack  of 
scruples  and  his  ignorance,  were  splendid  instru- 
ments in  the  hands  of  the  past  masters  of  intrigue. 
On  May  13th,  1911,  during  a mutiny,  Pascual 
Orozco  and  Villa  almost  succeeded  in  murdering 
Francisco  I.  Madero.  This  incident  pointed  out 
to  the  cientifico  element,  the  man  who  might  be  in- 


178  Carranza  and  Mexico 

duced  to  repeat,  more  successfully,  the  elimination 
of  another  leader  of  the  new  revolution. 

The  Villa  press  agents  began  to  fill  the  maga- 
zines and  Sunday  papers  with  romantic  stories 
about  the  bandit  general,  the  Napoleon  bandit,  the 
Washington,  the  Lincoln  of  Mexico.  The  life  rec- 
ord of  Villa,  his  personality  and  ignorance,  forbade 
his  ever  becoming  a presidential  possibility.  That 
just  suited  the  junta,  as  Villa’s  presidency  would 
have  been  fraught  with  too  many  dangers  for  the 
cientifico  element.  Huerta  worked  very  hard  to 
bring  about  a break  between  Villa  and  Carranza, 
while  he  was  in  power,  but  he  did  not  succeed. 
Nevertheless,  the  work  of  corrosion  and  strife  was 
continued  by  the  exiled  huertistas,  felicistas  and 
cientificos. 

During  the  summer  of  1913,  the  Villa  publicity 
reached  its  zenith.  As  much  as  two  hundred  dol- 
lars was  paid  to  a writer  to  get  a story  on  Villa 
into  a New  York  Sunday  paper.  At  about  that 
time  everybody  began  to  suspect  that  Huerta  would 
resign.  Carranza  was  approached  by  the  interests 
which  had  loaned  money  to  Huerta,  to  discover  if 
he  would  recognize  the  loan,  and  as  Carranza 
would  not  countenance  such  a proposition,  the  for- 
eign interests  united  with  the  Huerta,  f elicista  and 
cientifico  exiles,  with  the  addition  of  some  of  the 
Madero  clan,  to  work  together,  against  the  Con- 
stitutionalists. 

Villa,  with  all  his  ability  as  a guerrilla  general, 


Behind  the  Scenes 


179 


became  a marionette  in  the  hands  of  politicians  who 
pulled  the  strings.  Even  the  Aguascalientes  Con- 
vention became  a Punch  & Judy  show  managed 
from  New  York,  and  it  was  used  as  a convenient 
lever  to  oust  Carranza  and  place  a puppet  in  his 
stead.  The  original  suggestion  to  acclaim  Don  F. 
Iglesias  Calderon  as  provisional  president  missed 
fire,  because  of  the  refusal  of  that  very  fine  and  in- 
tegral personality  to  take  orders  from  a single  mili- 
tary division.  Suggestions  were  telegraphed  from 
New  York  to  the  junta’s  representatives  in  Aguas- 
calientes, who,  under  the  guise  of  radical  counsel- 
lors, were  really  dictating  what  Villa  should  do. 

In  fact,  all  the  interviews  passed  through  the 
hands  of  an  American  press  agent  of  Villa,  and  his 
manifestos,  proclamations  and  letters  were  written 
by  the  agents,  and  signed  by  Villa,  who  was  abso- 
lutely ignorant  of  the  contents  of  the  documents. 

The  Aguascalientes  convention  was  to  be  repre- 
sented by  all  the  generals  who  had  fought  in  the 
revolution.  Only  one  civilian  was  present:  Luis 
Cabrera.  No  soldiers  outside  of  the  personal 
staffs  of  the  generals  were  supposed  to  come  near 
Aguascalientes. 

Nevertheless,  Villa  sent  ten  thousand  soldiers  to 
the  city  and  had  it  surrounded  by  troops,  while  he 
sat  in  a caboose  on  a railroad  track  at  the  outskirts. 
For  all  practical  and  illegitimate  purposes,  the  Con- 
vention was  imprisoned  — the  deliberations  were 
not  free  and  independent,  and  were  not  meant  to  be 


180  Carranza  and  Mexico 

so.  Many  generals  who  tried  to  escape  outside 
of  the  ring  formed  by  Villa’s  soldiers  were  sent 
back  to  the  city;  while  others  managed  to  slip 
through  and  joined  their  commands. 

A perusal  of  the  cabinet  members  supposed  to 
be  named  by  E.  Gutierrez,  shows  that  the  list  was 
drawm  up  in  New  York.  F.  Iglesias  Calderon,  al- 
though perfectly  honest  and  independent,  stands 
very  high  among  the  members  of  the  Cientifico 
Junta.  He  refused  the  honor  of  a portfolio. 
Jose  Vasconcelos  is  known  to  the  American  public 
through  the  stolen  Hopkins  letters,  where  his  name 
was  mentioned  as  a recipient  of  American  oil  money. 
E.  C.  Llorente,  wTo  is  to  represent  Gutierrez  in 
Washington,  was  a porfirista  who  plotted  against 
the  Madero  regime  at  the  border. 

One  of  the  most  important  reasons  for  Villa’s 
caution  in  not  rushing  into  a fight  against  Carran- 
za’s generals,  is  that  he  did  not  feel  strong  enough 
to  cope  against  the  constitutionalist  forces.  Fight- 
ing veteran  Constitutionalists  is  a different  propo- 
sition from  fighting  Huerta’s  raw  recruits  and  ex- 
convicts, or  boys.  The  defection  of  Villa’s  best 
generals,  Generals  Luis  and  Maclovio  Herrera,  and 
the  Arrieta  brothers,  could  not  be  supplanted  by 
the  support  of  J.  M.  Maytorena. 

In  his  anxiety  to  fight  Carranza,  General  Villa 
went  so  far  as  to  enlist  many  federal  Huerta  gen- 
erals, whom  he  had  fought  so  bitterly  and  de- 
nounced so  roundly,  and  wrho  had  escaped  from 


Behind  the  Scenes  1 8 1 

Mexico  in  fear  of  Villa’s  wrath.  Poor  Villa 
seemed  unconscious  of  the  fact  that  he  was  slowly 
being  surrounded  by  all  the  reactionary  elements  in 
Mexico  — the  same  element  of  which  he  was  a con- 
spicuous victim  during  the  Diaz  regime.  When 
these  interests  that  now  surround  him  have  achieved 
their  purpose,  they  will  try  to  corrupt  him,  and  if 
they  cannot  buy  him  they  will  assassinate  him. 

Villa’s  blindness  could  not  go  any  farther.  No 
reasoning,  no  arguments,  no  sense  of  patriotism  or 
decency  can  rouse  such  an  innocent  fool,  and  there- 
fore, force  will  have  to  decide  once  more  the  ques- 
tion of  supremacy. 

As  Luis  Cabrera  said  in  a speech  before  the  Con- 
vention, “ In  all  probability,  the  only  solution  at 
which  the  Aguascalientes  Convention  will  arrive, 
will  be  another  war,  another  military  action,”  the 
name  of  Aguascalientes  (hot  waters),  is  very  sig- 
nificant as  to  the  trouble  which  the  Convention  has 
brought  Mexico  face  to  face  with. 

The  Cientifico-Huerta-Madero  junta  in  New 
York  decided  a few  months  ago  that  if  Carranza 
could  not  be  eliminated  through  the  Convention,  he 
could  be  forced  out  by  another  revolution  within  the 
revolution  proper. 

When  it  was  discovered  that  the  appeal  Villa  had 
sent  out  to  the  revolutionary  generals  on  September 
23d  before  the  Convention,  had  not  succeeded  in 
bringing  about  the  desired  result,  it  was  decided  to 
induce  the  doubtful  element  in  the  Convention  to 


182 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


join  in  a supposedly  legal  procedure.  After  Car- 
ranza’s resignation  had  been  refused  at  the  Conven- 
tion in  Mexico,  the  delegates  suggested  the  Aguas- 
calientes  meeting  as  a means  of  settling  all  the  ques- 
tions of  reform.  Villa’s  supporters,  instead  of 
keeping  to  the  business  on  hand,  jammed  through 
the  Gutierrez  election,  published  the  list  of  the  Cab- 
inet members,  and  sent  Carranza  an  ultimatum. 

In  this  way  they  expected  to  give  a legal  appear- 
ance to  their  action,  and  thus  accelerate  the  secession, 
throwing  the  loyal  Constitutionalists  on  the  side  of 
the  Villa  contingent. 

Neither  Villa  nor  Zapata  ever  harbored  the  in- 
tention of  handing  over  their  forces  to  the  generals 
designated  by  the  convention  — their  hope  was  that 
Carranza  might  resign,  and  then  they  would  con- 
trol the  situation  by  the  mere  threat  of  force,  backed 
by  their  success. 

It  can  be  safely  asserted  that  if  Villa  should  suc- 
ceed, he  would  be  the  president  maker,  the  virtual 
dictator  of  Mexico.  Then  Villa  and  the  cientifico 
faction  would  fight  for  supremacy  . . . and  de- 
stroy each  other. 

However,  no  matter  what  the  result  of  the  strug- 
gle may  be,  the  Mexican  people  are  tired  of 
“ strong  men  on  horseback  ” and  the  succession  of 
a Villa  tyranny  would  not  be  much  more  advan- 
tageous than  a Huerta  or  Diaz  dictatorship. 

The  Mexican  people,  the  15,000,000  who  have 
suffered  so  much  from  military  liberators,  will  very 


Behind  the  Scenes 


183 


effectively  overthrow  the  pretorian  rule  of  one  or 
more  guerrilla  czars,  when  they  discover  that  the 
strings  are  managed  by  Mexican  and  foreign  reac- 
tionary interests. 

Villa  will  only  repeat  Orozco’s  treachery  and  de- 
fection, and  he  will  pay  the  price  of  his  foolishness 
and  ignorance  with  the  contempt  and  ostracism  of 
the  real  revolutionary  element. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


THE  NEED  OF  A DEMOCRATIC  FINANCE  IN  MEXICO 
BY  CHARLES  FERGUSON 

During  the  summer  of  1914,  while  Mr.  M.  C.  Rolland 
was  studying  the  financial  system  of  the  United  States  for 
Carranza,  he  came  in  contact  with  Mr.  Charles  Ferguson, 
who  had  devoted  a year  to  investigating  financial  conditions 
in  Europe.  Mr.  Rolland  suggested  the  need  of  a democratic 
finance  in  Mexico,  so  as  to  liberate  it  from  the  financial 
system  left  over  by  J.  Y.  Limantour.  The  Mexican  and 
the  American  investigators  exchanged  their  views,  and  as 
both  were  on  mutual  and  sympathetic  ground  with  a perfect 
understanding  of  the  subject,  Mr.  M.  C.  Rolland  begged 
Mr.  Ferguson  to  crystallize  his  ideas  into  an  article.  The 
following  chapter  is  a simple  outline  of  the  idea  which  is 
behind  the  revolutionary  reforms  of  all  vital  questions  in 
Mexico. 

Mr.  Charles  Ferguson  was  for  a time  one  of  the  leading 
editorial  writers  of  a well  known  Metropolitan  paper.  He 
was  sent  abroad  by  President  Wilson  to  investigate  the 
banking  system  of  Europe.  Mr.  Ferguson  is  considered  one 
of  the  greatest  authorities  on  the  subject  of  finance  and 
banking  in  the  United  States. 

TTNDER  the  conditions  of  capitalistic  and  cor- 
porate  organization  and  of  universal  banking 
and  exchange  that  have  spread  throughout  the 

184 


Need  of  a Democratic  Finance  in  Mexico  185 

world  during  the  last  two  or  three  generations,  the 
problem  of  democratic  politics  has  become  an  en- 
tirely new  problem.  The  old  solutions,  the  ideas 
of  Rousseau,  Jefferson,  Juarez,  have  become,  in 
large  part,  inapplicable. 

The  change  is  mainly  due  to  the  strength  of  the 
modern  business  organization.  The  business  organ- 
ization tends  to  become  stronger  than  the  demo- 
cratic state,  because  it  deals  more  directly  with  the 
forces  of  nature  and  with  the  every  day  interests 
of  ordinary  men. 

Everywhere  in  Europe,  in  the  modern  States  of 
Asia  and  Africa,  and  in  North  and  South  America, 
there  is  a struggle  going  on  between  the  business 
organization  and  the  economic  rights  of  the  peo- 
ple. 

This  world-wide  struggle  has  shown  its  acutest 
phases  in  Mexico. 

The  Mexican  problem  cannot  be  solved  merely 
by  the  establishment  of  land  reform,  a wide  suf- 
frage and  a representative  parliament.  These 
things  are  good  and  necessary,  but  they  are  not 
enough.  If  the  banking  and  credit  system  of  Mex- 
ico is  left  to  settle  back  into  the  general  lines  ap- 
proved by  Diaz  and  Limantour,  or  by  the  orthodox 
financial  opinion  of  Europe,  the  banks  of  Mexico 
will  contravene  the  work  of  the  political  revolution. 

And  since  the  revolution  cannot  be  wholly 
crushed,  Mexico  will  continue  to  be  a house  divided 
against  itself,  and  will  utterly  exhaust  itself  in  a con- 


1 86 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


tinuing  series  of  revolutions  and  counter-revolu- 
tions. 

The  modern  business  system  centres  in  the  bank. 
If  the  democratic  revolution  is  to  prevail  and  stand 
fast,  the  business  system  of  Mexico  must  be  de- 
mocratized. It  is  impossible  to  make  business 
democratic  otherwise  than  by  making  the  bank 
democratic. 

The  leaders  of  the  Mexican  revolution  shall  seize 
upon  the  control  of  the  capitalistic  forces  of  the 
country.  This  can  be  done  by  improvising  — per- 
haps by  executive  decree,  perhaps  otherwise  — a 
central  bank  and  a banking  system  that  shall  mo- 
nopolize the  banking  function. 

The  existing  banking  systems  of  the  world  are  in 
general  based  upon  public  debts  and  are  motived 
in  their  operation  by  the  interest  of  a creditor  class. 
Mexico  should  have  a banking  system  based  first, 
upon  the  property  rights  of  the  nation  — the  sum 
of  the  material  values  that  belong  not  to  individuals 
but  to  the  Commonwealth;  second,  upon  a capital- 
ization of  the  productive  powers  of  the  people  to 
the  extent  that  these  can  be  developed  by  the  civiliz- 
ing projects  of  the  bank. 

Under  existing  banking  systems  the  National  es- 
tate is  either  not  represented  at  all  or  else  stands 
as  debtor  or  claimant  on  a footing  no  higher  than 
that  of  private  estates.  But  the  bank  of  the  revo- 
lution should  be  the  responsible  legal  trustee  of  the 
public  estate,  exclusively  devoted  to  the  improve- 


Need  of  a Democratic  Finance  in  Mexico  187 

ment  of  that  estate  — i.e.,  to  the  betterment  of  the 
material  status  of  common  citizenship. 

Under  most  banking  systems  the  bankers  have 
no  direct  interest  or  concern  with  the  development 
of  the  natural  and  creative  resources  of  a country. 
Their  interest  in  the  processes  of  production  is  at 
best  indirect  and  incidental.  What  the  bankers  aim 
at  is  the  accumulation  of  certificates  of  indebtedness 
against  society  at  large.  They  are  indeed  con- 
cerned that  the  assets  of  Society  at  large  shall  equal 
its  liabilities.  But  they  make  no  effort  and  take  no 
risk  for  the  enrichment  of  society  beyond  bare 
solvency. 

The  general  tendency  of  their  finance  is  to  load 
the  working  organization  of  the  world  with  as  heavy 
a weight  of  bond  and  mortgage  as  it  will  stand,  and 
to  vest  the  ownership  of  the  securities  in  a compara- 
tively small  class  of  creditors. 

The  unsocial  and  unscientific  character  of  the 
world’s  banking  systems  is  the  main  cause  of  that 
universal  conflict  between  the  business  organization 
and  the  democratic  state,  which  has  reached  its  most 
poignant  crisis  in  Mexico.  If  Mexico  can  work  out 
a congruity  between  modern  business  organization 
and  the  economic  rights  of  the  people,  it  will  solve 
the  essential  social  problem  of  our  times.  It  will 
win  economic  leadership  in  the  family  of  nations. 
It  will  achieve  unparalleled  wealth  and  power. 

The  bank  of  the  revolution  should  be  governed 
by  a board  of  directors,  got  together  with  a mini- 


1 88  Carranza  and  \ Mexico 

mum  of  racial  bias  in  the  spirit  — let  us  say — of 
the  university  — that  is,  of  the  arts  and  sciences. 

There  should  be  a dozen  men,  more  or  less,  hav- 
ing the  highest  reputation  and  credit  as  engineers, 
agriculturists,  sanitarians,  administrators,  and  so  on. 
They  should  be  paid  perhaps  on  the  scale  of  Cab- 
inet Ministers,  but  should  derive  no  other  income 
from  Mexican  sources.  Their  control  of  the  bank 
should  be  disinterested  and  impersonal  — like  that 
of  men  in  high  public  office. 

Every  detail  of  the  banking  business  will  undergo 
a marked  change  because  of  this  change  of  motive. 
Yet  there  need  be  no  serious  division  of  opinion  as 
to  the  financial  technique  that  will  best  promote  the 
new  purpose. 

The  changes  of  practice  concerning  discount  rates, 
note  issues,  metallic  reserves,  etc.,  will  follow  log- 
ically and  obviously  from  the  conception  that  the 
business  of  the  bank  is  not  the  accumulation  of  en- 
forceable claim  against  the  public,  but  rather  the 
husbanding  of  the  public  estate. 

Banking,  under  any  and  all  systems,  is  chiefly 
a matter  of  exchanging  specific  personal  claims  for 
general  social  claims.  The  bank  receives  personal 
debt-certificates  and  gives  back  certificates  of  social- 
debt  or  documentary  claims  against  society  at  large. 
Personal  credits  at  the  bank  are,  in  effect,  charges 
against  the  public.  Sound  banking  consists  in  not 
overcharging  the  public. 

The  mystery  that  shrouds  all  banking  problems 


Need  of  a Democratic  Finance  in  Mexico  189 

is  due  to  the  obscuring  of  the  fundamental  fact  that 
banking  has  become,  under  modern  conditions,  the 
most  vital  social  function;  it  determines  the  obliga- 
tions owed  by  society  to  the  individual  and  so  fixes 
every  man’s  status  and  power. 

It  is  absurd  that  such  a social  function  should  be 
performed  without  social  responsibility  and  solely 
for  the  sake  of  a speculative  private  profit.  The 
proposal  is,  therefore,  that  the  revolution  shall  es- 
tablish in  Mexico  the  first  banking  system  in  the 
world  deserving  to  be  called  modern.  For  no  ex- 
cellence of  banking  machinery  can  atone  for  the 
fact  that  throughout  the  whole  circle  of  commerce, 
private  credits  and  the  corresponding  public  obliga- 
tions are  being  measured  and  registered  by  men 
whose  interest  is  quite  separate  from  that  of  the 
public. 

The  proposed  identification  of  the  banking  in- 
terest with  the  public  interest  does  not  necessarily 
imply  that  banks  should  be  administered  by  political 
officials.  It  is  indeed  necessary,  as  an  exigency  of  the 
revolution,  that  the  new  bank  of  Mexico  should  be 
backed  by  the  highest  political  authority.  But  the 
real  point  is  that  modern  banking  will  reach  a nor- 
mal development  only  when  banking  has  become  a 
responsible  profession  — in  the  analogy  of  law  and 
medicine  at  their  highest  level.  In  the  long  run  it 
will  be  found  that  a sound,  democratic,  financial  sys- 
tem is  to  be  regarded  as  the  creator  rather  than  the 
creature  of  democratic  government. 


190 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


The  new  Mexican  government  should  take  its 
bank  managers  from  any  quarter  — as  one  might 
choose  world-famous  engineers  or  physicians  to  con- 
quer a devastating  plague,  or  to  accomplish  a con- 
structive public  work  of  extraordinary  difficulty. 
These  men  should  be  chartered  as  directors  of  a 
corporation  to  set  up  a central  banking  institution 
in  the  City  of  Mexico  and  a system  of  branch  banks 
in  provincial  towns.  The  basic  capital  of  the  bank 
should  be  a trust  deed  executed  by  the  Mexican 
Government  and  conveying  to  the  banking  corpora- 
tion such  portions  of  the  national  estate  as  are  not 
needed  for  the  administrative  uses  of  the  govern- 
ment. The  State  would,  of  course,  retain  its  right 
to  annul  if  necessary  the  bank  charter  and  trust 
deed  — after  reasonable  notice  and  with  due  adjust- 
ment of  the  equities  involved. 

The  Bank  should  be  the  general  fiscal  and  eco- 
nomic agent  of  the  Government  for  the  enhancement 
of  its  revenues,  the  funding  and  amortizing  of  out- 
standing public  debts  and  the  development  of  the 
wealth  of  the  country. 

Through  the  bank,  the  government  should  take 
good  care  of  the  soldiers  of  the  revolution  — giving 
them  possession  of  lands  on  easy  terms  and  assist- 
ance in  capitalizing  farms  and  small  business  under- 
takings. 

Legal  means  should  be  taken  to  cancel  or  com- 
pound uneconomic  commercial  concessions  made  to 
foreigners  and  other  private  persons  by  reactionary 


Need  of  a Democratic  Finance  in  Mexico  191 

governments  in  the  past.  The  inordinate  foreign 
profits  derivable  from  such  concessions  might  be 
scaled  down  by  a system  of  export  duties. 

It  should  be  understood  that  the  new  bank  in  all 
its  branches  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a passive  or 
merely  regulative  factor  in  the  economics  of  Mex- 
ico. It  should,  on  the  contrary,  embody  the  highest 
possible  organization  of  intelligence  and  will  for 
the  expansion  of  the  productive  life  of  the  people. 
Much  may  be  learned  for  this  purpose  from  a study 
of  the  working  methods  of  the  Deutsche  Bank  of 
Berlin. 


CHAPTER  XX 


carranza’s  foreign  policy  representative  of 

THE  NATIONAL  SPIRIT 

TTROM  the  beginning  of  the  Constitutionalist  revo- 
lution  the  attitude  of  Carranza  as  the  first 
Chief  toward  the  Foreign  Powers,  was  very  bitterly 
criticised.  His  uncompromising  stand  as  regards 
the  European  nations  was  corroborated  by  inter- 
views given  out  to  the  press.  Several  reasons  can 
be  given  for  Carranza’s  conduct  as  well  as  for  the 
criticisms.  The  first  one  is  that  Foreign  Cabinets, 
Ministers  and  Consuls  have  been  so  used  to  the 
servile,  cowardly  and  undignified  behavior  of  Diaz 
and  his  Ministers  toward  Foreign  Representatives 
that  the  proud,  independent  behavior  of  Carranza 
and  his  Ministers  was  a shock  to  European  courts. 

The  foreign  policy  of  the  Great  Powers  towards 
small  and  weak  nations,  with  the  exception  of  the 
United  States,  has  been  as  a rule,  that  of  polite  bul- 
lies and  buccaneers.  Great  nations  committed  po- 
litical acts,  which  private  individuals  would  not  dare 
perpetrate.  If  the  average  standard  of  the  indi- 
vidual has  been  raised,  that  of  the  nations  in  their 
international  policy,  has  advanced  very  little  from 
the  times  of  the  cave  dwellers. 

192 


193 


Carranza’s  Foreign  Policy 

Mexico  being  weak  and  torn  by  civil  war  since 
the  inception  of  her  independence,  has  always  suf- 
fered as  much,  if  not  more,  from  foreigners,  than 
from  her  own  enemies.  The  French  in  the  thirties 
and  sixties,  the  Americans  in  the  forties,  the  Span- 
iards intermittently,  have  brought  trouble  to  Mex- 
ico. The  Mexicans  are  always  suspicious  of  the 
international  policy  of  the  European  powers. 

When  Huerta  committed  murder  in  the  persons 
of  the  President  and  Vice-President  of  Mexico, 
France,  England,  Germany  and  Spain  rushed  to 
recognize  him,  so  anxious  were  they  to  get  in  at  the 
trough  of  concessions.  It  was  this  conscienceless, 
greedy,  sordid  behavior  which  disgusted  Carranza 
in  particular,  and  Mexicans  in  general.  No  action 
in  the  history  of  the  United  States  has  created  more 
sympathy  for  the  feared  Yankees  in  Mexico  and 
South  America,  than  the  refusal  of  the  recognition 
of  Huerta  on  moral  grounds.  Carranza’s  refusal 
to  give  an  account  or  to  allow  Villa  to  permit  an 
investigation  into  the  murders  of  Benton  and 
Bauche,  was  correct  from  an  international  stand- 
point. England,  who  had  so  hastily  recognized  the 
murderer  of  a Mexican  President  and  Vice-Presi- 
dent, became  very  indignant  at  the  murder  of  a nat- 
uralized Britisher  who  got  into  trouble  through  his 
own  fault,  and  expected  the  United  States  to  de- 
mand satisfaction  for  it.  Carranza,  as  the  first 
Chief,  insisted  that  England  should  protest  to  him, 
as  the  representative  of  the  revolution,  not  to  Villa 


194 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


or  the  United  States.  The  attitude  of  England, 
France,  Germany  and  Spain  towards  Mexico,  was 
very  arrogant  and  insulting;  their  protests  to  the 
United  States  were  quite  expressive  of  their  anx- 
iety to  have  the  United  States  intervene  and  police 
Mexico  in  the  same  manner  as  had  been  done  in 
Cuba. 

The  European  powers  were  quite  too  busy  watch- 
ing their  own  frontiers  to  embark  on  a foolish  expe- 
dition like  the  threatened  march  and  occupation  of 
Mexico  City  by  the  allied  powers.  The  American 
papers  came  out  time  after  time  announcing  the  land- 
ing of  European  marines  in  Mexico,  in  case  that  the 
United  States  should  not  deem  it  expedient  to  pro- 
tect their  interests.  Any  one  familiar  with  Eu- 
ropean politics  could  have  guessed  that  the  alarmist’s 
warning  came  either  from  the  innermost  circles  of 
the  American  military  clique  which  had  been  itching 
for  intervention  for  the  last  four  years,  or  from  for- 
eign chancellorships  who  wanted  to  frighten  the 
United  States  into  a war  with  Mexico. 

The  European  powers  foreboded  a general  con- 
flagration at  the  end  of  1914.  Some  of  them  felt 
that  the  northern  republic  should  do  their  police 
work  in  Mexico  while  they  would  be  busy  fighting 
for  their  own  existence  in  Europe;  others  more  char- 
itably inclined,  hoped  that  the  United  States  might 
easily  get  into  a wasps’  nest,  by  intervening  in  Mex- 
ico,— especially  as  Japan  stood  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Pacific,  as  a warning  of  the  brown  peril,  and  as 


195 


Carranza’ s Foreign  Policy 

a sympathetic,  though  selfish  supporter  of  Mexican 
integrity.  In  spite  of  contrary  assertions,  Mexican 
statesmen  and  level-headed  thinkers  dread  an  Amer- 
ican invasion  into  their  country;  be  it  for  the  pur- 
pose of  conquest  or  an  unselfish  police-work. 

A military  offensive  or  defensive  alliance  with 
Japan  is  much  more  dreaded  by  the  Mexicans  than 
an  American  intervention.  The  American  Colos- 
sus, as  the  United  States  is  called,  does  not  represent 
the  brutal,  military,  imperialistic  methods  of  the 
Japanese,  but  a danger  of  elimination  by  military 
conquest  or  absorption  by  political,  commercial,  and 
financial  attrition  and  suction. 

All  the  Mexican  politicians,  writers  and  states- 
men fear  American  meddling  in  their  internal  af- 
fairs, and  although  their  admiration  for  the  United 
States  and  its  greatness  is  unbounded,  nevertheless, 
their  patriotism  is  still  greater  than  their  neighborly 
love.  The  whole  spirit  of  South  America,  south  of 
the  Rio  Grande,  is  not  Spanish  nor  Indian  — the 
spirit  is  essentially  latin  and  gallic.  The  mental  at- 
titude of  the  Zapotec  Indian  Juarez  was  neither 
Iberian  nor  Aztec,  but  essentially  of  the  roman  type 
of  the  republic. 

The  intellectual  radicalism  of  the  liberals,  Gomez 
Farias,  Melchior  Ocampo,  Leandro  del  Valle,  was 
of  the  same  pattern  as  that  of  the  French  revolu- 
tionary Jacobins  — the  clearest,  most  advanced  and 
progressive  ideas  in  politics  have  been  absorbed  from 
Gallic  and  Latin  sources.  The  French  revolution, 


196 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


the  Napoleonic  epos,  are  the  text  books  of  the  lib- 
erals and  the  ambitious  politicians.  Roman  and 
French  history  was  admired  and  unconsciously  imi- 
tated. The  one  for  the  civic  virtues,  courage  and 
greatness  of  its  citizens, — the  other  for  the  daring, 
patriotism  and  intellectual  clearness  of  its  most 
prominent  men. 

Spanish  history  and  philosophy  is  a closed  book  to 
Mexican  thinkers  — for  Spanish  thought  was  always 
in  the  rear  guard  of  intellectual  Europe.  The 
Spanish  spirit  is  found  in  reactionary  types,  like  Lu- 
cas Alaman, — the  Don  Quixotic  characteristic  in  a 
Lopez  de  Santa  Ana, — the  Castilian  cruelty  in  a 
Miguel  Marquez.  As  a Mexican  writer  once  said: 
“ Spain  has  brought  us  only  priests,  money-lenders, 
bull-fighters  and  dancers.” 

Americans  ‘ were  astonished  at  the  outburst  of 
hatred  made  manifest  in  the  persecution  of  Spanish 
priests  in  Mexico,  and  Spaniards  in  general,  espe- 
cially in  the  State  of  Morelos,  by  Zapata,  and  the 
deportation  of  Spaniards  in  Chihuahua  by  Villa. 
They  do  not  know  that  the  Spaniards  have  always 
been  on  the  side  of  the  dictators,  the  oppressors, 
never  with  the  liberators,  and  that  the  active  co-op- 
eration of  Spaniards  in  politics  has  outlawed  them. 
After  the  assassination  of  Madero  and  Suarez,  the 
Spaniards  in  Vera  Cruz  gave  a banquet  in  honor  of 
the  tragedy.  The  Mexicans  are  not  likely  to  forget 
this  incident.  The  Mexicans  of  the  middle  class  and 
the  Indians  despise  the  Spaniards.  On  the  other 


197 


Carranza’ s Foreign  Policy 

hand,  they  do  not  dislike  the  Americans,  but  they 
dread  the  proximity  of  the  Colossus,  and  the  con- 
stant threats  of  American  armed  invasion. 

The  American  public  was  shocked  by  the  reported 
cruelties  of  the  revolutionists  in  Durango,  and  other 
captured  cities.  Many  reports  were  exaggerated, 
but  the  Durango  stories  were  utterly  false.  Several 
Americans  who  came  to  New  York  after  the  capture 
of  Durango  declared  that  they  had  witnessed  the 
entry  of  the  Constitutionalist  soldiers,  and  their  be- 
havior in  Durango,  and  could  vouch  for  the  inac- 
curacy of  the  news  — not  only  in  the  general  outline, 
but  in  all  its  details. 

The  American  public,  as  well  as  the  editors  in  the 
American  press,  did  not  suspect  then  that  Huerta 
had  press  agents  in  New  York,  who  made  it  a point 
of  disseminating  false  reports  about  the  revolution- 
ists, so  as  to  discredit  the  movement  and  pave  the 
way  for  recognition  of  Huerta.  Governor  Hunt,  of 
Arizona,  wrote  a letter  to  the  first  Chief,  protesting 
against  the  alleged  cruelties.  Venustiano  Car- 
ranza answered,  and  the  following  letter  is  quoted 
as  a fair  example  of  the  attitude  of  the  Chief  and  the 
Mexican  revolutionists  on  the  question  of  retaliations 
and  shooting  of  prisoners. 

Hermosillo.  November  27th,  1913. 
Governor  George  W.  P.  Hunt, 

Phoenix,  Arizona. 

Esteemed  Sir  and  Friend: 

I am  pleased  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  your  interesting 


198 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


letter  of  the  17th  inst.,  written  on  account  of  the  occupation 
of  Ciudad  Juarez  by  the  Constitutional  forces  under  the 
immediate  command  of  General  Francisco  Villa, — and  to 
manifest  to  you  my  gratitude  for  the  kind  phrases  which 
you  express  in  same,  regarding  myself. 

Recognizing  with  pleasure  in  the  spirit  of  frank  friend- 
ship which  animated  your  letter,  the  personal  sympathy  of 
yourself  and  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  for  the  strug- 
gle of  civilization  and  justice,  which  we  are  sustaining,  I 
can  only  lament  that  a not  entirely  perfect  knowledge  of 
the  peculiar  conditions  of  the  Mexican  problems  may  be 
propitious  in  certain  cases  (and  in  spite  of  that  excellent 
disposition)  to  a bad  intelligence  of  some  of  our  acts. 

This  is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  the  criminal  acts 
with  which  the  struggle  was  initiated,  and  the  cruel  proceed- 
ings employed  to  sustain  it,  have  been  forgotten.  When 
Mexico  had  realized  the  highest  democratic  prerogative  to 
elect  its  mandataries,  and  we  had  the  right  to  expect  in  the 
midst  of  peace  and  tranquillity,  the  periodical  renovation  of 
the  public  powers,  for  the  expression  of  the  national  will 
only,  the  most  corrupt  balance  of  the  conquered  classes  have 
tried  to  destroy  our  political  institutions  for  all  time  and 
by  violence  or  force  only  have  they  disposed  of  the  life,  the 
rights  and  interests  of  our  countrymen.  They  have  perpe- 
trated bloody  executions  without  subjection  to  any  law;  they 
assassinate  the  Constitutionalists  who  fall  wounded,  bat- 
tling with  arms  for  the  liberty  of  the  people, — and  depu- 
ties and  senators  who  defend  our  democratic  institutions  by 
word,  they  drag  peaceful  men  and  even  children  from  their 
homes,  obliging  them  to  take  up  arms  against  us,  and  instil 
terror  throughout,  burning  entire  towns.  It  has  been  crimes 
of  this  nature  which  have  made  the  cause  that  I represent, 
constitute  not  only  a corrective  political  revolution  but  also 


Carranza’s  Foreign  Policy  199 

that  it  should  have  the  character  of  an  act  of  peace,  and 
severe  justice  which  will  chastise  the  guilty,  and  provide  for 
the  salvation  of  the  Mexican  family. 

To  fill  these  purposes,  within  the  spirit  of  our  Constitu- 
tion, without  any  sentiment  of  passion,  but  meditating  with 
reflection  up  to  what  point  clemency  and  magnanimity  can 
arrive,  before  an  imperious  duty  of  justice  and  the  high  neces- 
sity of  assuring  peace  and  the  future  of  the  nation,  I have 
determined  that  the  law  of  Juarez  of  January  25th,  1862, 
which  defines  and  chastises  crimes  against  the  public  peace, 
shall  be  put  into  force. 

With  strict  subjection  to  that  pre-existent  law,  the  Huerta 
officials  were  tried  and  executed,  among  whom  were  some 
who  had  been  apprehended  in  Torreon  by  the  same  General 
Villa  who,  in  addition  to  pardoning  them,  then  acceded  to 
the  fact  that  they  should  become  incorporated  in  our  forces, 
in  which  they  tried  later,  but  in  vain,  to  make  the  men 
whose  command  was  entrusted  to  them,  desert  — they  finally 
running  away,  in  order  to  relapse  into  their  crimes. 

It  is  true  that  the  principles  established  in  international 
wars  agree  to  give  pardon  and  immunity  to  the  prisoners, 
but  in  civil  struggles  the  most  civilized  nations  in  all  epochs 
have  employed  proceedings  still  more  rigorous  and  bloody 
than  those  which  we  have  been  obliged  to  adopt.  In  the 
case  of  executions  of  officials  in  Ciudad  Juarez,  the  chastise- 
ment according  to  the  law,  of  delinquents  against  peace  and 
public  security  must  be  viewed,  as  a just  punishment,  rather 
than  a cruelty  to  prisoners  of  war. 

The  Mexican  people,  exhausted  in  the  first  phase  of  this 
civil  war,  headed  by  Francisco  I.  Madero,  all  their  clem- 
ency and  all  their  pardon,  experiencing  as  only  fruits  of  this 
magnanimity,  tyranny  in  the  interior  and  the  loss  of  pres- 
tige in  the  exterior.  To-day  it  wishes  to  assure  the  opera- 


200 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


tion  of  its  institutions  and  re-establish  peace  for  all  time, 
by  means  of  a definite  and  official  guarantee  of  a national 
organism. 

The  events  of  Ciudad  Juarez  have  been  very  far  from 
revesting  the  individual  importance  which  the  intemperance 
of  our  enemies  have  wished  to  give  it,  in  the  same  manner 
as  was  calumnious  the  statement  published  by  them,  that  in 
Durango  more  than  forty  women  and  young  girls  commit- 
ted suicide,  for  fear  of  the  excesses  of  the  Constitutionalists, 
as  I could  personally  verify  that  in  Durango,  as  in  all  parts, 
our  forces  have  been  disciplined  and  respectable,  giving  guar- 
antees to  the  towns  which  have  fallen  into  their  power. 

Before  concluding,  it  gives  me  great  satisfaction  to  advise 
you  that  I am  animated  by  the  same  sentiments  of  humanity 
that  you  possess,  and  that  if  I have  placed  the  law  of  Juarez 
in  force,  in  respect  to  an  exigency  of  national  sentiment,  of 
justice,  of  public  convenience,  and  the  necessity  of  bringing 
peace  to  my  country, — I have  at  the  same  time  tried  to  have 
this  law  applied  to  unscrupulous  enemies  within  the  limits  of 
the  most  absolute  necessity,  always  authorizing  pardon  and 
immunity  to  the  unconscious  ones. 

I hope  the  preceding  declarations  will  be  sufficient  to  es- 
tablish the  attitude  of  the  well  understood  justice  and  hu- 
manity of  the  Constitutionalists,  in  order  not  to  detract  the 
personal  sympathy  and  favorable  opinion  of  the  North  Amer- 
ican people  from  our  cause,  and  you  may  be  sure  that  I shall 
take  into  consideration  your  noble  ideas,  in  order  to  recom- 
mend greater  clemency  toward  our  enemies,  always  within 
the  respect  of  the  law. 

Assuring  you  of  my  highest  estimation  and  respect,  and 
asking  that  you  will  consider  me  an  affectionate  and  sincere 
friend,  I remain, 

(Signed) 


V.  Carranza. 


Carranza  s Foreign  Policy  201 

It  would  be  too  much  to  have  asked  of  the  revolu- 
tionists to  pardon  and  release  the  federal  officers 
captured  by  them.  The  experiment  was  tried,  and 
every  time  they  repeated  their  treacheries,  cruelties 
and  infamies.  They  were  trained  in  the  school  of 
Diaz  and  Huerta  — with  few  exceptions  they  were 
men  without  conscience,  honor  or  patriotism.  They 
represented  militarism  in  its  lowest,  most  despicable 
and  sordid  form.  A federal  officer  who  had  been 
fighting  in  Morelos  against  Zapata  was  interviewed 
on  his  arrival  in  New  York.  He  asserted  candidly 
that  the  only  manner  to  eradicate  the  land  problem 
in  Morelos  consisted  in  killing  the  whole  male  pop- 
ulation of  the  State  and  that  any  other  solution  was 
Utopian. 

When  the  American  marines  landed  in  Vera  Cruz, 
the  news  caused  a sensation  in  Mexico.  A gentle- 
man who  was  present  at  the  headquarters  of  Car- 
ranza describes  the  excitement  of  all  the  Mexican 
civilians  as  well  as  the  soldiers  in  the  camp.  With- 
out a doubt  it  was  the  most  critical  moment  of  the 
revolution;  everybody  was  discussing  the  news  and 
the  agitation  was  intense.  The  only  calm  and  cool 
person  was  Carranza;  he  was  sitting  immobile  and 
silent,  looking  straight  ahead,  without  seeing  any- 
body or  paying  attention  to  the  noise,  bustle,  gesticu- 
lations and  the  shouts  of  the  people. 

He  was  thinking  very  hard  and  the  only  gesture 
which  gave  a clue  to  his  agitation  was  a slow  move- 
ment of  the  hand,  stroking  his  beard  in  a mechanical 


202 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


fashion.  When  the  Carranza  protest  was  published 
there  was  like  an  universal  sigh  of  relief  after  a tense 
situation. 

The  Mexicans  felt  that  Carranza  had  embodied 
in  his  protest  their  outraged  sense  of  national  dignity 
and  pride. 

The  protest  was  a safety  valve  which  prevented  a 
dangerous  national  explosion.  Huerta,  who  had 
cunningly  contrived  to  bring  about  American  inter- 
vention, worked  feverishly  to  use  this  patriotic 
wave,  and  to  attract  it  under  his  guidance  in  a for- 
eign war,  which  would  save  him  and  his  army  from 
annihilation. 

In  the  United  States  many  persons  were  disgusted 
at  what  they  called  the  ingratitude  of  Carranza. 
They  forgot  to  enquire  if  Carranza  had  asked  for  in- 
tervention, and  that  an  unbidden  gift  is  an  unwelcome 
gift.  They  should  have  demanded  the  thanks  of 
Huerta  instead.  Subsequent  events  have  proven  the 
assertion  of  Mexican  observers  that  the  occupation 
of  Vera  Cruz  by  the  Americans,  instead  of  helping 
the  revolution,  assisted  in  keeping  Huerta  several 
months  longer  in  power. 

Vera  Cruz  could  easily  have  been  captured  by  the 
revolutionists,  and  Huerta  would  have  hastened  to 
flee  by  the  way  of  Puerto  Mexico.  The  occupation 
of  Vera  Cruz  by  the  Americans  prevented  the  revo- 
lutionists from  attacking  the  railroad  connecting 
Mexico  City  with  Puerto  Mexico, — as  Vera  Cruz 
had  to  be  used  as  a base.  If  the  occupation  of  Vera 


203 


Carranza’s  Foreign  Policy 

Cruz  was  achieved  to  prevent  the  cargo  of  war  ma- 
terial of  the  Ypiranga  from  reaching  Huerta,  then  it 
failed  in  the  purpose.  It  did  not  accelerate  the  res- 
ignation of  the  dictator,  nor  did  it  calm  the  Mexican 
troubled  waters. 

If,  as  it  is  claimed,  the  occupation  of  Vera  Cruz 
was  the  climax  or  punishment  for  a series  of  insults 
to  Americans,  and  the  upholding  of  national  honor, 
would  it  not  have  been  more  in  keeping  with  mili- 
tary traditions  to  capture  or  sink  Mexican  gunboats 
in  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  without  attempting  to  land 
marines  in  any  port,  and  to  blockade  both  coasts  of 
Mexico? 

The  ABC  Peace  Commission  would  have  ar- 
rived at  Niagara  Falls  by  the  same  road  and 
achieved  the  same  results.  The  meddling  in  Mex- 
ico would  not  have  cost  the  American  tax  payers  five 
million  dollars.  The  most  charitable  description  of 
the  incident  is  that  it  was  a hasty  and  costly  blunder 
of  the  Navy  Department. 

Let  us  put  ourselves  in  the  place  of  the  Mexicans 
themselves.  The  touchiness  of  their  national  pride 
and  their  dignity  is  well  known,  as  well  as  that  their 
patriotism  and  love  of  country  is  as  great  as  that  of 
the  greatest  nation.  Why  criticise  a characteristic 
of  a weak  nation  which  is  considered  a virtue  in  a 
strong  one? 

Consider  for  instance  the  question  as  applied  to 
the  United  States.  If  during  the  Civil  War  British 
marines  had  landed  and  occupied  New  Orleans  for 


204 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


some  reason  or  other,  what  would  have  happened? 
Would  the  northerners  have  protested  against  Brit- 
ish intervention,  or  acclaimed  it?  Would  not  the 
northerners  as  well  as  the  southerners  have  fought 
British  occupation? 

If  it  is  a question  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  we  beg 
to  differ  — the  Monroe  Doctrine,  to  reach  its  high- 
est value  as  a political  tenet,  should  w’ork  both  ways, 
— in  the  interests  of  the  United  States  as  well  as 
Central  and  South  America.  If  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine is  expedient,  in  the  case  of  the  United  States, 
it  should  be  acceptable  to  Latin  America.  Latin 
America  rebels  against  a one-sided  view  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine. 

When  Villa  gave  out  his  interview  on  the  occu- 
pation of  Vera  Cruz,  he  was  evidently  inspired  by 
his  American  adviser  and  Mephisto.  He  was  giv- 
ing out  the  American  side  of  the  question, — not  the 
Mexican.  Unconsciously  Villa  acted  as  Porfirio 
Diaz  or  any  other  Cientificos  would  have  done,  if 
they  had  been  in  his  place.  Carranza  represents  the 
Mexican  people,  although  Carranza  has  never  been 
anything  but  a friend  and  admirer  of  the  United 
States.  It  must  be  considered  that  no  true  friend- 
ship can  exist  without  self-respect  on  Mexico’s  side 
and  mutual  respect  on  both  sides. 

The  occupation  of  Vera  Cruz  has  been  a source 
of  irritation  for  the  Mexican  and  American,  and  a 
constant  element  of  danger.  It  was  a mistake  which 
turned  into  a costly  blunder. 


CHAPTER  XXI 


president  Wilson’s  Mexican  policy 
HE  attitude  of  President  Wilson  towards  the 


Huerta  regime  was  attacked  not  only  in  the 
European  press  but  likewise  in  the  American  news- 
papers. The  French,  German,  English  and  Span- 
ish daily  and  weekly  papers  sneered  at  what  they 
dubbed  the  moral  policy  of  a puritan  school  teacher. 

The  American  papers  were  divided  in  their  opin- 
ion; the  Republican  organs  laughed  at  the  reversal 
of  their  beloved  “ dollar  diplomacy,”  and  many  so- 
called  Democratic  papers  attempted  to  uphold  the 
blustering  “ big  stick  ” policy.  With  the  exception 
of  the  labor  and  socialistic  press  there  was  a great 
deal  of  doubt  and  misgivings  expressed  as  to  the  out- 
come of  the  new  diplomacy. 

Even  the  average  American,  who  is  always  on  the 
side  of  justice  and  fair  play,  was  rather  taken  back 
by  this  radical  departure  in  American  and  foreign 
relations.  For  American  diplomacy,  although  usu- 
ally equitable,  always  took  into  consideration  the  in- 
terests of  the  Americans  in  a foreign  country  first 
and  last,  even  if  they  clashed  with  the  fundamental 
rights  of  the  natives. 

In  the  case  of  American  interests  in  Mexico,  it 


20  6 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


was  long  suspected  they  had  been  playing  politics 
and  throwing  their  all  powerful  influence  in  favor 
of  the  government  which  could  give  them  the  best 
advantages  in  a business  way,  which  were  in  oppo- 
site relation  to  the  liberal  principles  and  the  welfare 
of  the  majority  of  the  Mexicans. 

The  great  corporations  have  always  received  ex- 
traordinary favors  from  dishonest  governments. 
The  mining  and  oil  syndicates,  the  railroad  and  land 
concessionaires,  acquired  great  privileges  and  gave 
very  little  in  return  for  them.  For  example,  an 
American  oil  company  in  Mexico  made  as  high 
as  450  per  cent,  profit  on  its  original  investment 
and  doubled  the  selling  price  of  oil  and  gaso- 
line. As  soon  as  an  English  company  invaded  the 
field  they  fought  each  other  for  a while,  then  realiz- 
ing that  it  was  an  expensive  affair  which  redounded 
to  the  benefit  of  the  Mexican  consumer,  they  came 
to  an  agreement  by  dividing  the  territory  among 
themselves  and  right  away  the  price  of  oil  and  gaso- 
line went  up  again. 

Scores  of  cases  can  be  cited  to  prove  that  all  the 
advantages  are  in  favor  of  foreign  investors.  The 
salaries  of  the  Mexican  workingman  or  peons  are 
not  raised,  but  the  prices  of  commodities  are  never 
lowered.  The  great  Orizaba  cotton  mills,  all  the 
factories,  the  great  mining  corporations  have  always 
paid  the  lowest  salaries.  Whenever  there  was  a 
strike  for  higher  wages  or  for  better  conditions,  the 
Diaz  and  Huerta  regimes  always  protected  the  for- 


President  Wilson’s  Mexican  Policy  207 

eigners  and  at  the  slightest  pretext  massacred  the 
strikers.  In  the  rare  cases  when  the  government  was 
fair  to  the  strikers,  as  happened  under  Madero  and 
Carranza,  then  the  foreign  investors  protested  to 
their  governments  that  their  interests  were  in  danger 
of  destruction. 

With  the  Mexican  laborer  and  peons  it  has  be- 
come a conviction  that  foreign  interests  are  always 
on  the  side  of  dictators  as  against  the  Mexican  peo- 
ple. In  Central  and  South  America  the  new  demo- 
cratic policy  was  watched  with  keen  interest;  the 
Latin  Americans  shrewdly  guessed  that  the  attitude 
of  the  Democratic  administration  would  be  a test 
stone  of  their  relations  with  the  State  Department. 

So  much  had  been  written  about  the  famous  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  by  successive  American  statesmen  that 
the  original  meaning  of  this  doctrine  had  been  en- 
tirely lost  to  view. 

The  original  Monroe  doctrine  was  uttered  as  a 
warning  to  the  Holy  Alliance  in  its  well  known  de- 
signs to  attempt  the  reconquest  of  the  provinces  lost 
by  Spain. 

The  Monroe  doctrine  was  never  meant  to  be  an 
excuse  to  collect  debts  for  American  or  foreigners 
or  a pretext  to  police  unruly  republics. 

With  the  exception  of  some  Central  American 
States  there  has  never  been  a case  in  a hundred  years 
when  South  America  and  Mexico  could  not  cope  suc- 
cessfully against  foreign  invaders. 

As  far  back  as  1806-07  England  attempted  to 


208 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


conquer  Argentina  and  Uruguay  when  they  were  still 
under  Spanish  rule.  The  Spaniards  and  the  natives 
fought  very  bravely  and  repelled  the  invaders,  who 
had  already  occupied  Buenos-Ayres.  The  native 
South  Americans  did  not  intend  to  exchange  masters 
and  soon  afterwards  they  overthrew  the  Spaniards. 

In  the  early  forties  France  fought  the  Argentinian 
dictator  Rozas,  but  after  a two  years’  war  she  was 
defeated.  Later,  in  1845,  France  and  England  pre- 
tended that  Rozas  should  open  the  interior  rivers  to 
international  navigation.  Buenos-Ayres  was  block- 
aded and  the  war  lasted  for  five  years;  but  England 
and  France  were  defeated. 

Brazil  and  Argentina  tried  to  conquer  the  little 
republic  of  Paraguay.  The  war  lasted  five  years 
( 1865-70) . The  result  was  that  forty-five  per  cent, 
of  the  male  population  was  killed  in  battle,  but 
Paraguay  was  not  conquered. 

The  Latin  American  republics  feel  that  they  can 
take  care  of  themselves,  and  their  nationality  against 
their  neighbors  as  well  as  against  Europe.  No  mat- 
ter what  the  ambitions,  intentions  or  plans  of  con- 
quests of  certain  European  powers  may  be  they  know 
fully  well  that  there  is  not  the  slightest  chance  for  a 
permanent  occupation  by  European  armies,  and  that 
any  conquest  by  any  Asiatic  or  European  nation  is 
an  absurd  dream. 

It  is  understood  that  the  Monroe  doctrine  was 
once  a very  useful  moral  protection,  but  it  did 
not  prevent  attacks  and  occupation  of  South  Ameri- 


President  Wilson’s  Mexican  Policy  209 

can  territory  by  Spain,  France  and  England.  The 
only  reason  which  interfered  with  the  territorial  de- 
signs of  European  powers  was  not  the  help  of  the 
United  States,  when  it  was  most  needed,  but  the 
heroic  resistance  of  the  Latin  American  nations 
themselves.  The  fear  is  rampant  that  the  Monroe 
doctrine  might  be  used  as  a pretext  for  aggression  by 
the  United  States. 

Latin  Americans  follow  this  line  of  argument;  the 
great  American  corporations  can  invest  a great  deal 
of  money  in  South  America.  They  can  very  easily 
send  agents  to  foment  revolutions  which  necessarily 
would  destroy  American  property  and  then  a pre- 
text would  be  found  for  American  intervention,  as 
happened  in  Nicaragua. 

There  is  a very  short  step  from  temporary  to 
permanent  occupation,  tending  to  create  a very  dan- 
gerous precedent  in  favor  of  American  occupation 
in  any  country  where  there  is  a great  deal  of  invested 
American  capital. 

The  thought  was  expressed  by  a great  many  South 
American  statesmen  that  President  Wilson’s  Mexi- 
can policy  would  be  a good  illustration  of  the  future 
policy  towards  South  America.  At  the  beginning 
the  expressions  of  neutrality  and  non-intervention  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  Mexico  were  considered  rather 
suspiciously. 

Had  the  President  of  the  United  States  declared 
war  on  Mexico  and  sent  troops  to  Mexico  City  on 
any  pretext  whatsoever,  the  Latin  American  nations 


2 10 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


would  have  closed  their  doors  to  American  capital, 
commerce,  and  would  have  boycotted  American 
goods.  The  thought  would  have  always  been  pres- 
ent that  the  Americans  would  always  use  their  in- 
terests as  a wedge  for  interference  in  their  national 
affairs. 

The  entrance  of  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile  in 
a solution  of  the  Mexican-American  incident  at  Tam- 
pico was  a characteristic  move  exemplifying  the  new 
trend  of  thought  on  statesmanship  in  Washington. 

Under  a republican  administration,  England, 
France  and  Germany  would  have  been  asked  to  set- 
tle the  question  with  the  United  States  instead  of  the 
ABC  powers.  Without  fear  of  contradiction  it 
can  be  stated  that  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile’s  en- 
trance into  Pan  American  affairs  with  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  United  States  proves  that  the  State  De- 
partment has  finally  learned  the  A B C of  Pan  Amer- 
ican statesmanship.  Likewise,  that  the  Monroe 
doctrine  can  only  reach  its  highest  efficiency  in  co- 
operation with  the  whole  of  America  from  Pata- 
gonia to  Canada. 

When  the  Americans  create  a Pan  American  doc- 
trine, then  there  is  no  doubt  that  Europe  will  not 
dare  to  challenge  it. 

At  present  a challenge  to  the  Monroe  doctrine 
is  in  reality  a challenge  to  the  American  navy.  With 
a new  Pan  American  doctrine  the  challenge  would 
include  all  Latin  American  countries,  with  the  United 
States  and  Canada  in  an  offensive  and  defensive  al- 


21  I 


President  Wilson's  Mexican  Policy 

liance  against  one  or  more  European  powers.  At 
present  it  appears  as  if  the  defence  of  the  territorial 
integrity  of  all  America  was  shouldered  upon  the 
United  States  alone.  The  Latin  Americans  feel  that 
they  should  have  a share  of  this  responsibility,  for 
they  believe  themselves  capable  and  ready  to  do 
so. 

There  was  a great  deal  of  excitement  and  indigna- 
tion in  South  America  when  the  American  marines 
landed  in  Vera  Cruz.  Huerta  was  not  made  more 
popular  by  this  incident,  but  the  national  instinct  of 
preservation  of  the  Latin  races  made  them  uncon- 
sciously understand  that  the  landing  of  American 
blue  jackets  was  only  a wedge  to  achieve  American 
occupation  and  that  as  long  as  Vera  Cruz  was  occu- 
pied, it  was  only  a question  of  time  until  American 
soldiers  would  march  to  Mexico  City. 

When  Roosevelt  was  in  South  America  he  was 
feted  and  banqueted  by  the  most  prominent  men  in 
the  ABC  republics.  They  were  too  polite  to  in- 
form him  what  they  thought  of  his  speeches  on  the 
Monroe  doctrine.  The  articles  and  editorials  com- 
menting Roosevelt’s  theories  were  very  plain  if 
courteous:  that  either  Mr.  Roosevelt  had  forgotten 
the  original  meaning  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  or  that 
he  was  deceiving  himself  into  an  imperialistic  mean- 
ing of  the  doctrine. 

The  Latin  Americans  and  Mexico  hope  fervently 
that  the  unselfish,  humanitarian  and  democratic 
diplomacy  of  President  Wilson  will  bear  the  brunt 


212 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


of  the  tremendous  influences  that  are  brought  to 
bear  upon  it. 

It  is  a well  known  platitude  that  certain  American 
mining,  railroad  and  oil  interests  are  subterraneously 
working  against  this  idealistic  policy;  that  the  War 
Department  has  been  itching  for  a war  of  conquest 
or  police  work  in  Mexico.  An  officer  of  the  United 
States  army  in  an  expansive  moment  volunteered 
the  information  that  intervention  in  Mexico  would 
mean  an  increase  from  80  to  350,000  men  in  the 
American  army  and  make  it  possible  to  organize  it 
more  in  proportion  with  its  population.  That  there 
being  always  a danger  of  a war  with  Japan,  and  the 
United  States  not  being  ready  for  it,  a war  with 
Mexico  would  prepare  the  army  for  that  eventu- 
ality. 

President  Wilson  has  more  admirers  in  Mexico 
and  South  America  than  any  other  President  or 
statesman  in  the  whole  history  of  the  United  States 
has  ever  had,  not  even  excepting  the  martyr  Presi- 
dent Lincoln,  or  Washington. 

The  popular  thought  has  been  deeply  imbedded 
with  the  conviction  that  if  the  dictator  Huerta  could 
not  exasperate  and  inveigle  President  Wilson  into  a 
war  with  Mexico,  that  no  power  for  evil  can  achieve 
the  purpose  in  the  future. 

Far  seeing  Mexicans  did  not  expect  a prompt  so- 
lution of  the  vital  problems  after  the  elimination  of 
Huerta.  The  dictator  was  only  the  greatest  im- 
pedimenta to  a realization  of  liberal  ideals;  once 


President  JVilson’s  Mexican  Policy  213 

Huerta  eliminated  the  work  was  a little  less  ardu- 
ous, but  still  of  tremendous  purport. 

The  participation  of  England,  France  and  Ger- 
many in  a struggle  for  life  in  Europe  has  luckily  re- 
lieved Mexico  of  three  great  mischief  makers.  The 
great  and  sombre  powers  which  have  kept  Mexico  in 
a turmoil  for  a hundred  years  are  still  at  work:  the 
clericals,  the  landowners  and  the  militarists;  in  the 
last  twenty  years  the  American  interests  have  been 
added  to  the  list. 

A Mexican  thinker  concreted  the  thought  thus: 
“The  great  powers  for  evil  in  Mexico  are:  The 
Church,  the  Latifundise  and  the  Trusts;  their  great 
victims  will  be  President  Wilson,  Carranza  and  the 
Mexican  people.” 


REFLECTIONS 


In  the  beginning  of  the  revolution  against  Diaz, 
as  public  opinion  seemed  to  be  favorable  to  what 
was  called  “ The  Great  Constructive  Work  of 
Diaz,”  there  was  a vague  and  superficial  impression 
that  the  United  States  should  repeat  the  policy  which 
had  been  inaugurated  toward  Cuba;  a sort  of  po- 
litical tutelage  which  left  the  independence  of  the 
island  in  the  hands  of  the  natives. 

Subsequent  events  have  revealed  to  the  Americans 
that  although  the  Mexicans  were  still  groping  for 
a Constitution  more  in  keeping  with  their  racial  char- 
acteristics, that  they  had  had,  in  opposition  to  Cuba, 
which  gained  its  independence  from  Spain  in  1908, 
a national  history  for  one  hundred  years,  with  great 
national  heroes,  martyrs  and  political  ideals  which 
could  not  be  infringed  and  trespassed  upon  by  an 
uncalled  for  intervention  in  their  internal  affairs. 

Thoughtful  and  well-informed  statesmen  and  poli- 
ticians have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  a political 
tutelage  as  in  Cuba  will  never  be  tolerated  in  Mex- 
ico, any  more  than  military  aggression  for  the  sake 
of  conquest,  or  under  the  hypocritical  name  of  peace. 

The  average  American  knows  that  a Mexican  war 
would  be  a war  without  heroes  or  glory  for  Amer- 
ican arms. 


214 


Reflections 


215 


The  Mexicans  are  intensely  grateful  to  President 
Wilson  for  insisting  on  keeping  hands  off  in  Mexico. 
The  internal  struggle  of  the  liberals  fighting  against 
the  reactionary  powers  in  Mexico  must  be  settled  by 
the  Mexicans  themselves,  or  it  will  have  to  be  set- 
tled all  over  again. 

The  impression  of  a great  many  Americans  is 
that  Mexico  is  going  towards  political  disruption, 
that  is  to  say,  a secession  into  three  entities:  the 
North,  the  Centre  and  the  South. 

Northern  secession  is  encouraged  by  the  great  min- 
ing, oil,  railroad,  and  land  interests  in  the  United 
States  and  by  the  reactionaries  in  Mexico.  South- 
ern secession  is  not  only  encouraged,  but  fomented, 
by  the  ambitious  and  able  dictator  of  Guatemala. 

The  northern  republic  would  comprise  the  bor- 
der states,  as  well  as  Lower  California,  which,  even 
if  independent,  would  be  more  friendly  to  the  United 
States  than  a united  Mexico.  That  is  the  convic- 
tion of  those  interested  in  a Northern  secession. 

A Southern  republic  would  mean  the  absorption 
of  the  States  of  Yucatan,  Campeche,  Tabasco,  Chia- 
pas, and  the  Territory  of  Quintana  Roo,  under  the 
leadership  and  hegemony  of  Guatemala. 

Working  towards  that  end,  and  in  co-operation 
with  the  Guatemalan  dictator,  is  a gentleman  in  the 
State  Department,  who  was  once  U.  S.  representa- 
tive in  Guatemala. 

American  interests  are  allied  with  the  Mexican  in- 


21 6 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


terests,  whereas,  the  American  radicals,  socialists 
and  the  labor  party  are  in  sympathy  with  the  Mex- 
ican liberals.  The  American  and  Mexican  capital- 
ists are  opposed  to  the  American  and  Mexican  mid- 
dle class  and  proletariat. 

The  same  class  trouble  is  going  on  in  the  Church 
in  Mexico.  The  native  Mexican  clergy  is  opposed 
to  the  high  or  foreign  clergy.  All  the  oppressions, 
cruelties,  and  treacheries  in  the  fight  of  the  clericals 
against  the  liberals  have  emanated  from  the  foreign 
or  high  clergy,  which  used  the  military  element  for 
that  purpose.  The  unselfish,  libertarian  struggle  on 
the  other  hand,  was  always  actively  assisted  by  the 
native  priests;  by  men  like  Morelos  and  Hidalgo. 
The  poor  Mexican  priest,  or  better  said,  the  low 
Mexican  clergy,  is  first  a Mexican,  and  if  that  agrees 
with  his  belief,  he  will  be  a good  Catholic;  but  if 
his  faith  is  pitted  against  the  welfare  of  his  country, 
then  he  will  invariably  prefer  to  be  a good  Mexican 
and  a poor  Catholic,  to  being  a poor  Mexican  and 
an  obedient  Catholic. 

The  higher  clergy  in  the  United  States,  by  attack- 
ing the  liberal  policies  in  Mexico,  and  waging  an  ac- 
tive campaign  against  the  Mexican  revolutionists, 
is  placing  itself  in  direct  opposition  to  the  lower 
Mexican  clergy. 

From  the  Mexican  point  of  view,  three  principles 
have  been  laid  down  to  face  and  combat  American 


217 


Reflections 

aggression,  or  absorption.  The  elimination  of 
predatory  American  capital,  the  curtailment  of  Amer- 
ican immigration  schemes,  and  the  advancement  of 
European  immigration.  American  methods,  on  the 
other  hand,  will  be  encouraged  in  all  the  active  ex- 
pressions of  life,  such  as  business  organizations, 
farming  and  school  methods. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  ten  years  of  a complete 
and  practical  rural  school  system  in  Mexico  will 
change  the  whole  social  and  political  character  of  the 
republic.  The  advancement  of  woman  in  life  will 
also  gain  a decided  advantage  for  the  Mexican,  for 
no  nation  can  be  greater  or  better  than  its  women. 

Oriental  immigration  cannot  be  encouraged,  as 
being  dangerous  to  the  best  interests  of  Mexico,  not 
because  of  the  inferiority  of  the  Orientals,  but  be- 
cause of  their  superiority,  which  would  tend  to  segre- 
gate them  into  colonies. 

A Mexican  engineer  suggested  a plan  to  cut  a 
canal  in  Lower  California,  from  Ensenada  to  the 
Rio  Colorado,  a distance  of  ninety  miles.  By  this 
method  Lower  California  would  be  made  into  an 
island,  and  the  passage  of  ships  from  the  Pacific 
Ocean  at  Ensenada,  through  the  Canal  into  the  Gulf 
of  California  would  double  the  importance,  com- 
mercially and  politically,  of  the  States  of  Sonora, 
Sinaloa  and  the  Eastern  side  of  Lower  California. 


2l8 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


Irrigation,  and  later  immigration,  in  Lower  Cal- 
ifornia, would  change  the  barren  island  into  a garden. 

The  Mexican  revolutionists  are  socialists  without 
knowing  it;  their  actions  in  the  economical  and  po- 
litical field  have  proven  it;  the  Marxian  theorists  in 
Europe  showed  by  their  attitude  in  the  war,  that  they 
were  not  socialists,  but  political  trimmers. 

The  French  revolution  is  being  repeated  in  Mex- 
ico. Bare  feet  are  pattering  up  on  one  side  of  the 
stairwray,  while  patent  leathers  are  descending  on 
the  opposite  side. 

The  Mexican  problem  is  like  a sand-bar  in  the 
path  of  the  American  Ship  of  State. 


APPENDIX 


THE  PLAN  OF  SAN  LUIS  POTOSI 
By  F.  I.  Madero. 

DECLARATION  TO  THE  NATION 

The  people,  in  their  constant  effort  to  bring  about  the 
triumph  of  their  ideals  of  liberty  and  justice,  have  deemed  it 
necessary  at  certain  historical  moments  to  make  the  greatest 
sacrifices. 

Our  dear  country  has  arrived  at  one  of  these  times;  a 
tyranny  which  the  Mexicans  had  not  been  accustomed  to  en- 
dure, since  we  gained  our  independence,  oppresses  us  in  such 
a manner  that  it  has  become  intolerable.  In  exchange  for 
that  tyranny,  peace  has  been  offered  us,  but  a shameful  peace 
for  the  Mexican  people,  as  it  is  not  based  on  right  but  on 
might;  for  it  does  not  have  as  an  object  the  advancement 
and  prosperity  of  the  country,  but  only  the  enrichment  of 
a small  group  who,  abusing  their  influence,  have  converted 
the  public  positions  into  fountains  of  benefit  exclusively  per- 
sonal, exploiting  without  scruples  all  the  concessions  and 
lucrative  contracts. 

The  legislative  power  as  well  as  the  judicial  are  com- 
pletely under  the  executive;  the  division  of  power,  the  State 
sovereignty,  the  liberty  of  the  municipal  government  and  the 
rights  of  the  citizen  only  exist  as  they  are  written  in  our 
Magna  Charta;  but  as  a fact,  in  Mexico  it  can  almost  be 
said  that  martial  law  reigns  constantly;  justice  instead  of 

219 


220 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


imparting  protection  to  the  weak,  only  serves  to  legalize 
the  plundering  committed  by  the  strong;  the  judges  instead 
of  being  the  representatives  of  justice  are  agents  of  the  ex- 
ecutive, whose  interests  they  serve  faithfully;  the  House  of 
Congress  of  the  Union  has  no  other  will  than  that  of  the 
dictator;  the  State  Governors  are  appointed  by  him,  and 
they  in  their  turn  appoint  and  tax  in  the  same  way  the  mu- 
nicipal authorities. 

From  this  it  results  that  the  administrative  gear,  judicial 
and  legislative,  obeys  with  one  will  the  caprice  of  Gen. 
Porfirio  Diaz,  who  during  his  long  administration  has  dem- 
onstrated that  the  principal  motive  that  guides  him  is  to  main- 
tain himself  in  power  at  all  costs. 

For  many  years  deep  uneasiness  has  been  felt  throughout 
the  republic,  due  to  the  above  form  of  management  of  the 
Government,  but  General  Diaz,  with  great  astuteness  and 
perseverance,  had  well-nigh  crushed  out  all  independent  ele- 
ments, so  that  it  was  impossible  to  organize  any  kind  of  a 
movement  to  deprive  him  of  the  power,  which  he  had  so  mis- 
used. The  mischief  was  constantly  aggravated,  and  the 
decided  eagerness  of  General  Diaz  to  impose  on  the  nation 
a successor  in  the  person  of  Mr.  Ramon  Corral,  brought 
matters  to  a crisis  and  determined  many  Mexicans,  although 
lacking  political  affiliations  because  it  had  been  impossible  to 
form  them  during  the  thirty-six  years  of  dictatorship,  to 
throw  themselves  into  a struggle,  intending  to  regain  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people  and  their  purely  democratic  right 
to  the  land. 

Among  other  parties  which  had  the  same  object,  the  Na- 
tional Anti-Re-electionist  Party  was  organized,  proclaiming 
the  principles  of  effective  suffrage  and  no  re-elec- 
tion as  the  only  ones  capable  of  saving  the  republic  from 
the  imminent  danger  which  menaced  from  the  prolongation 


Appendix 


221 


of  a dictatorship  each  day  becoming  more  and  more  onerous, 
more  despotic  and  more  immoral. 

The  Mexican  people  actively  seconded  that  party  and  re- 
sponded to  the  call  which  was  made,  sending  its  represen- 
tatives to  a convention,  in  which  also  was  represented  the 
National  Democratic  Party,  which  also  interpreted  the  pop- 
ular desires.  The  said  convention  appointed  its  candidates 
for  the  Presidency  and  Vice-Presidency  of  the  republic,  those 
nominations  devolving  upon  Dr.  Francisco  Vasquez  Gomez 
and  on  me,  for  the  respective  charges  of  Vice-President  and 
President  of  the  republic. 

Although  our  situation  was  extremely  disadvantageous 
owing  to  the  fact  that  our  adversaries  received  the  sanction 
of  all  the  official  element,  on  which  they  did  not  hesitate  to 
rely,  we  believe  it  our  duty  to  accept  an  honorable  appoint- 
ment like  this  in  order  to  best  serve  the  cause  of  the  people. 
In  imitation  of  the  wise  customs  of  republican  countries,  I 
travelled  over  a portion  of  the  republic,  calling  upon  my 
compatriots.  My  passing  from  one  town  to  another  was 
like  a real  triumphal  march,  for  everywhere  the  people,  elec- 
trified by  the  magic  words  Effective  Suffrage  and  No  Re- 
election,  gave  evident  proofs  of  their  irrevocable  resolution 
to  obtain  the  conquest  of  such  secure  principles.  At  length, 
the  moment  arrived  when  General  Diaz  began  to  notice  the 
true  situation  of  the  republic,  and  understood  that  he  could 
not  advantageously  struggle  with  me  in  the  field  of  democ- 
racy, and  sent  me  to  prison  before  the  elections,  which  were 
consummated  while  excluding  the  public  from  the  primaries 
through  violence,  filling  the  prisons  with  independent  citi- 
zens and  committing  the  most  shameful  frauds. 

In  Mexico,  as  a democratic  republic,  the  public  power 
cannot  have  any  other  origin  or  base  than  the  national  will, 


222 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


and  this  cannot  be  subordinated  to  formulas  consummated 
in  a fraudulent  manner. 

For  this  reason  the  Mexican  people  have  protested  against 
the  illegality  of  the  last  elections,  and  wishing  to  employ 
successively  all  the  recourses  which  the  laws  of  the  republic 
offer,  in  due  form  they  requested  the  annulment  of  the  elec- 
tions before  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  in  that  body  a legitimate  origin  was  not  recognized, 
and  it  being  known  beforehand  that  the  members  of  the  same 
were  not  representatives  of  the  people  and  only  respected 
the  will  of  General  Diaz,  to  whom  exclusively  they  owed 
their  investiture. 

In  such  a state  of  affairs  the  people,  who  are  the  only 
sovereign,  also  protested  in  an  energetic  manner  against  the 
elections,  in  imposing  manifestations  consummated  in  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  republic,  and  if  these  did  not  spread  through 
all  the  national  territory,  it  was  due  to  the  terrible  pressure 
exercised  by  the  government,  which  always  smothers  in  blood 
any  democratic  demonstration,  such  as  passed  in  Puebla, 
Vera  Cruz,  Tlaxcala,  Mexico  and  other  parts. 

But  this  situation  so  violent  and  illegal  could  not  last 
long. 

I have  understood  very  well  that  if  the  people  have  ap- 
pointed me  as  their  candidate  for  President  it  is  not  because 
there  may  have  been  an  opportunity  of  discovering  in  me  the 
faculties  of  a statesman  or  a governor,  but  only  the  virility 
of  a patriot  resolved  to  sacrifice  himself  if  necessary  in  the 
cause  of  liberty,  and  to  help  the  public  free  itself  from  the 
odious  tyranny  which  oppresses  the  nation. 

From  the  time  when  I threw  myself  into  the  democratic 
struggle  I knew  very  well  that  General  Diaz  had  no  respect 
for  the  freewill  of  the  nation  and  the  noble  Mexican  people, 
and  upon  attending  the  primaries  I knew  also  very  well  the 


Appendix 


223 


attacks  that  awaited  them;  but  notwithstanding  these  facts, 
the  public  gave  to  the  cause  of  liberty  a numerous  contingent 
of  martyrs  when  these  were  necessary,  and  with  admirable 
stoicism  met  at  the  polls  to  receive  all  sorts  of  annoyances. 

But  such  conduct  was  indispensable  to  demonstrate  to  the 
world  at  large  that  the  Mexican  people  are  ready  for  de- 
mocracy, that  they  are  thirsty  for  liberty,  and  that  their 
present  governors  do  not  meet  their  aspirations. 

Besides,  the  attitude  of  the  people  before  and  during  the 
elections,  as  well  as  after  them,  demonstrates  clearly  that 
they  opposed  with  energy  the  government  of  General  Diaz, 
and  that  if  their  electoral  rights  had  been  respected  I might 
have  been  elected  as  President  of  the  republic. 

Taking  this  into  consideration  and  echoing  the  public 
sentiment,  I declare  illegal  the  past  elections,  and  as  the 
republic  for  that  reason  is  without  legitimate  governors,  I 
assume  provisionally  the  Presidency  of  the  republic,  while 
the  people  appoint  according  to  law  their  governors.  To 
attain  this  object  it  is  necessary  to  hurl  from  power  the  au- 
dacious usurpers,  who  for  all  the  titles  of  legality  boast  a 
scandalous  and  immoral  fraud. 

With  all  honor  I declare  that  I wTould  consider  it  a sign 
of  weakness  on  my  part  and  treason  to  the  public  who  have 
confided  in  me,  not  to  place  myself  in  front  of  my  fellow- 
citizens  who  anxiously  call  upon  me  from  all  parts  of  the 
country,  to  compel  General  Diaz  by  force  of  arms  to  respect 
the  national  will. 

The  present  Government,  although  it  originated  in  vio- 
lence and  fraud  from  the  moment  that  it  was  tolerated  by 
the  people,  yet  can  hold  for  foreign  nations  certain  titles  of 
legality  up  to  the  30th  of  the  coming  month,  in  which  their 
tenure  expires;  but  as  it  is  possible  that  the  new  government 
emanating  from  the  last  fraud,  may  not  by  that  time  be  in 


224 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


power,  at  least  because  the  greater  part  of  the  nation  is 
making  an  armed  protest  against  that  usurpation,  I have 
appointed  SUNDAY,  the  20th  of  next  November,  from  6 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon  on,  for  all  the  towns  and  villages 
in  the  republic  to  take  up  arms  against  the  government  un- 
der the  following 


PLAN. 

1st.  The  elections  for  President  and  Vice-President  of 
the  republic,  Magistrates  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Justice 
of  the  Nation  and  Deputies  and  Senators,  held  in  June  and 
July  of  the  present  year,  are  hereby  declared  null  and  void. 

2nd.  The  present  government  of  General  Diaz  is  not 
recognized,  nor  the  power  of  any  authority  emanating  from 
the  popular  vote,  for  not  having  been  elected  by  the  people, 
they  have  lost  what  little  title  they  did  have  of  legality, 
aiding  and  favoring  for  their  own  interests  the  most  scan- 
dalous electoral  fraud  ever  known  in  the  history  of  Mexico, 
with  the  money  placed  at  their  disposal  by  the  public. 

3d.  To  avoid  as  much  as  possible  the  upheavals  incident 
to  all  revolutionary  movements,  all  the  laws  promulgated  by 
the  present  administration  and  the  rules  pertaining  to  the 
same,  with  the  exception  of  those  which  are  found  to  be 
decidedly  opposed  to  the  principles  set  forth  by  this  plan,  are 
declared  to  be  in  force,  until  such  as  require  adjustment  may 
be  reformed  according  to  constitutional  methods.  Also,  ex- 
ception is  made  of  laws,  sentences  of  courts,  and  decrees 
which  may  have  been  sanctioned  regarding  the  accounts  and 
handling  of  funds  of  all  the  functionaries  of  the  Porfirista 
administration,  in  all  their  branches.  For  as  soon  as  the 
revolution  triumphs  the  formation  of  commissions  of  investi- 
gation will  be  initiated  to  decide  on  the  responsibilities  which 


Appendix  225 

the  functionaries  of  the  State  and  city  federations  may  be 
able  to  incur. 

In  all  cases  the  obligations  contracted  by  the  Porfirista  ad- 
ministration with  foreign  governments  and  corporations  be- 
fore the  20th  of  the  coming  month,  will  be  respected. 

Abusing  the  law  of  waste  land,  numerous  small  proprietors, 
mostly  all  quite  poor,  have  been  despoiled  of  their  posses- 
sions, through  the  connivance  of  the  Secretary  of  Public 
Welfare,  or  by  decrees  of  the  courts  of  the  republic.  It 
being  only  just  to  restore  to  their  former  owners  the  lands 
of  which  they  have  been  despoiled  in  such  an  arbitrary  man- 
ner, such  dispositions  and  decrees  have  been  declared  subject 
to  revision,  and  there  will  be  demanded  of  those  who  ac- 
quire them  in  such  a lawless  manner,  or  of  their  heirs,  to 
make  restitution  to  their  former  proprietors,  who  will  also 
pay  an  indemnity  for  the  injuries  suffered.  Only  in  cases 
where  such  lands  have  passed  to  a third  person  before  the 
promulgation  of  this  plan,  the  former  owners  will  receive 
indemnity  from  those  in  whose  benefit  the  spoliation  was 
accomplished. 

4th.  Besides  the  constitution  and  laws  in  force,  the  su- 
preme law  of  the  republic  is  declared  to  be  the  principle  of 
NO  re-election  of  the  President  and  Vice-President  of  the 
republic,  Governors  of  the  States  and  Municipal  Presidents, 
while  the  respective  constitutional  reforms  may  be  made. 

5th.  I assume  the  character  of  Provisional  President  of 
the  United  States  of  Mexico,  with  the  necessary  faculties 
to  make  war  on  the  usurping  government  of  General 
Diaz. 

As  soon  as  the  capital  of  the  republic  and  half  of  the 
States  of  the  Federation  may  be  in  the  power  of  the  army 
of  the  nation,  the  Provisional  President  will  call  for  extra 
general  elections  for  a month  thereafter,  and  will  deliver 


226 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


the  power  to  the  President  who  may  be  elected,  as  soon  as 
the  result  of  such  election  may  be  known. 

6th.  The  Provisional  President,  before  handing  over  the 
authority,  will  give  account  to  the  Congress  of  the  Union 
of  the  use  which  has  been  made  of  the  faculties  which  the 
present  plan  confers  upon  him. 

7th.  The  20th  day  of  the  month  of  November,  from  the 
6th  of  the  afternoon  on,  all  the  citizens  of  the  republic  will 
take  up  arms  to  hurl  from  power  the  authorities  which  at 
present  govern  them.  (The  towns  which  are  situated  away 
from  the  railway  lines  will  take  up  arms  from  the  even- 
ing on.) 

8th.  When  the  authorities  present  armed  resistance,  they 
will  be  compelled  by  force  of  arms  to  respect  the  popular 
will ; but  in  this  case  the  laws  of  war  will  be  rigorously  ob- 
served, attention  being  specially  called  to  the  prohibitions 
relative  to  not  using  expansive  balls,  nor  shooting  prisoners. 
Also  attention  is  called  respecting  the  duty  of  all  Mexicans 
to  have  consideration  for  all  foreigners  and  their  inter- 
ests. 

gth.  The  authorities  who  oppose  resistance  to  this  plan 
will  be  sent  to  prison  so  that  they  may  be  judged  by  the 
courts  of  the  republic,  when  the  revolution  may  be  over. 
As  soon  as  each  city  or  town  recovers  its  liberty,  there  will 
be  recognized  as  legitimate  temporary  authority  the  principal 
chief  at  arms,  with  the  faculty  of  delegating  his  functions  to 
any  other  citizen,  who  may  be  confirmed  in  his  charge  or 
removed  by  the  Provisional  Governor. 

One  of  the  first  measures  of  the  provisional  government 
will  be  to  put  at  liberty  all  the  political  prisoners. 

10th.  The  nomination  of  Provisional  Governor  of  each 
State  that  may  have  been  occupied  by  revolutionary  troops, 
will  be  made  by  the  Provisional  President.  This  Governor 


Appendix  227 

will  be  under  strict  obligation  to  convoke  the  elections  for 
the  Provisional  Governor  of  the  State,  as  soon  as  it  may  be 
possible  to  do  so,  according  to  the  judgment  of  the  Provis- 
ional President.  There  is  excepted  from  these  rulings  the 
States  that  for  two  years  have  sustained  democratic  cam- 
paigns for  a change  of  government,  for  in  these  the  man  who 
was  the  candidate  of  the  people  will  be  considered  as  Pro- 
visional Governor,  of  course  it  being  understood  that  he 
is  expected  to  adhere  strictly  to  this  plan. 

In  case  that  the  Provisional  President  has  not  made  a 
nomination  of  Governor,  or  the  nominee  has  not  arrived  to 
take  charge  of  his  position,  or  if  the  person  so  honored  does 
not  accept  for  any  reason,  then  the  Governor  will  appoint 
by  vote  among  all  the  chiefs  of  the  army  who  may  operate 
in  the  territory  of  the  respective  State,  with  the  understand- 
ing that  his  nomination  may  be  ratified  by  the  Provisional 
President  as  soon  as  it  may  be  convenient. 

nth.  The  new  authorities  will  dispose  of  all  the  funds 
that  are  found  in  the  public  offices  for  the  ordinary  expenses 
of  the  administration  and  for  the  expenses  of  the  war,  keep- 
ing account  scrupulously.  In  case  that  these  funds  may  not 
be  sufficient  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  war,  loans  are  to  be 
contracted,  either  voluntary  or  forced.  These  last  to  be 
consummated  only  with  citizens  or  national  institutions.  Ac- 
count will  also  be  carefully  kept  of  these  loans,  and  receipts 
will  be  tendered  in  due  form  to  the  interested  parties,  with 
a view  to  making  restitution  to  those  who  have  loaned,  the 
revolution  having  triumphed. 

Transitory.  A.  The  chiefs  of  the  volunteer  army  will 
hold  the  rank  which  may  correspond  to  the  numbers  of  forces 
on  hand.  In  case  of  operating  military  forces  and  volun- 
teers together,  the  chief  of  the  highest  rank  will  take  com- 
mand of  them,  because  in  the  event  of  both  chiefs  holding 


228 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


the  same  rank,  the  command  will  be  for  the  military  chief- 
tain. 

The  civil  heads  will  profit  by  said  rank  while  the  war  lasts, 
and  once  terminated,  these  appointments  on  petition  of  the 
parties  interested,  will  be  revised  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
who  will  confirm  the  various  ones  in  their  charges,  or  re- 
move such  as  he  may  see  fit. 

B.  All  the  chiefs,  civil  as  well  as  military,  will  keep  their 
troops  under  the  strictest  discipline,  as  they  will  be  held  re- 
sponsible by  the  Provisional  Government  for  any  misbe- 
havior of  which  the  soldiers  under  their  command  may  be 
guilty;  excepting  in  such  cases  where  they  may  justify  them- 
selves by  proving  that  it  was  impossible  to  restrain  the  troops, 
and  to  have  imposed  on  the  offenders  the  merited  punish- 
ment. 

The  severest  punishments  will  be  inflicted  on  any  soldiers 
who  sack  any  town  or  kill  defenceless  prisoners. 

C.  If  the  army  and  the  authorities  sustained  by  General 
Diaz  shoot  prisoners  of  war,  the  same  procedure  will  not 
be  observed  with  those  who  fall  into  our  hands,  as  repris- 
als; but  on  the  contrary,  the  civil  or  military  authorities  in 
the  service  of  General  Diaz,  who  may,  after  the  initiation 
of  the  revolution,  have  ordered,  decreed  in  any  form,  sent 
an  order,  or  shot  any  of  our  soldiers,  will  be  shot  within 
twenty-four  hours  after  a court-martial. 

From  this  sentence  the  highest  functionaries  will  not  be 
exempted ; the  only  exception  will  be  that  of  General  Diaz 
and  his  ministers,  who  in  case  of  their  ordering  shootings  or 
permitting  them,  will  receive  the  same  punishment,  though 
after  having  judged  them  in  the  courts  of  the  republic,  when 
the  revolution  may  have  terminated. 

In  such  cases  where  General  Diaz  may  decree  that  the 
laws  of  war  may  be  respected,  and  the  prisoners  who  fall 


Appendix 


229 


into  his  hands  are  treated  with  humanity,  his  life  will  be 
safe,  but  he  must  explain  in  the  courts  as  to  how  he  has 
handled  the  funds  of  the  nation,  and  as  to  how  he  has  com- 
plied with  the  law. 

D.  As  it  is  an  indispensable  requisite  of  the  laws  of  war 
that  the  belligerent  troops  may  wear  some  uniform  of  dis- 
tinction, and  as  it  would  be  difficult  to  uniform  the  numer- 
ous forces  of  the  people  who  are  going  to  take  part  in  the 
contest,  there  will  be  adopted  as  distinctive  of  all  the  liber- 
ating army,  whether  they  be  volunteers  or  regular  soldiers, 
a tricolored  ribbon,  in  the  cap  or  on  the  arm. 

Fellow  Citizens.  If  we  are  called  to  take  up  arms 
and  overturn  the  government  of  General  Diaz,  it  is  not  only 
for  the  offence  committed  during  the  last  elections,  but  only 
to  save  the  country  from  the  dark  future  which  awaits  her, 
if  she  continues  under  his  dictatorship,  and  under  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  abominable  scientific  oligarchy,  that  unscru- 
pulously and  with  great  rapidity  are  absorbing  and  wasting 
the  national  resources;  and  if  we  permit  them  to  continue 
in  power,  within  a very  brief  space  of  time  they  will  have 
completed  their  work;  they  will  have  carried  the  nation  to 
ignominy  and  degradation;  they  will  have  absorbed  all  of 
her  riches  and  left  her  in  total  misery;  they  will  have 
caused  the  bankruptcy  of  our  finances  and  the  dishonor 
of  our  country,  which,  weak,  impoverished  and  manacled, 
will  find  herself  unable  to  defend  her  frontiers,  her  honor 
and  her  institutions. 

With  respect  to  me,  I have  a tranquil  conscience,  and  no 
one  can  accuse  me  of  promoting  the  revolution  for  personal 
interests,  for  the  whole  nation  understands  that  I did  all 
that  was  possible  to  arrive  at  a peaceful  arrangement,  and 
was  disposed  even  to  renounce  my  candidacy  if  General  Diaz 
would  only  have  permitted  the  people  to  appoint  the  Vice- 


230 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


President  of  the  republic;  but  dominated  by  incomprehensi- 
ble pride  and  by  unheard  of  haughtiness  he  was  deaf  to  the 
voice  of  the  country,  and  preferred  to  precipitate  the  nation 
in  a revolution  before  conceding  one  jot  toward  returning 
to  the  people  an  atom  of  their  rights,  before  executing,  al- 
though it  might  be  in  the  last  stages  of  his  life,  a part  of  the 
promises  he  made  in  Noria  and  Tuxtepec. 

The  present  revolution  was  justified  when  he  said : “ That 
no  citizen  may  be  charged  with  and  perpetuated  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  power,  and  this  will  be  the  last  revolution.” 

If  in  the  mind  of  General  Diaz  there  had  been  more  at- 
tention paid  to  the  interest  of  the  country  than  the  sordid 
interests  of  himself  and  his  counsellors,  this  revolution  might 
have  been  avoided  by  making  some  concessions  to  the  people ; 
but  it  has  not  been  so  — so  much  the  better!  The  change 
will  be  rapid  and  more  radical,  for  the  Mexican  public  in 
place  of  lamenting  like  a coward,  will  accept  the  chal- 
lenge like  a hero,  and  even  if  General  Diaz  pretends  to  de- 
pend upon  brute  force  to  imposing  his  ignominious  yoke, 
the  public  will  rely  on  the  same  force  for  throwing  aside 
this  yoke,  for  hurling  this  dismal  man  from  power  and  for 
reconquering  liberty. 

Fellow  Citizens.  Do  not  hesitate  a moment:  Seize 

the  arms,  throw  the  usurpers  from  power,  recover  your 
rights  as  free  men,  and  remember  that  our  predecessors  be- 
queathed us  an  inheritance  of  glory  which  we  must  not 
stain.  Remember  how  they  acted:  invincible  in  war,  mag- 
nanimous in  victorj'. 

EFFECTIVE  SUFFRAGE.  NO  RE-ELECTION. 

San  Luis  Potosi,  October  5,  1910. 

(Signed)  Fco.  I.  Madero. 

Note.  The  present  plan  will  circulate  only  among  the 


Appendix 


231 


co-religionists  of  the  greatest  confidence  up  to  November 
15th,  from  which  date  it  will  be  re-printed;  the  plan 
will  be  prudently  divulged  from  the  1 8th  and  profusely 
from  the  20th  on. 

PROTEST  AGAINST  MEETING  OF  DIAZ  AND 

TAFT 

(Reprinted  from  The  Evening  World,  September  3,  1909.) 

To  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

Sir:  The  national  press  has  lately  startled  thoughtful 

men  with  the  most  unusual  of  announcements.  We  are  told 
we  may  shortly  expect  to  witness  the  meeting  of  the  popu- 
larly elected  President  of  this  great  Republic  with  the  un- 
crowned Czar  of  Mexico.  Calculated  to  inspire  enthusiasm 
in  the  minds  of  the  ignorant  or  the  falsely  informed,  this 
piece  of  news  brings  dismay  to  those  who  know  the  truth 
and  honor  American  traditions.  For  the  last  thirty  years 
the  world  has  only  heard  unchallenged  reports  of  the  genius, 
the  equity  and  the  kindness  of  Porfirio  Diaz.  All  this  being 
true,  it  would  only  be  fitting  and  proper  that  the  two  neigh- 
boring chiefs  should  exchange  international  courtesies. 

But  as  a matter  of  history  Porfirio  Diaz  represents  in 
Mexico  what  Abdul  Hamid  was  to  Turkey.  On  his  white 
head  rests  the  responsibility  for  the  massacres  of  over  50,000 
Mexican  Christians;  the  slavery  of  thousands  of  Yaqui  and 
Maya  Indians  who  escaped  fire  and  sword ; the  destruction 
of  all  liberties,  personal  as  well  as  public ; the  corruption  of 
the  judiciary;  the  creation  of  a financial  system  which  has 
mortgaged  Mexico  to  European  and  American  bankers;  for 
the  persecution  of  all  the  Mexican  liberals  in  the  United 
States,  which  reached  a climax  of  brazenness  and  impudence 
when  a Mexican  liberal  was  kidnapped  across  the  Rio 


232  Carranza  and  Mexico 

Grande  from  an  American  jail  by  the  help  of  American 
detectives  in  the  payroll  of  the  Czar. 

Therefore,  I protest  in  the  name  of  humanity,  common 
decency  and  national  dignity  as  distinguished  from  political 
expediency  and  international  courtesy  against  such  an  ex- 
change between  the  deeply  trusted  and  patriotic  President  of 
the  United  States  and  the  treacherous,  unpopular  and  bloody- 
handed  Nero  of  Mexico. 

You  might  retort  that  it  is  no  business  of  mine  to  couple 
your  name  with  an  attack  seemingly  so  unwarranted. 

My  answer  is  that  I speak  no  more  than  truth  and  not 
otherwise  than  I have  spoken  in  a recent  book  on  the  real 
political  conditions  in  Mexico.  I am  moved  to  repeat  these 
truthful  characterizations  of  Mexico’s  president  and  the 
rule  he  stands  for,  because  this  pamphlet  has  been  suppressed 
by  an  indictment  against  me  in  an  American  court  brought 
about  by  the  Mexican  Government,  which  used  your  own 
brother,  Henry  W.  Taft,  as  their  lawyer  against  me,  trans- 
parently to  gain  for  their  case  the  weight  of  an  implied  con- 
nection between  it  and  the  Administration. 

You  might  reply  that  the  American  Government  cares 
nothing  about  the  internal  policy  of  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment as  long  as  it  behaves  and  protects  American  interests. 

I answer  that  if  a neighbor  be  a good  neighbor  it  might 
be  sufficient  unto  you;  but  if  your  neighbor  should  torture 
or  attempt  to  kill  his  children  would  it  not  be  your  duty  to 
protest? 

If  the  excuse  for  meddling  in  another  nation’s  affairs  is 
only  found  in  the  destruction  of  American  lives  and  their 
property,  under  what  pretext  did  the  American  Government 
protest  against  the  Armenian  massacres?  What  brought 
about  armed  intervention  in  Cuba?  Why  did  the  State  De- 


A ppendix 


233 


partment  undertake  to  refund  the  unjust  Chinese  indemnity? 
And  how  are  you  to  explain  the  wherefore  of  the  tremendous 
struggle  to  stamp  out  slavery? 

The  reason  for  this  system  of  intervention  lies  deeper  than 
in  financial  and  political  interests.  It  proves  to  the  civilized 
world  that  the  American  nation  is  something  mightier  than 
a rich,  powerful  and  progressive  republic;  that  it  is  likewise 
a moral  entity  backed  by  the  conscience  of  a people. 

The  propaganda  about  Mexico  has  its  source  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  real  history  of  Porfirio  Diaz.  At  the  beginning 
of  his  career  he  concealed  his  real  political  face,  but  the 
higher  he  rises  in  power  and  statecraft,  the  more  he  uncovers 
his  fundamental  lack  of  principle. 

Even  as  I write  these  lines  the  report  is  wired  from 
Mexico  that  General  Diaz  has  ordered  the  demission  of  the 
Governor  of  Coahuila  as  the  latter  showed  a marked  ten- 
dency in  favor  of  General  Reyes’s  candidacy.  Imagine  the 
Republican  President  of  the  United  States  asking  for  the 
resignation  of  Governor  Johnson  of  Minnesota  because  of 
his  Democratic  leanings! 

Political  evolution  in  Mexico  will  move  faster  in  the  next 
twelve  months,  inasmuch  as  the  new  generation  is  impelled 
by  cleaner,  more  honest  and  patriotic  motives  than  those  of 
the  malevolent  Czar  and  his  infamous  camarilla.  Porfirio 
Diaz  is  fashioning  the  tools  of  his  own  destruction  and  as 
a last  resort  is  using  the  handshake  across  the  Rio  Grande 
to  countenance  in  advance  the  arbitrary  repressions  and  as- 
sassinations which  are  sure  to  take  place  in  the  false  elec- 
tions of  next  year. 

When  that  period  is  passed  the  mask  of  this  master 
Machiavelli  will  have  been  torn  aside.  The  American  peo- 
ple will  then  realize  with  humiliation  that  their  honored 


234 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


President  has  exchanged  an  intimate  greeting  with  the  basest 
slave-driver  of  modern  times. 

Carlo  de  Fornaro, 
National  Arts  Club. 


Translation. 

LETTER  FROM  ARCHBISHOP  GILLOW  TO 
URRUTIA. 

Hacienda  de  Chautla,  July  nth,  1913. 
Sr.  Dr.  Aureliano  Urrutia, 

Minister  of  the  Interior,  Mexico. 

Esteemed  Sir  and  Friend : 

I returned  to  this  hacienda  yesterday  and  was  informed 
that  up  around  Huejotzingo,  capital  of  this  District,  things 
are  rather  unsettled,  due  to  a few  disturbers  who  molest 
the  authorities,  and  consequently  disturb  public  peace.  Hav- 
ing in  mind  the  kind  offers  wThich  you  made  to  me  during 
my  recent  visit  in  that  city,  I now  take  the  liberty  of  ad- 
dressing you. 

The  disturbers  of  Huejotzingo  are  a certain  Luis  Pinto 
and  his  brother.  They  own  real  estate  and  small  houses 
to  the  amount  of  may  be  Three  Thousand  Dollars  each,  in 
that  locality.  They  put  on  airs  of  caciques,  and  have  for 
some  time  even  gone  so  far  as  to  pretend  to  subordinate 
the  local  authorities.  They  have  become  more  overbearing 
since  the  time  of  Madero. 

While  Mr.  Alberto  Garcia  Granados  was  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  the  referred-to  Pinto  brothers  attempted  to  over- 
throw Mr.  Enrique  Acevedo  from  his  position  as  Governor 
of  the  Province.  Mr.  Acevedo  has  maintained  the  peace 
and  well-being  in  this  district  ever  since  he  came  into  of- 
fice. As  Mr.  Granados,  owner  of  the  Hacienda  de  Chagua, 


A ppendix 


235 


near  Huejotzingo,  knows  Mr.  Acevedo,  he  maintained  Mr. 
Acevedo  as  Governor,  and  the  Pinto  brothers  did  not  molest 
him  any  more  until  Mr.  Granados  resigned  the  secretary- 
ship. 

As  Mr.  Acevedo  is  well  acquainted  with  the  intrigues  of 
the  Pinto  brothers,  he  has  kept  them  well  watched,  and 
they,  resenting  this,  have  hostilized  him,  to  the  degree  of 
having  trumped  up  false  accusations  against  him  before  the 
municipality  of  Puebla.  They  did  not  however,  obtain  their, 
end,  for  they  were  unable  to  obtain  his  removal,  though  he 
was  for  a time  suspended  from  office,  much  to  the  regret 
of  the  honest  contingent  of  Huejotzingo.  The  Mayor  re- 
placed him  during  this  time. 

On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Ramon  Vargas,  Judge  of  the 
Primary  Court  of  Claims  of  Huejotzingo,  has  been  for 
three  months  working  unceasingly  to  put  to  date  all  pending 
cases,  which  had  been  accumulating,  due  to  the  fact  that  his 
predecessors,  partly  due  to  indifference  and  partly  to  fear 
of  the  Revolution,  often  absented  themselves,  abandoning 
their  offices.  Among  those  who  most  distinguished  them- 
selves of  these  last  mentioned,  was  a certain  Felipe  Ramirez, 
whose  wife  is  a Huejotzingo  woman,  on  which  account  he 
was  of  course  interested  in  holding  that  position  in  Huejot- 
zingo. The  mother  of  the  lady  in  question  also  found  a 
way  to  take  advantage  of  the  situation,  and  arranged  things 
so  that  those  who  wished  their  cases  attended  to,  had  to 
have  a recommendation  from  her,  if  they  wanted  a favor- 
able judgment.  For  this  she  was  of  course  paid  a certain 
sum,  and  she  managed  to  derive  quite  a fine  income. 

This  by-play  came  to  the  knowledge  of  Mr.  Garcia 
Granados,  and  he  managed  to  obtain  the  Puebla  Munici- 
pality to  offer  the  Judge  Felipe  Ramirez  to  transfer  him 
to  Matamoros,  which  offer  he  declined,  staying  in  Huejot- 


236  Carranza  and  Mexico 

zingo  and  exercising  his  profession  of  lawyer.  This  Mr. 
Ramirez  works  in  harmony  with  the  Pinto  brothers,  and 
the  three  of  them,  openly  antagonize  Acevedo  the  Governor, 
Ramon  Vargas,  the  Judge  and  Sidronio  Primo,  Commis- 
sioner of  the  Ministry,  who  is  an  old  employe  in  this  locality 
and  who  works  together  with  the  other  two  last  mentioned. 

With  the  foregoing  details,  and  prompted  by  the  desire 
to  maintain  order  and  peace  in  this  district,  I beg  you  to 
exert  your  good  influence  with  the  government  of  Puebla, 
to  have  Mr.  Acevedo  return  to  his  post,  and  to  have  Mr. 
Ramon  Vargas  the  present  Judge,  and  also  Mr.  Sidronio 
Primo,  stay  in  their  positions.  The  presence  of  Mr.  Felipe 
Ramirez,  who  still  pretends  to  occupy  the  position  of  Judge 
in  this  District,  is  very  harmful  to  public  interests,  as  is  also 
the  presence  of  the  Pinto  brothers,  so  that  although  I har- 
bor no  feelings  of  personal  enmity  towards  them  for  I do 
not  know  them  except  from  hearsay,  I beg  to  suggest  the  ad- 
vantage of  their  being  removed  from  this  locality,  in  what- 
ever way  you  may  deem  most  appropriate. 

Kindly  forgive  the  length  of  this  letter,  but  I feel  justi- 
fied in  giving  you  all  these  details,  for  the  sake  of  the 
preservation  of  peace  in  this  region,  which  has  some  impor- 
tance due  to  its  relations  to  Puebla  and  Mexico. 

Thanking  you  in  advance  for  whatever  you  may  deem  fit 
to  do  in  the  interests  of  the  honest  citizens  who  have  given 
me  the  above  information,  and  which  I transmit  to  you  con- 
fidentially, I beg  to  remain, 

Very  respy.,  etc.,  etc., 

Eulogio  G.  Gillow, 
Archbishop  of  Oaxaca. 


Appendix 


237 


LETTER  FROM  MINISTER  URRUTIA  TO 
ARCHBISHOP  MORA. 

Mexico,  July  9th,  1913. 

Very  illustrious  Sir  — 

Kindly  allow  me  to  acquit  myself  of  the  pleasant  duty  of 
expressing;  to  you,  very  sincere  thanks  for  the  good  assist- 
ance you  have  been  lending  to  the  Government  in  the  re- 
establishment of  peace, — a task  the  moje  useful  because 
accomplishing  it,  as  you  are  doing,  with  intelligence  and 
common  sense,  it  might  be  able  to  effect  a durable  benefit 
to  the  country. 

In  the  name  of  the  government  to  which  I belong  and 
with  which  you  are  happily  connected,  I earnestly  beg  of 
you  to  continue  your  good  work,  if  possible,  with  more 
energy  than  before. 

In  this  connection  and  prompted  by  the  confidence  which 
your  kindness  invites,  I take-  the  liberty  of  telling  you  that 
some  memorial  services  held  in  honor  of  the  Madero 
brothers,  made  a bad  impression  in  social  circles,  and  es- 
pecially on  the  Government,  and  therefore  I would  ask  of 
you  to  take  such  measures  as  you  may  deem  necessary,  to 
prevent  a repetition  of  demonstrations  of  this  nature,  which 
might  contribute  to  retard  the  success  of  the  work  under- 
taken by  the  Government  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  our 
internal  wars. 

I also  must  call  your  attention  to  the  necessity  of  stop- 
ping at  all  costs,  a certain  person  in  the  clergy,  from  con- 
tinuing his  propaganda  against  the  Government,  and  this 
for  the  same  reasons  as  above  expressed.  With  your  intel- 
ligence and  tact,  I am  sure  you  will  find  an  efficacious  means 
to  put  a stop  to  the  workings  of  the  person  in  question. 

I remain,  etc.,  etc., 

Urrutia. 


GLOSSARY  OF  SPANISH  WORDS. 


Carranzista 

Casas  de 
Vecindad 
ClENTIFICO 


Ciudadela 

COLORADOS 


COMPADRE 


CUARTELAZO 

Don 


Political  follower  of  Venustiano  Car- 
ranza. 

Tenement  houses. 

A group  of  politicians  headed  by  J.  I. 
Limantour,  who  took  as  a basis  of 
their  political  party  some  of  the  Comte 
theories.  They  believed  in  a scien- 
tific government.  The  term  cien- 
tifico  is  now  applied  to  political 
exponents  of  graft  in  politics. 

Citadel. 

Reds,  red-flaggers.  Name  given  to  the 
guerrilla  troops  under  Orozco,  be- 
cause besides  carrying  a red  flag  they 
carried  destruction  everywhere  by  fire 
and  sword. 

Godfather,  an  expression  which  means 
protector,  benefactor, — and  implies 
great  obligations  and  great  sacrifices. 

A military  mutiny.  From  cuartel,  a 
military  barrack. 

Title  of  courtesy  given  to  people  of  the 
better  class.  Formerly  in  Spain, 
when  addressing  a person  of  aristo- 
cratic lineage,  it  was  customary  to 
write  before  the  name, — De  origen 
239 


240 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


Egidos 

Felicista 

Fiesta 

Fomento 


Gachupines 

Gringo 

Hacienda 

Huertista 

Incomunicacion 


Jefe 

Jefe  Politico 


Ley  Fuga 


noble — (of  noble  origin).  It  was 
afterwards  abbreviated  to  D.  O.  N. 
One  should  be  careful  to  use  the  Don 
only  before  the  first  name,  or  together 
with  first  and  second  names,  for  in- 
stance — Don  Porfirio  Diaz,  never 
Don  Diaz,  as  it  implies  an  insulting 
meaning. 

Communal  lands  surrounding  villages 
and  cities  in  Mexico. 

Political  follower  of  Felix  Diaz. 

Holiday,  merry-making. 

Excite,  encourage.  Ministerio  de  Fo- 
mento: the  department  for  the  devel- 
opment of  the  country,  industrially 
and  commercially. 

Nickname  given  to  Spaniards. 

Nickname  used  in  Mexico  and  South 
America  to  designate  Americans. 

Plantation,  ranch,  farm. 

Political  follower  of  Victoriano  Huerta. 

Incommunication.  The  position  of  a 
man  in  prison  who  is  not  permitted  to 
communicate  with  his  friends,  law- 
yers or  any  one  from  the  outside. 

Chief. 

Political  chief.  Head  of  a district 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Governor. 
Under  Diaz  they  had  almost  unlim- 
ited power  for  mischief. 

The  Runaway  Law  — which  was  re- 
sorted to  for  the  purpose  of  doing 
away  with  obnoxious  political  ene- 


Glossary 


241 


Maderista 

Mocho 

Neo-Cientifico 


Pacifico 

Pelado 

Peon 

Plan  De  Ayala 


Plan  De 
Guadalupe 


mies  or  agitators;  while  they  were 
taken  from  one  prison  to  the  other, 
they  were  shot  from  the  back,  and 
the  pretext  was  that  they  had  tried 
to  run  away. 

Political  follower  of  F.  I.  Madero. 

Contemptible  term  to  designate  mem- 
bers of  the  clerical  party  in  Mexico. 

New  scientist.  A political  party  which 
was  a continuation  of  the  old  cien- 
tifico  party.  They  came  into  power 
under  Madero,  and  were  headed  by 
Ernesto  Madero,  uncle  of  Don  F.  I. 
Madero,  and  by  Rafael  Hernandez,  a 
cousin  of  the  president. 

A peaceful  Indian,  one  that  cultivates 
the  land  and  does  not  carry  arms. 

“ Skinned.”  Term  applied  to  a very 
poor  Indian. 

Indian  worker  on  plantation  or  mines. 

Written  by  a school-teacher,  Montano, 
for  Zapata.  It  was  aimed  against 
the  neo-cientificos  in  the  Madero  cab- 
inet,— the  provisional  president  was 
supposed  to  be  P.  Orozco,  and  in  case 
of  his  absence  Emiliano  Zapata.  The 
Plan  was  essentially  an  agrarian  plan, 
local  in  its  ideas  of  reforms. 

A Manifest  written  by  V.  Carranza  to 
rally  the  Mexicans  in  the  overthrow 
of  the  Huerta  dictatorship.  It  did 
not  attempt  to  bring  about  any  re- 
forms,— only  the  elimination  of 

Huerta  and  his  supporters. 


242 


Carranza  and  Mexico 


Plan  De  San 
Luis  Potosi 

PoRFIRISTA 

PORRISTA 


Religion  y 
F UEROS 


VlLLISTA 

Zapatista 


Was  the  political  plan  written  by  F.  I. 
Madero  against  the  Diaz  regime  on 
October  5th,  1910. 

Political  follower  of  Porfirio  Diaz. 

A member  of  the  Porra,  a political  club 
created  by  the  friends  of  F.  I.  Madero, 
supposed  to  be  headed  by  Gustavo 
Madero,  to  fight  and  intimidate  the 
enemies  of  the  Maderistas. 

Battle-cry  of  the  clericals  since  the  revo- 
lution. “ Religion  & Privileges.” 
The  Church  and  the  army  under 
Spanish  rule  had  special  courts  com- 
posed of  either  religious  clerics  or  of 
soldiers,  which  judged  members  of 
the  church  or  soldiers  in  criminal 
cases.  The  Clericals  now  demand  a 
return  of  their  old  privileges. 

Political  follower  of  F.  Villa. 

Political  follower  of  Zapata. 


Date  Due 


AP29’55 


